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Abstract 
This dissertation questions the modem and contemporary promotion of objective and 
Crucifixion-centred models of the Atonement at the expense of the apparently 
'subjective' and 'moral'. I suggest that the idea of revelation as salvific is more 
fundamental to many of the 'exemplarist' models of salvation than the idea of Jesus as a 
moral example, and that the criticisms fired at example-based soteriology are 
inapplicable to soteriology rooted in revelation. I argue that the grounds for its 
exclusion from the status of first-order model should be re-evaluated, and defend it 
against five primary criticisms. First, I argue against the accusation that a revelatory 
model has no foundation in Scripture or Christian tradition, and in so doing I explore 
the relationship between salvation and revelation in The Gospel of John, and in the 
works of Origen, Abailard, GWH Lampe, and Diunitru Staniloae. Second, I dispute the 
assertion that a revelatory model is subjective and entails a Pelagian attitude towards 
divine grace, suggesting that the objective/subjective distinction is a false dichotomy, 
and, taken to extremes, is damaging to soteriology. Third, I contest the perennial 
criticism that a revelatory model would render Christ's death superfluous, suggesting 
rather that such a soteriology might unite history and theology in biblically and 
theologically responsible way. Fourth, I question the claim that a revelatory model 
necessarily excludes the non-Christian from salvation in Christ. Finally, I argue against 
the idea that a revelatory model would have a weak and naive view of sin, suggesting a 
view of sin connected to a revelatory model rooted in (but not identical with) that of 
Augustine of Hippo. 
While much of the dissertation is therefore apologetic, there is also a 
constructive element to the work. In the final chapter I sketch a possible revelatory 
model, connecting ideas such as the identification of God as love, sin as privation and 
apatheia, and the equation of inspiration and infiision. In addition, I point to many of 
the insights inherent in a revelatory model from which, I suggest, soteriology as a whole 
would benefit. The aim of the dissertation, therefore, is to propose a re-evaluation of 
revelatory soteriology as a first-order model, questioning many of the preconceptions 
that currently obstruct it, and indicating reasons for its theological value. 
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Introduction 
The assertion that Jesus of Nazareth is the Saviour of the world has, throughout 
Christian history, naturally led to exploration of the way in which Jesus effected 
salvation. Early Christians drew upon themes and images within their cultural context in 
order to explain both what the world needed saving from, and how this salvation was 
accomplished. In particular, imagery from the contexts of the law-courts, the battlefield, 
religious and cultic life and the market-place were applied to the salvific work of Christ, 
although in the early church these remamed metaphorical and were never developed as 
comprehensive explanations of how salvation took place. In the Middle Ages, Ansebn 
of Bee took the unprecedented step of developing a juridical metaphor into a 
soteriological theory, interpreting God's relationship with humanity and the oeconomy 
of salvation in the light of the legal norms of his own day. The development of salvific 
imagery into soteriological models and even comprehensive theories soon became the 
norm, and models such as satisfaction, Christus Victor, sacrifice and ransom are often 
given the status of first-order models. A fiirther model is recognised as a secondary and 
inferior model, generally regarded as dependent upon the primary models of salvation, 
since its apparently subjective and moral nature renders it inadequate in and of itself as 
an expression of God's redeeming work in Christ. This model, and imagery concerning 
the work of Christ as Teacher or Revealer, is called exemplarism. 
In this essay I question the association of Christ's revelation of God with 
Christ's moral example. I look at the presuppositions underlying condemnation of 
exemplarist and revelatory soteriology, suggesting that what is true of the former does 
not apply to the latter. In the first chapter, I am concerned with the portrayal of both 
exemplarist and revelatory approaches in recent work on soteriology, suggesting that 
the two are erroneously associated, and that there are good reasons for the 
reconsideration of revelation as a first-order model. In Chapters Two and Three, I 
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discuss the theme of revelation m particular parts of Scripture and Christian fradition, 
attesting against the assertion that a revelatory model has no foundation either in the 
Bible or in fradition. In so doing, I aim to demonstrate that much that has been regarded 
as exemplarism is in fact essentially revelatory, and does not fall into the same fraps as a 
model based on example. In addition, I explore many of the premises and themes 
surrounding a revelatory model - particularly concerning the nature of sin, the love of 
God and the relation between the revelation of God in Christ and the salvation of the 
mdividual. In Chapter Four, I sketch a revelatory model of salvation, re-appropriating 
and developing the insights of Augustine of Hippo into the nature of sin and God as 
love. In the Conclusion I return to the problems set out in Chapter One, reviewing the 
kind of revelatory model sketched in Chapter Four in the light of the criticisms of those 
who believe it to be unsatisfactory as a first-order model. 
Unfortunately, there is much that must lie beyond the scope of the current essay. 
In the first place, I do not discuss the nature of models and their relation to metaphors 
and to theories, but instead take the term in a fairly general sense to signify aspects of 
both. Secondly, I deal only with the salvation of the individual, and, while I recognise 
that salvation also takes place within the community and is in an important sense also a 
community phenomenon, I feel that discussing the process of the salvation of the 
individual is sufficient for a dissertation of this size. Thirdly, my concern is with the 
process of salvation in this life, although it is assumed that salvation is an ongoing 
process that contmues beyond the current world, and that salvation in its fullest sense is 
experienced only in the afterlife. Fourthly and finally, the accomplishment of salvation 
discussed here has a christological focus rather than a pneumatological one, although it 
is recognised that the work of the Holy Spu-it in the life of the individual (and the 
community) is an important and coimected subject within soteriology. The limitations 
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and presuppositions of this essay are necessitated by the enormity and complexity of the 
subject matter, and I can only recognise the partiality of the idea I suggest. 
Chapter One 
Exemplarism, Exemplarists and Subjective Soteriology: Conclusive 
Condemnation ? 
Among the diverse theories, models, and metaphors of the Atonement is that inspired by 
the writings of Peter Abailard and developed by Hastings Rashdall. This model is 
generally called exemplarism, based upon the perception that its primary tenet is that 
Christ's salvific efficacy lies in the moral example that Christ gave himianity to imitate. 
The model is also known as the 'moral' theory of the Atonement, since it is thought that 
the model entails that good ethical practice is the key to salvation, and sometimes the 
'subjective' theory of the Atonement, since it is thought that, according to the model, 
Christ effects not an objective change in the relationship between God and humanity, 
but a subjective change m demonstrating to humanity how it is that they should live. 
Such a model has undergone a critical response, often in terms that constitute an 
accusation of Pelagianism. This is perhaps most unambiguously and vehemently 
encapsulated by Alister McGrath's critique at the end of his article, 'The Moral Theory 
of the Atonement'. Rashdall is taken as the primary representative of exemplarism, and 
thus the chief focus of McGrath's attack. The main thrust of the attack is upon 
Rashdall's competence as an historian, particularly with respect to his mterpretation of 
Abailard, and his awareness of the Aufklarting and of Kant. Criticisms of his theology 
are also fired at the end of the article, and are as follows. 
1.1 McGrath on Rashdall 
First, other models of the Atonement emphasise the primacy of God's grace in 
our salvation, that is, what God achieves, through Christ, for us and even despite us. In 
contrast, Rashdall's model seems to suggest that humans earn their own salvation 
through moral works. According to McGrafh, Rashdall's theory 'amounts to nothing 
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less than a doctrine of salvation by merit.'' Secondly, and consequent upon the first 
criticism, Rashdall's theory has too high an expectation with respect to what human 
beings can achieve morally. McGrath writes, 'It does not take account of the weakness 
and frailty of human nature.'^  As a result, Rashdall's model demands that humans must 
be morally perfect i f they are to be saved, since, as Kant has argued, freedom to behave 
morally implies an obligation to do so. According to McGrath, ' i f man can advance to 
moral perfection, it necessarily follows that he must do so.'^  
Thirdly, the horrific himian activity of the twentieth century, particularly during 
the first and second world wars, demonstrates that Rashdall's optimistic view of human 
nature is inaccurate. McGrath regards the atrocities that humans have inflicted upon one 
another as conclusive evidence for the existence of sin in the human race as a whole. He 
writes, ' I f ever there was a period in which it was clear that man was a sinner, it is the 
twentieth century.''* The fourth criticism concerns the question of whether humanity is 
'in captivity' to sm, or whether the notion of being captive to sin is a crippling illusion. 
While the revelation of God's love for humanity, and humanity's responsive love for 
God, are both necessary parts of any soteriology, 'man needs more than education about 
God - he needs liberation from the forces which imprison him.'^ Furthermore, 
Rashdall's idea that once man is made aware of his own situation he can 'effect his 
salvation' is incorrect if, as McGrath holds, the situation is one of captivity and not 
freedom, from which a person needs to be saved by another being. McGrath illustrates 
this difference between his and Rashdall's view of humanity's situation using the 
metaphor of freedom from and incarceration in a prison. McGrath's theory of 
humanity's situation is illustrated by 'a man in prison: upon being told that he is in 
' Mister McGrath, "The Moral Theory of the Atonement', in The Scottish Journal of Theology 38 (1985), 
p.219 
^ McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
^ McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
" McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
^ McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
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prison, he is not thereby in a significantly better position - he still requires liberation.'* 
In contrast, Rashdall's model implies that man believes himself to be in prison, whereas 
actually he is free: 'upon being informed of the true situation, he is thus freed from false 
estimations of his position, and is able to act accordingly.'^  If, as McGrath asserts, 
humanity is m some sense 'captive' to sin, then the theory that Rashdall propounds is 
ineffective since it assumes that humanity is free and offers no objective liberation from 
captivity. 
Fifthly, Rashdail's high estimation of human free will is naive concerning those 
who suffer from psychological disorders that prevent them exercising their free will 
fully. Furthermore, Rashdail's view implies that, since salvation must be brought about 
through moral perfection, those who suffer from psychological disorders preventing 
them from acting morally cannot be saved. McGrath points out that Rashdall's view 
'offers no hope of salvation to those who are slave to habits'.* Increased awareness of 
psychological disorders such as kleptomania, dipsomania, and psychosis means that 
theologians after Rashdall are more open to the 'idea of enslavement to alien forces.'^ 
Rashdall's soteriology, by contrast, 'denies salvation to those who are simply not 
capable of doing the will of God.''" 
This summary of McGrath's criticisms of Rashdall's model demonstrates the 
madequacy of a soteriology based solely on Christ's example. A purely exemplarist 
model fails to take accoimt of the saving grace of God and the depth and complexity of 
human sin. I f McGrath is accurate in his interpretation of Rashdall's work, then 
Rashdall's model may rightly be condemned as naive Pelagianism. Before consigning 
Rashdall's work to the flames, however, it may be helpfiil to reconsider his work and to 
question whether this understanding of Rashdall is entirely accurate and therefore 
* McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
' McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
' McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
' McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
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whetiier McGrath's criticisms are undoubtedly justified. Is the model Rashdall suggests 
really based upon the idea of Christ as an example for humanity to follow? Does it 
actually imply that humans effect their own salvation by moral living, and so belittle the 
role of God's grace in the work of Atonement? 
1.2 Rashdall Revisited 
Rashdall's soteriological model is sketched in his 1892 and 1894 sermons, 
'Revelation by Character' and 'The Abailardian Doctrine of Atonement', published in 
1898 in Doctrine and Development: University Sermons. His theory was developed at 
greater length in the Bampton lectures of 1915, published in 1919 as The Idea of 
Atonement in Christian Theology. In the earlier work, Rashdall describes hunself as 
'franslating'" fraditional Christian ideas into the language of modem thought, while in 
the later work Rashdall seems more aware of the distinctiveness of his own thought 
with respect to contemporary theology. 
While it is the element of Christ's moral example that is drawn out by the term 
'exemplarism', it seems to me that the elements of Christ as revealing God's nature and 
inspiring human love are at least as important to Rashdall himself In The Idea of the 
Atonement in Christian Theology, Rashdall discloses three aspects of how salvation 
takes place when he writes that the object of Christ's entire Incarnation - life, death, and 
Resurrection - is to '...make knovra God's nature and His will, to instruct men in the 
way of salvation, and to excite in them that love which would inspire sorrow for past sin 
and give the power to avoid sin in the future.'*^ The second of these three aspects is 
frequently taken to be constitutive of exemplarism, and yet it can be seen that 
Rashdall's theory involves a three-fold soteriology. This comprises, fu-st, the revelation 
'' Hastings Rashdall, Doctrine and Development: University Sermons (London: Methuen and Co., 1898), 
p.vii 
Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (London: Macmillan & Co., 1919), p. 
443 
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of God as loving and compassionate, secondly, ethical teaching and example, and, 
thirdly, inspiration to love God because of the love shown by God. The revelatory 
aspect of soteriology is also evident in 'Revelation by Character','^  where Rashdall 
writes that the Christian revelation is two-fold, revealing both the nature of God, and 
what humanity was originally intended to be. However, he writes, the two are integrally 
linked. This is because, while Rashdall does not identify God and humanity, he believes 
there to be a union between the divine and the human natures based on humanity's 
creation in the image of God. Consequently, in revealing what God is like, Christ 
reveals what humanity was eternally meant to be. Conversely, in setting forth the ideal 
of human life, Christ reveals the eternal nature of God. Again, in 'The Abailardian 
Doctrine of the Atonement', Rashdall emphasises the revelatory and inspiring aspects of 
Christ's work alongside the exemplarist. He displays his own soteriology when he 
writes that according to Abailard 'The whole life of Christ, the whole revelation of God 
which is constituted by that life, excites the love of man, moves his gratitude, shows him 
what God would have him be, enables him to be in his imperfect way what Christ alone 
was perfectly, and so makes at-one-ment, restores between God and man the union 
which sin alone has destroyed.'*'* This demonstrates that Rashdall's theory concerns 
only partially the notion of Christ as Example, also suggesting the themes of Christ the 
Illuminator or Revealer, and Christ as Inspirer or Infuser'^ of love. While McGrath 
focuses solely on Rashdall's exemplarist aspects, a subtler soteriology is evident, and 
may be worthy of soteriological consideration. With this in mind, I shall consider the 
place of Christ's revelation and pedagogy** involved in allegedly 'exemplarist' 
Rashdall, 'Revelation by Character', in Doctrine and Development, p.llO - 111 
Rashdall, 'The Abailardian Doctrine of the Atonement', in Doctrine and Development, p. 137 
While Rashdall speaks of 'inspiration', implying a natural psychological response, Abailard speaks of 
'infijsion', suggesting a stronger sense of divine intervention. The two are complementary, and it is 
suggested in Chapter Four that, because God is love, the natural response of being inspired is 
indistinguishable from the divine gift of infiision. The two are therefore be used synonymously. 
I assume Lessing's association of pedagogy and revelation, according to which pedagogy is pertinent to 
the individual, while revelation is pertinent to humanity as a whole: 'What education is to the individual 
man, revelation is to the whole human race.' (Lessing's Theological Writmgs, trans, and ed. Henry 
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soteriologies, and shall speak, where appropriate, of revelatory or pedagogical models. I 
shall now look at Rashdall's soteriology as a whole, since this will shed light on the 
partially revelatory soteriology he propounds, and will offer a larger context to facilitate 
later discussion and critical development. 
While Rashdall asserts the need for theological reconstruction where elements of 
Christianity have become incomprehensible or morally abhorrent, he insists upon the 
need to base contemporary theology upon the Christian tradition as it has developed 
since the time of Christ. In consequence, Rashdall begins in his later work by 
establishing the roots of his own theory of the Atonement within Christian tradition. 
While Rashdall is rightly criticised for his historical inaccuracy, particularly with 
respect to Abailard'', Rashdall's treatment of salvation in Christian history is significant 
because it highlights what he regards the primary elements of the Atonement to be. The 
model Rashdall derives from his historical survey is important as theology in and of 
itself and regardless of the fact that Rashdall interpreted history in accordance with his 
own soteriological theory, as historians generally now agree. 
According to Rashdall's historical appraisal, the Atonement was not a part of 
Jesus' teaching and (with the exception of Paul) the Biblical writers, Apostolic Fathers 
and early fathers up imtil the time of Irenaeus expounded no 'definite theory' of 
substitution or expiation, that is, those metaphors that have been developed into theories 
of Christ's death such as ransom to the devil, or as sacrifice to or satisfaction of God. 
Furthermore, in much of the early chiu-ch as in Rashdall's own theology, the salvific 
work of Christ is related to the entire Incarnation of Christ - life, death, and 
Resurrection - rather than to Jesus' death exclusively. 
Chadwick, London, 1956, quoted in Timothy Gorringe, Redeeming Time: Atonement through Education 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1986), p.l 
Rashdall sees Abailard's emphasis upon Christ's salvific revelation as a theory, and erroneously 
believes him to hold it exclusively of other models of Atonement. 
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Christ's death is primarily revelatory, 'completing that revelation of the nature 
and character of God which it was the object of Christ's whole mission to set forth.''* 
However, far from reducing the significance of Jesus' death, Rashdall sees Jesus' death 
as the supreme instantiation of God's love for humanity: the revelation of God's nature 
as loving is found pre-eminently in the self-sacrificing death of Christ because, as Jesus 
himself articulated, laying down one's life for one's fiiends is the ultimate expression of 
love. Rashdall appeals to the words of Peter the Lombard, conveying the Abailardian 
idea that God's love saves humanity by initiating a loving response: 'So great a pledge 
of love having been given us, we are both moved and kindled to love God who did such 
great things for us; and by this we are justified, that is, bemg loosed from our sins we 
are made just. The death of Christ therefore justifies us, inasmuch as through it charity 
is stirred up in our hearts.'" 
One oft-raised criticism of this theory is that a 'subjective' interpretation of 
Jesus' death as the revelation of God's love makes the crucifixion meaningless: being 
executed for someone does not express one's love for them unless one is accomplishing 
something for them in dying. Therefore, many have argued, Jesus' death must have an 
'objective' purpose, such as removing sin by way of a sacrifice or freeing humanity by 
means of a ransom, in order for the 'subjective' element to be meaningful. In the words 
of Rashdall's rival, James Denney, ' . . . ( I do not know of) any interpretation of Christ's 
death which enables us to regard it (Jesus' death) as a demonstration of love to siimers, 
i f this vicarious or substitutionary character is denied.'^° Among the several replies 
Rashdall makes to Denney, of importance to revelatory soteriology is the idea that 
Christ's death was the necessary outcome and cuhnination of the way in which Jesus led 
his life. Jesus was executed because he never ceased to live in accordance with God's 
Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement, p.437 
" Sent Hi Dist. xix.i, cited in Rashdail, The Idea of Atonement, p.371, my emphases. 
James Denney, The Death of Christ: Its Place and Interpretation in the New Testament (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1902), p. 172 
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will and to serve himianity, even to the extent of challenging die leaders of the society 
and the established framework of presuppositions and rules in which they lived. 
Rashdall argues that Jesus had no thought of offering a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins 
of the whole world. Rather, he regarded himself as persisting in his task of preparing 
and inaugurating the Kingdom in obedience to God - a task he persisted in even to the 
point of death. 
Several instances of revelatory soteriology developed in the light of Rashdall's 
thesis have used the notion of the revelation of God suffering with his creation to 
demonsfrate further the necessity of the Crucifixion on a solely 'subjective' view of the 
Atonement. Interestingly, Rashdall makes less of this idea than later theologians, 
primarily because of his view of the relation between God and the human Jesus.^ ' Like 
'Suffering God' theologians, however, Rashdall does reject the idea of divine 
impassibility, which, he argues, is not essentially Christian but Aristotelian. 
Furthermore, he argues, suffering is necessarily concomitant with love where the object 
of that love is in a state of moral or spiritual deterioration, or is suffering and in pain: 
' . . . i f God loves mankind. He must needs suffer over himian sin and human pain.... A 
God who could contemplate such a world as ours without suffering would not be a 
loving God, nor would He be in the least like Christ.'^ The model Rashdall suggests 
emphasises the love of God for creation, and the costliness of this love for God because 
of the suffering it entails. 
'^ Despite denying divine impassibility, Rashdall argues that we cannot hold that God's sufferings are 
identical with a particular person's pain or even with Jesus' Passion. To do so would either be pantheistic 
in identifying God and humanity absolutely, or would fall into the traps of Modalism, equating the 
Persons of God the Father and God the Son entirely and without qualification, and distinguishing between 
them only in their manifestations. It is even more certain in Rashdall's mind that we carmot think of God 
as actually dying in the person of Jesus, for this would be to posit an oxymoron and a logical 
impossibility because of the nature of God as etemal. In the attempt to balance the suffering nature of 
God with the fear of making God 'too human', Rashdall argues that we may say that the suffering Christ 
reveals the suffering God, but not that the suffering Christ is the suffering God. God did not suffer in the 
human Jesus, but God's love was revealed in Christ's self-sacrificing love because of God's presence in 
the human Jesus: 'The sufferings of Christ reveal to us the love of Christ, and the love of Christ reveals 
the love of God.' {The Idea of Atonement, p.451) 
Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement, p. 452 - 453 
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Contrary to McGrath, Rashdall does view humanity as captive to sin, and in 
need of liberation or salvation. However, departing from conventional understandings 
of sin, Rashdall views sin as a lack of love^ ,^ and asserts that Christ overcame and 
overcomes human sin by revealing the love of God, teaching God's will, and initiating a 
response of love from humanity. But it is not simply the removal of or liberation from 
sin that constitutes salvation according to Rashdall's view; rather, life in the Kingdom 
of Heaven is the fiillest manifestation of salvation. For this reason Rashdall, 
incorporating the element of the ransom metaphor that affirms himianity's liberation 
from sin into his own model, writes that: 'The prominent thought (of salvation 
according to the Gospels) is not what Christ delivered men from, but what He bought 
them fi)r. He bought them for His kingdom. He made them subjects of His spiritual 
empire, at the cost of His own death. That is the ultimate purpose of all Christ's work, of 
which even the deliverance from the slavery of sin is but a negative and a subordinate 
aspect.'^ '* 
Rashdall's theory of Atonement is, in one respect, seemingly paradoxical. 
Unlike other, more 'objective' soteriological metaphors and theories, Jesus does not 
instigate a different state of affairs with respect to humanity's status before God, but 
merely reveals an eternally present situation - God's love for humanity, and the union 
between the divine and human natures.^ ^ On the other hand, Rashdall's theory suggests 
a greater change in the situation, in that salvation has a real and observable effect on 
those who experience it, while accordmg to some other metaphors and theories 
justification or satisfaction are not really part of the individual's experience, but are 
merely regarded as such in the sight of God. On this point, Rashdall writes that'.. .the 
justifying effect of Christ's work is a real effect, not a mere legal fiction. Christ's work 
really does make men better, instead of merely supplying the groxmd why they should 
" Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement, p. 450 
'The Abailardian Doctrine of the Atonement' in Doctrine and Development, p. 130, my emphasis. 
'Revelation by Character' in Doctrine and Development, p. 110-111 
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be considered good or be excused the punishment of sin, without really being made any 
better than they were before.'^ ^ 
This brief overview of Rashdall's thought suggests that, contrary to McGrath, 
Rashdall's soteriology is not based merely on the idea of Christ as a moral example to 
be followed in order to earn salvation. Rather, it is also rooted in the revelation in Christ 
of God's love for the world, and the inspiration or infusion of love in humanity because 
of Christ. Furthermore, Rashdall's theory exhibits positive elements valuable to our 
understanding of the Atonement. For instance, a revelatory model differs from most 
western soteriology because it implies that the entirety of Jesus' Incarnation is salvific, 
and does not regard salvation as taking place solely on the Cross (a tendency I shall 
henceforth refer to as cruciocentric). Again, Rashdall and his successors move away 
from the idea of divine impassibility, and suggest that God actually suffers for his 
creation, insisting that God's love is more than a principled duty or concern devoid of 
actual compassion, or comparable with a moral but emotionally indifferent ruler. 
Furthermore, a revelatory model suggests that salvation is not just something being 
removed, but also something being given, that is, a new kind of life lived in the 
knowledge and presence of God's love. Rashdall also shows the way in which salvation 
may have an actual rather than just a theoretical effect upon the individual, so that 
salvation is conceived of as pertaining (at least partially) in the present world, and is not 
seen solely as a fixture promise of immortality (though it is seen as this also). 
Such positive aspects are indispensable to our understanding of salvation, the 
nature of God, and person and work of Christ. While Rashdall is in some ways more of 
a product of his age than some other soteriologies, there appears to be much of lasting 
value to theology inherent in his work. As such, it might be expected that aspects of 
Rashdall's thought would be found, alongside other models, in soteriological 
26 Rashdall, 'The Abailardian Doctrine of the Atonement', in Doc/r/«e and Development, p.l37 
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scholarship written since 1919. With this in mind, I shall turn to more recent work on 
the Atonement, in order to ascertam the place of Rashdall's model and the insights it 
offers in later twentieth-century thought. 
1.3 Rashdall: The Consensus 
In The Actuality of Atonement, Gunton argues that use of metaphor is crucial to 
the advance of human knowledge and understanding in all disciplines, and that 
Enlightenment rationalism, represented by Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, has 
deprived theology by its reductionist approach. Gimton recognises three metaphors of 
the Atonement: victory over the daemons, the satisfaction of justice, and sacrifice. These 
metaphors have differing aspects appealed to m Gunton's hypothesis, and each seems to 
supplement the others' defects in some respect. In stressing that these are indeed 
metaphors, and should not be regarded as theories to be pushed to their logical 
conclusions, Gunton relieves the traditional imagery of the Atonement of many of the 
challenges by liberal theologians in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
metaphor may not be regarded as 'wrong' as such, and it is with respect to the positive 
elements of the victory, justice and sacrifice themes rather than, for instance, any 
negative connotation these metaphors may have on the nature of God, that Gunton 
believes the metaphors to be pertinent. While the metaphors are primarily focused on 
Jesus' death on the Cross, Gunton also regards them as expressions of Jesus' 
Resurrection, and imaginatively extends them to God's activity in creation and the 
eschaton. 
As the title. The Actuality of Atonement, might suggest, Gunton's concern is to 
establish 'objective' approaches to the Atonement over and against 'subjective' 
approaches. These latter, Gunton argues, result m the belittlement of grace and the 
belief that humans can achieve their awn salvation. He comments pointedly that 'The 
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Christian church still stands or falls by whether it proclaims and lives by the Gospel of 
the liberating grace of God, or whether its life degenerates into some form of self-
salvation.'^' In Gimton's view, exemplarist and subjective views are 'different aspects 
of a single approach to a topic'?* In reference to Schleiermacher's subjective view, 
Gunton suggests that it is new-fangled because it 'differs from tradition', precisely in 
not being a satisfaction or sacrificial model and in not teaching 'that on the cross Jesus 
in some way or other underwent the divine judgement on human sin'.^' Gunton does not 
include the idea of Christ as Pedagogue, Example or Teacher among his primary 
metaphors, and, while recognising that Christendom would be bereft were it not to 
recognise Jesus' moral example as important, his discussion of the theme consists in 
large part of the four following criticisms of it. 
First, a 'largely exemplarist' approach is mistaken because it only takes into 
account certain parts of the Bible. Exemplarism, argues Gunton, tends to concentrate on 
one specific text and to isolate it from the rest of Scripture, thus removing its proper 
context and framework of interpretation. He writes, ' . . . i t takes passages from the Bible 
out of context and makes what is a part, and a part consequent on the priority of divine 
initiative, into aknost the whole'.Secondly, an exemplarist model does not take fiill 
account of the qualitatively unique nature of Jesus: 'Jesus is an example because he and 
he alone is the incarnate Son who by the enabling of the Holy Spirit remained unfallen 
where we universally fall'.^' According to Gimton's interpretation of'exemplarism', all 
humans have the ability to achieve the moral perfection of Christ. This is not only 
problematic because it seems implausible, but, additionally, it does not take into accoimt 
Jesus' divine nature. Thirdly, Jesus' Passion dominates the entire Gospel narratives and 
" Colin E. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian 
Tradition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988) p.lOl 
Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 156 
^' Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p.l3 
"^ Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 158 
'^ Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 158 
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the Epistles, and so any soteriology must be cniciocentric. I f an 'exemplarist' 
soteriology is taken to be cruciocentric, however, it renders Jesus' death no more 
significant than that of a martyr such as Socrates. While there is the element of 
martyrdom in Christ's death, it is also clear fi-om Scripture that the Crucifixion is to be 
regarded as something qualitatively different and as decreed by God. Gunton writes, 
'...the death of Jesus is first of all to be understood as part of the divine purpose of 
redemption. In the language of sacrifice, God 'gives up' or hands over his Son to 
death.' An 'exemplarist' view, argues Gunton, fails to take account of the Scriptural 
view that Jesus' death is a divinely ordained event as well as an act of self-sacrifice on 
the part of a human being. Fourthly, Gunton, like McGrath, objects to a merely 
'exemplarist' soteriology because it does not take human sin seriously, and because it 
overrates the ability of humans to save themselves: '...the human condition is too 
enmeshed in evil to be restored by its own agency.'^ ^ Furthermore, such a model seems 
to imply that sin is solely moral, whereas in fact the problem is 'encompassing all 
dimensions of human existence and its context.'^ '* Even supposing it were possible for 
humans to be as morally perfect as Christ, sin in all its aspects would not be conquered. 
There must, he argues, be a redemptive act in which God takes the initiative to correct 
the disordered himian condition. 
At the root of Gimton's suspicion of 'exemplarism' seems to be a sharp divide 
between objective and subjective approaches, and the related question of whether Christ 
accomplishes for us a new ontological reality, or whether he 'merely' reveals to us 
something of significance. This might be re-expressed in the language of M. KShler, 
who asks whether Christ initiated a new situation, or whether it is rather that he revealed 
certain insights concerning an eternal and unchanging situation.^ ^ In Gunton's view, an 
Gimton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 159 
" Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 159 
Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 160 
Zur Lehre von der Versdhnung. Dogmatische Zeitfragen II (1898), cited in McGrath, MTA, p.211 
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'exemplarist' model would suggest the latter, while a substitutionary view of the work 
of Christ asserts the former, and it is this view that Gunton supports. He writes, 'The 
real evil of the world is faced and healed ontologically in the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus.'^ ^ Gunton describes what a sound view of sm and of salvation 
would involve, and defines this in contrast to what 'exemplarism' is perceived by him to 
be. The problem with which Atonement deals is objective and theological, 'it does not 
consist primarily in morally wrong acts whose effect is on human life alone and can 
therefore be rectified by merely human remedial action, but in a disrupted relationship 
with the creator'. In the Ught of what we have seen of Rashdall's soteriology, we may 
question how accurate Gunton's view of 'exemplarism' is. For instance, the idea that 
'the problem' with which the Atonement deals is 'morally wrong acts' is contrary to 
Rashdall's view of sin as a lack of love. Again, the suggestion that sin 'can be rectified 
by merely human remedial action' is contrary to the central place attributed to Christ by 
Rashdall, and to the idea that Christ was able to reveal God and so save himianity 
precisely because he was not just another human being but was also God himself. 
Gunton's work proved to be indicative of what was to come in later soteriology. 
In 1992 a further review of contemporary soteriology emerged, once again treating 
Rashdallian approaches with short shrift. Mclntyre's The Shape of Soteriology is a 
scholarly treatment of the relation between the different models^ * that have been used in 
connection with the Atonement. Mclntyre argues against the view that interpretation 
and data form two separate halves of a fact, contesting instead that data include 
interpretation. Arguing that the different models may all co-exist and enrich one another 
like stars within a constellation, Mclntyre emphasises the role of the different models as 
interpretations of Christ's death designed to speak of the Crucifixion at different 
^ Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 159. cf 5. 1 below 
Gunton, The Actuality of Atonemera, p. 160 
Models differ from the metaphors dealt with by Gunton in that the model constitutes the basic analogy 
for the theory, whereas the metaphor is the means by which the theory develops. 
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dimensions or levels. In offering an interpretive description of a phenomenon or event 
(such as the Crucifixion), a model propounds a provisional 'ontological claim', that is, it 
puts forward a particular theory concerning Jesus' death. However, these theories are 
oblique and analogy is employed in forming the models, since a model suggests only 
one facet of Jesixs' death, and is normally understood through knowledge of a 
comparable phenomenon, such as sacrifice or ransom. In other words, the different 
models are 'realistic', but 'indirectly' so; because of the nature of the Atonement 'we do 
not know and we cannot describe these subjects other than in terms of the models and 
metaphors.'^ ^ 
Example is treated as the penultimate model of thirteen, and is the only 
interpretation to be designated a 'second order model'. Immediately upon it being 
mentioned, Mclntyre outlines three criticisms that would prevent 'exemplarism' taking 
its place alongside other models as a first-order model. First, Mclntyre echoes Deimey's 
objection concerning the need for another model in order to explain of what Christ's 
death is an example: 'the death of Christ is only an example i f we first define what its 
nature in itself is, so that what is to be imitated then becomes clear.' Secondly, Mclntyre 
shares McGrath's anxiety about the depths of human sinfiihiess. Humanity is unable to 
live up to Christ's example, and a person cannot save him or herself but needs to be 
redeemed by another. He writes, 'The second difficulty... is that it presupposes that 
mankind has the moral and spiritual ability to imitate the example of Jesus Christ. But 
the absence of such ability in mankind is the very circumstance which made atonement 
a necessity in the first place.' Thirdly, he suggests, an example is an inadequate way of 
redeeming humanity. He writes, 'an example as such is not necessarily redemptive. In 
fact, quite the reverse, for the perfect obedience of one man to the will of God, in spite 
" John Mclntyre, The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ (Edinburgh, T. 
and T. Clark, 1992), p.75 
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of the sufferings entailed by such obedience, might show up himian disobedience in an 
even worse light than it would be without such an example.''"' 
Eruditely foreseeing the possibility of a revelatory model which would be 
regarded as a development of an 'exemplarist' model, Mclntyre points out the defects of 
such a theory as if to eliminate it while it is still in embryonic form. A revelatory model 
could only be considered a second-order model, for the same reasons that 
'exemplarism' could, and, in addition, it lacks biblical and historical foundation. 
Mclntyre argues, 'There is virtually no biblical evidence for regarding 'revelation' as a 
soteriological model, worthy to be ranked along with the others we have examined, nor 
has it established itself in the history of docfrine.' 
Further criticism of 'non-objective' approaches to the Atonement is to be found 
in White's 1991 book Atonement and Incarnation, which distinguishes not between the 
'objective' and the 'subjective' views, but, rather more insightfully, between 
'constitutive' and 'revelatory' models. The purpose of the book is to insist upon the 
necessity of constitutive models, and to highlight the shortcomings of revelatory 
approaches. White provides a definition of constitutive approaches, as follows. A 
constitutive model is, first, one that entails that salvation is dependent upon the Christ 
event; secondly, one that sees the occiurence of the Christ-event and of Atonement as a 
divine achievement, necessarily going beyond revelation, and, thirdly, one that sees this 
achievement as significant for humanity as a whole.^ ^ It is noteworthy that White 
includes in his definition of a constitutive model that it necessarily goes beyond 
revelation, and so excludes a revelatory approach from being constitutive from the 
outset. This mirrors the way in which objective and subjective approaches are often 
assumed to be polar opposites in the other works we have considered. 
^ Mclntyre, The Shape ofSoteriology, p.49 
Mclntyre, The Shape ofSoteriology, p.50 
"•^  Vernon AVhite, Atonement and Incarnation: An Essay in Universalism and Particularity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.30 
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The significance of White's work for the current essay lies in his recognition of 
the problem, for a revelatory model, of claiming that Christ is of universal salvific 
significance for the entire world, rather than just for those who explicitly follow him. 
While so-called 'constitutive' models of the Atonement claim that Christ accomplished 
a metaphysical reality effective regardless of whether people know about it or not, the 
salvific efficacy of a revelatory model depends upon the perception of the individual of 
the revelation, and the transformation consequent upon this. I f Jesus' life and death are 
salvific because of what they reveal about God, does this not imply that the Christ-event 
saves only those who have heard of Christ, and who are transformed by the revelation 
of God's love? Is the Christ-event salvific only for those who know of it, and is it 
devoid of universal significance? 
To deny that Christ's life and death has any significance for people who have 
not heard of him is indeed, according to White, the logical conclusion of the work of 
Maurice Wiles, whose view of the Christ-event as an effective cause within history to 
transform people's lives has lead him to assert that to look for some universal 
metaphysical accomplishment is to chase a 'will o' the wisp'.'*^ For Wiles, the Christ-
event involves the revelation of God and the consequential transformation of the 
individual, or, in Wiles' terminology, 'historical effectiveness'.'" There is no 'elusive 
something more','*' and, as a result, claims White, Christ can be of no significance for 
those who have not heard of him. While beginning fi-om the opposite starting-point, 
John Hick reaches a similar conclusion about the significance of Jesus for those who 
have not heard of him. In arguing for the revelation of God in faiths other than 
Christianity, Hick is concerned to show that the Christ-event is of significance only to 
those who know of it, and that non-Christian individuals may be transformed by the 
Maurice Wiles, The Remaking of Christian Doctrine: The Hulsean Lectures (London: SCM Press, 
1974), p.82 
^ Wiles, Christian Doctrine, p.81 
Wiles, Christian Doctrine, p.81 
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divine disclosure of their own faiths and traditions. As such, the Christ-event is not seen 
as the unique revelation of God's love, but is reduced to 'one of the points at which God 
has been and still is creatively at work within human life', whose meaning and 
significance lies not in any unique content or 'additional truth' but in the dynamism of 
the revelation as a 'visible story'.''* Carl E. Braaten expresses the dilemma confronting a 
revelatory soteriology to which Wiles and Hick are possible responses when he writes 
that ' I f the special status of Jesus Christ must be explicated by the term "revelation" 
then we are driven either to deny that God reveals Himself elsewhere... or to reduce 
Jesus Christ to the level of other revelations.''*^ While it is entirely valid to claim that 
other religions experience genuine revelation of the divine and yet that Christ is the 
supreme and qualitatively unique revelation, the crux of the problem that Braaten 
highlights is that, i f revelation is to be identified with salvation, all the revelations of the 
divine in other religions and in human history must be regarded as saviours. Even 
supposing that Christ were to be regarded as the supreme Saviour and all others 
regarded as 'smaller' saviours, this would still be contrary to the Christian insistence 
that Christ alone is Saviour, and that all salvation is 'in Christ'. How can a revelatory 
soteriology that affirms the revelation of God m other faiths and experiences be 
considered a first-order model given its apparent incapacity to view the whole of 
salvation as taking place in Christ? Alternatively, how can the salvation of non-
Christians be seen to be 'in Christ' i f it consists in the revelation of God through 
entirely different people or experiences than the Christ-event? 
1.4 Conclusive Condemnation? 
In spite of the criticisms and difficulties facing a revelatory soteriology, there are 
possible reasons why some forms of the model which would be or have been called 
^ Hick, 'Evil and Incarnation', in Michael Goulder (ed.), Incarnation and Myth: The Debate Continued 
(LoaAon: SCM Press, 1979), p.82 
••^  Carl E . Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 14, cited White, Incarnation and Atonement, p.23 
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'exemplarism' deserve reconsideration as a first-order model alongside the other 
'objective' or 'traditional' models. In the first place, this kind of model would hold 
together Jesus' Incarnation, death and Resurrection. This tendency may help to 
counterbalance the predominantly western cruciocentric tendencies of other models. In 
addition, a pedagogical approach, necessarily attentive to the earthly life and teaching of 
Christ as well as to his death and Resurrection, may prevent the distinction between 'the 
Jesus of history' and 'the Christ of faith' from becoming an actual separation in the 
mind of theologians and laypersons alike. Secondly, a pedagogical model may prove to 
be one of the models most intelligible to a contemporary individual. It is, as Rashdall 
insightfully observed, the model most often preached in the community of faith. 
Rashdall writes: 
But when he [the theologian] leaves the cave of theological formulae and comes down into the 
world to speak to the hearts and consciences of men, then we find it is usually of the character of 
God revealed in Christ that he speaks, of the love of Christ for man in life and in death, of the 
demand which that revelation makes for answering love, of the example of Christ, of the hope 
inspired by His Resurrection, of the assurance which all this work of Christ brings with it of 
forgiveness, renewal, and spiritual life for all mankind.'** 
Thirdly, revelatory soteriology is worthy of reconsideration because it 
recognises that the continuing process of salvation has a real effect on the believer. A 
pedagogical model perceives the on-going work of God in the world through those who 
have experienced God's love and who, in turn, may reveal God's love through their 
example and teaching. In this way, a revelatory approach would be open, for instance, to 
the idea of the presence of God in the saints or in individuals endowed with a particular 
degree or a certain kind of char ism. Furthermore, this sort of approach would highlight 
the idea that it is not merely the removal of sin that constitutes salvation, but a life lived 
in fellowship with God, and with awareness of his love and purpose for creation. 
Fourthly, while other models emphasise the 'objective' aspect of salvation, that is, the 
Rashdall, 'The Abailardian Doctrine of the Atonement', in Doctrine and Development, p.l42 
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saving grace of God, a revelatory model has the potential to balance the stress on 'what 
God did for us' with a recognition of human free will. While maintaining the insistence 
upon God's salvific work in the person of Christ, revelatory soteriology may also have 
the ability to recognise humanity's free response to God's offer of salvation, and the 
constant striving of the individual to become, through grace, that for which God created 
them. On a revelatory model, this would not suggest that humans achieve moral 
perfection in order to effect their salvation, but rather that to attempt to be that which 
God intended humans to be is an expression of faith in God and love for him. In this 
case, revelatory soteriology could not only avoid the pitfalls of a 'salvation by works' 
hypothesis, but also balance the 'objective' models that, taken by themselves, would 
reign supreme at the expense of necessitating a docfrine of predestination. In relation to 
this foxuth point, it is possible that a revelatory model would encourage contemplation 
of the human as well as the divine nature of Jesus, thus avoiding a one-sided 
Christology. This may stimulate a more general understanding of what it is to be 
human, in its original intended, and, because of the contrasting disparity, in its fallen, 
state. Fifthly, a pedagogical approach, emphasising the revelation of God as love, may 
redress the mistaken interpretation sometimes attached to the models of satisfaction and 
of sacrifice that the eternal God could or would 'change his mind' or alter his attitude 
towards humanity by means of a sacrifice or satisfaction. 
In the light of this, I suggest that there are persuasive grounds why a revelatory 
model may be an asset to Christian theology. This suggestion implies that a 
soteriological model associated but not equated with the model of Rashdall is worthy of 
reconsideration as a first-order model. Such a model would have to be focused on the 
revelation of God and of himian nature as it was intended to be, and on the idea of 
Christ as inspiring or infusing love, rather than on the notion of Christ as a supreme 
moral example per se. Such an approach would aspire to include the positive elements 
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suggested above, while also taking into account and avoiding the pitfalls into which 
critics believe a Rashdallian approach to have fallen. 
The purpose of this essay is to suggest that a revelatoiy or pedagogical 
soteriology should indeed be reconsidered and revived as a first-order model. In so 
doing, this paper shall seek to take into accoimt the criticisms of Gunton, Mclntyre, 
McGrath and White. While it is not within the scope of this essay to develop an 
independent revelatory or pedagogical model or to defend a revelatory approach from 
all the objections raised against it, I shall examine several of the more serious criticisms 
and possible answers to them. In particular, I shall discuss whether a revelatory 
soteriology is 'untraditional' and has no basis m Christian Scripture or history, whether 
it has a weak view of sin, whether it is 'subjective' and imderrates the role of grace, 
whether it belittles Christ's significance, whether it necessarily excludes non-Christians 
from salvation 'in Christ', and whether it depends upon an alternative, recognised 'first-
order model' in order to show why Christ's death was necessary. 
In the following chapter, I shall note the biblical precedent of salvation as 
revelation in the Gospel of John and, in passing, some Old Testamental themes of 
salvific revelation on which John draws. In the third chapter I shall look at historical 
traditions of revelatory soteriology represented by Origen and Abailard, and modem 
expressions of the idea such as that of GWH Lampe in western thought and Dimiifri 
Stanilaoe in eastern thought. In exploring the history of the idea, I hope to highlight the 
theology associated with it, to show the different forms it has taken and different ideas 
cormected to it, to open up possibilities of alternative ways of thinking of revelatory 
soteriology, and perhaps also to observe what mistakes have been made in the past and 
should not be repeated. The Scriptural and historical study will testify against 
Mclntyre's objection that there is no biblical or historical foundation for a revelatory 
soteriology, and that it has not established itself as doctrine in the Christian tradition. 
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but I also hope that it will facilitate later discussion of the theology surrounding the idea 
and facilitate more knowledgeable development of the idea. 
In Chapter Four, I shall sketch what a revelatory model might look like. I shall 
begin discussion of salvation with discussion of the Augustinian view of sin as 
privation, since a soimd conception of salvation is ultimately rooted in a sound 
understanding of that which salvation seeks to redress. I shall then turn to the nature of 
salvation, developing in particular some of Augustine's insights into revelation and into 
the nature of God as love. Despite its basis in Augustine, Chapter Four is intended to be 
primarily theological rather than historical in nature, for the focus will be on re-
appropriating and developing some of Augustine's ideas in new ways, and applying 
them to revelatory soteriology in a way that has not, to my knowledge, previously been 
done. 1 shall also provide some brief discussion of whether divine ineffability is an 
insurmountable obstacle to a revelatory soteriology, arguing that some of Christ's 
attributes may be projected onto God in eternity by means of the analogy of intrinsic 
attribution. Chapter Four is not intended to be prescriptive or normative of a revelatory 
soteriology in any way, but to provide some sort of outline of what a revelatory model 
might look like so as to have a basis for discussion and criticism in the Conclusion. In 
sketching a model in this manner, 1 hope to separate a revelatory model from its 
traditional 'exemplarist' associations, and in discussing issues surrounding divine 
ineffability I hope to indicate how such a model might be epistemologically as well as 
theologically defensible. 
The Conclusion is intended to be a critical and analytical review of the sort of 
revelatory model of salvation sketched in Chapter Four. I hope to discuss the most 
perennial and most weighty criticisms of McGrath, Mclntyre, Gunton and White, in 
order to suggest that the difficulties are not insurmoimtable. In particular, I shall discuss 
the criticisms pertaining to sin, to grace, to the significance of Jesus' death, and to the 
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question of the salvation of non-Christians in and through Christ. The aim in so doing is 
to suggest that a revelatory model may still be regarded as a first-order model in its own 
right, and that it may be considered as significant and theologically illimiinating as the 
'objective' or constitutive models supported and developed by contemporary theology. 
It is outside the scope of the current essay to develop a revelatory soteriology that is as 
three-dimensional and as substantial as, for instance, the metaphors that Gunton draws 
upon and elaborates, but it is hoped that this paper will raise serious doubts concerning 
the conviction that a revelatory model is inadequate as a first-order model, and that it 
will indicate and suggest directions in which such a model might be developed in the 
future. 
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Chapter Two 
The Gospel of John: Salvation, Revelation and Incarnation 
Textual evidence for the theme of revelation in the Fourth Gospel is not difficult to find. 
John Ashton remarks that, 'Every major motif in the Gospel is directly linked to the 
concept of revelation', and that 'revelation is unquestionably the dominant theme of the 
Gospel.'''^  It is precisely because revelatory motifs permeate the Gospel so entu-ely that 
they are particularly hard to pin down: all of the key terms used in the Gospel (Word, 
words, glory, truth, signs, knowledge, and witness, for example) are linked directly to 
the concept of revelation in a way that would make any exhaustive study of the theme in 
the Fourth Gospel a life-time work. 
In addition, it has become increasingly clear that revelation is not only a major 
theme in the Fourth Gospel, but also that it is regarded as the primary i f not sole^ *' 
means of salvation. The fact that revelation is regarded as salvific in the Fourth Gospel 
is now generally accepted by biblical scholars. This is indicated by the treatment of 
Johannine soteriology by Robert Kysar writing in the Anchor Bible Dictionary, who 
states: 'Soteriology is hardly separable from christology in the Fourth Gospel, since it is 
the view of Christ as revealer of the Father which constitutes the salvific opportunity for 
humanity. Revelation comprises the cenfral soteriological theme. The revelation in itself 
is saving.'^' Thus it is, for instance, that at the begirming of the Gospel we are 
infroduced to the idea of the need for a revelation of God: 'No man has ever seen God; 
the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of The Father, he has declared him'^^, and 
John Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p.515 
F. Terence Forestell, for instance, has argued for revelation as the sole means of salvation in the Gospel 
of John {The Word of the Cross: Salvation as Revelation in the Fourth Gospel [Analecta Biblica, 1974]), 
while Bruce Grigsby has argued that the sacrificial theme plays a complementary salvific role alongside 
revelation ('The Cross as an Expiatory Sacrifice in the Fourth Gospel', in the Journal for the Study of the 
New Testament 15 [1982]). 
" Robert Kysar, 'John', in the Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1983) m . 925 
'^John 1.18 
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towards the end it becomes clear that revelation is the means of salvation and 
knowledge of God the substance of salvation itself: 'And this is life eternal, that they 
may know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom he has sent.''^  It is not within 
the scope of this chapter to give a thorough discussion of the evidence for revelatory 
soteriology in the Fourth Gospel, but to draw out some of the incontroverably revelatory 
themes and to point to their soteriological significance, and to consider questions 
pertaining to Johannine revelatory soteriology that are significant to the present 
theological debate. The theme of revelation as salvific is also to be found in abundance 
in the Old Testament, but to trace such a theme is also outside the reach of the current 
work. However, in discussing revelatory soteriology in John, Old Testament revelatory-
salvific themes will be alluded to, and I hope that this is sufficient to give a sense of 
their existence in the Hebrew Scriptures. 
2.1 Divine Identity and Disclosure 
One way in which the theme of revelation is expressed is through the sayings of 
Jesus involving the significant linguistic formula T am', either on its own or followed 
by a predicate. The absolute "I am" sayings, those which do not precede a predicate, are 
revelatory because they identify Jesus with God. The most promising^ '* source for the 
Johannine Jesus' use of "I Am" is that of Deutero-Isaiah, where "I Am" is the divine 
self-reference and is used absolutely. Here "I Am" is associated with God's uniqueness 
and the maintenance of monotheism: 'I am I Am and apart fi^om me there is no other.''* 
This implies that John uses the phrase to assert that Jesus was not a deity alongside his 
Father, but that he and the Father are one. Moreover, in Isaiah "I Am" has become a 
"John 17.3 
The most promising, since in Exodus 3.14, God refers to himself as "I Am that I Am", significantly at 
the point in Israel's history at which he becomes known as Saviour and Liberator. However, the 
Septuagint translation of "I Am that I Am" is literally "I Am the (One) just like" and thus that it is "The 
One just like", rather than "I Am", that is the divine name. While Ex. 3 therefore cannot be considered a 
primary midrashic text alongside Deutero-Isaiah, it may have been in the background of John's use of the 
term in relation to Jesus. 
Isaiah 45.21,22 
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personal name: 'I am I Am that comforts you."'^  In referring to himself as "I Am", the 
Johannine Jesus reveals himself in a unique way as the very person of YHWH. 
There is a climactic development of the "I Am" sayings in John, so that the 
revelation of Jesus' identity is heightened as the Gospel proceeds. The first two are to 
be understood as common parlance, whereas the middle three, those in ch. 8, necessitate 
a divine interpretation. Thus when Jesus says, 'Before Abraham was, I Am', his 
audience attempt to stone him.^ ^ The final four instances of "I Am" have a double 
meaning, the everyday meaning being understood by the characters of the Gospel, and 
the theological meaning by its readers. The one exception to this is ch. 18, where those 
who have come to arrest Jesus fall doAvn before him as though experiencing a 
theophany. This evidence suggests that the absolute "I Am" sayings of the Fourth 
Gospel are intended as part of the revelation that Jesus is to be identified with the divine 
being. The form of the Gospel implies a revelatory process beginning with the 
Incarnation, for the extent of Jesus' propinquity with God is not merely stated and 
restated; the revelation of Jesus' identity is mitially hinted at, becomes increasingly 
evident, and reaches a crescendo toward the end of the Gospel narrative with the 
admission that Jesus is God himself 
The "I Am" sayings that are followed by a predicate likewise imply divine 
identity, and also reveal further truths about Jesus' identity and nature. For instance, 
Jesus' dialogue concerning the Water of Life to the Samaritan woman appears on a 
superficial level to be a simple messianic affirmation. However, the reply "I Am, the 
one speaking to you" implies not only divine identity in the way in which the absolute 
"I Am" sayings do, but is particularly reminiscent of Is. 52.6, which emphasises the idea 
that salvation of God's people takes place through the revelation of God's presence.^ * 
Isaiah 51.12 
The pxmishment of stoning was used for blasphemy, and as claimmg to be older than Abraham is not in 
itself blasphemous, the hostile response was probably provoked by the phrase "I Am". 
ForesteU, Word of the Cross, p.28 
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Allusions such as these suggest that the revelation of the Father m the person of Jesus is 
salvific in the Fourth Gospel, in that those who respond to the revelation with 
perception and faith experience the spiritual transformation that is concomitant with 
knowledge of and personal encounter with God. 
The allusion to water in the dialogue with the Samaritan woman also has 
overtones of God's saving revelation to his people. In late Judaism, the water received 
from God was primarily equated with wisdom,'^ which has a revelatory role. Wisdom 
was identified by Ben Sirach with the Law^, and so water is linked to the idea of the 
revelation of God's will.*' The dialogue reveals that the revelation of God in Jesus 
surpasses all Israelite and Jewish expectation: Wisdom states that those who drink of 
her will thirst for more*^ , while those who drink the water Jesus gives are never thirsty 
again. The theme of Jesus as the Water of Life re-emerges in ch. 7, where Jesus invites 
the thirsty to come to him to drink.*^ The notion of God and, accordingly in John, Jesus, 
as the source of living water, is probably based on the Exodus miracle of water from the 
rock.^ The theme fmds expression in Jeremiah where God is the fountain of the water 
of life,*^ in Psalm 36 where he is the 'fountain' of life, and in Isaiah where YHWH 
offers the hungry and thirsty nourishment in the form of word and teaching, the source 
of life: 'Ho, everyone that thirsts, come to the waters, and he that has no money; come, 
buy, and eat.... Incline your ear, and come to me: hear, and your soul shall live....'** 
Thus the identification of Jesus with the Water of Life not only reveals Jesus as God, 
C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) 
p. 137 
Sirach 24. 23 
Foi«stell, Word of the Cross, p. 28, cf Num. 21. 16 - 18; Sir. 15. 3; 24. 23 
Sirach 24. 21 
" John 7.37 
"Exodus 17. 6 
Jeremiah 2. 13 
Isaiah 55. 1-3 
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but also reiterates the Johannine view that salvation is to be found, as in Isaiah 55, in the 
knowledge imparted through divine pedagogy.^ ^ 
A fiirther way in which the theme of revelation is cashed out in the Fourth 
Gospel is through the designation of Jesus as Logos. The term Logos in and of itself 
implies the significance of Jesus as Divine Revealer, since, among its several meanings, 
it is refers to 'word', a primary means of communication. Yet the revelatory 
implications oi Logos go far fiirther than this. The description of the Logos propounded 
in the Prologue could not fail to remind a Jewish reader of Wisdom. Of Wisdom, Sirach 
writes that, ' Among all these I sought a resting place; I sought in whose territory I 
might lodge'. However, Wisdom does not find a dwelling place until she is sent to dwell 
among the Israelites: 'Then, the one who created me assigned a place for my tabernacle. 
And he said. Make your dwelling place in Jacob and in Israel receive you inheritance.'^ * 
In John, the Logos seeks but fails to find a home in Israel, and so eventually 'is 
tabernacled among us', presumably the Johannine community. The same word is used 
in Sirach and in John to refer to tabernacle or dwelling. 
In the Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom is outside time and is seated by the throne 
of God.*' In the Fourth Gospel, the Logos is present in the begiiming with God, and 
helps God in the act of creation. In the Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom enters history as 
the Law, but, like the Logos in John, is responded to with incomprehension and 
rejection. As we have akeady seen, the figure of Wisdom was seen as a primary 
instrument of divine revelation, and so the association of the Logos with Wisdom 
suggests that John's primary theological theme is that of revelation. In the light of this, 
Ashton writes that the Prologue should be seen not simply as a hymn about creation 
culminating in Incarnation, but revelation culminating in Incarnation. The work of the 
Cf. Gail O'Day, Revelation in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative Mode and Theological Claim 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 
Sirach 24.8 
Wisdom of Solomon, 9.4 
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revealing Logos has two aspects, life and light (imited in the phrase, 'The life was the 
light of men'^°), and these two aspects correspond to the two facets of God's work, 
creation and revelation (salvation)." 
In anticipation of potential criticism, it is noteworthy that the Johannine view of 
salvation as revelation is not a fa9ade collapsing on to an alternative conceptual 
fi-amework, such as that of sacrifice or ransom to the devil. Rather, the soteriological 
emphasis on revelation is a self-sufficient and independent model, consistent with and 
integral to a distinctive theology, view of sin, and understanding of salvation. John's 
entire theology makes sense as a coherent whole when read in the light of his revelatory 
soteriology, and is not eventually reduced to 'objective' models of salvation on closer 
inspection. This fact is demonstrated through several characteristics with which the next 
part of this chapter is concerned. First, the irreducibility of this revelatory model is 
mdicated by the superficiality and half-heartedness of the inclusion of sacrifice and 
Christm Victor themes. Secondly, the integrity of John's revelatory soteriology within 
the Gospel is shown by John's focus on Incarnation as well as crucifixion. Thu-dly, the 
self-sufficiency of John's revelatory soteriology is indicated by John's own distinctive 
understanding of sin which corresponds to and elucidates an understanding of salvation 
based upon divine revelation. Thirdly, the integrity and independence of the idea of the 
means of salvation as revelation is demonstrated by the subtlety and complexity of the 
view of what the revelation is, and the way it points to what salvation itself consists in 
and what kind of existence it is. I shall briefly discuss these four aspects of Joharmine 
theology that are crucial if revelatory soteriology is to be considered a three-
dimensional and comprehensive model. 
™ John 1.4 
'^ Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel, p.528 
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2.2 Imagery. Incarnation, and Sin 
While the Fourth Gospel includes unageiy indicating to some that the evangelist 
suggests a view of salvation based on Christ's death as a sacrifice or a victory over the 
devil, scholars since Bultmann have recognised increasingly that such imagery only 
goes skin-deep. Nicholson expresses this when he says that to interpret John 
sacrificially because of the huper ('on behalf of ) sayings, and because of the 
prominence of sacrificial thought in much of the rest of the New Testament, is an 
approach often followed by earlier scholars. However, Nicholson writes, '... we would 
now have to say that this judges the Fourth Gospel by non-johannme standards. For 
while there is an outcropping of such language in the Fourth Gospel, the Gospel itself is 
not determined by categories of sacrifice and atonement. This language occurs in places 
but the Fourth Evangelist does not make anything of it; he does not "buy into" the 
associated mindset in understanding Jesus' death.'^ ^ 
Development of the sacrificial theme is conspicuously absent in the Gospel, 
ahnost as if John inherited the imagery fi-om the Christian tradition, and, while 
including it in the Gospel narrative, did not expoimd upon it or allow it to permeate his 
theology. Kysar says in this respect that 'While Jesus' death is clearly viewed as an act 
of sacrifice (e.g., 15:13), the effort to explicate this theme in terms of analogies drawn 
fi-om sacrificial cultic worship are notably absent.''^  It appears that, rather than scrap a 
significant portion of traditional Christian imagery altogether, the evangelist chose to 
re-interpret the old imagery in the light of the revelation of God in Christ. For instance, 
as F. Terence Forestell argues, the Passion in John is seen as a victory over the prince of 
this world, not because it makes possible the forgiveness of sin by God or because 
through it the devil is 'tricked' as in later thought, but because Jesus' death is a 
G. C. Nicholson, Death as Departure: The Johannine Descent-Ascent Schema, (Chico: Scholars Press, 
1983) p.2 
" Kysar, 'John', m the Anchor Bible Dictionary, 926.111 
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revelation of love, that will 'draw all men to Jesus' and lead them to faith in him. This is 
a persuasive view of the Passion as a victory over the devil because in responding with 
faith, people reject the evil one and are fi-eed fi-om sin and death, being granted instead 
the opposite mode of existence, eternal life."* Likewise, sacrificial imagery is used in 
the context of Jesus' death, and yet this does not appear to be cultic in nature. Rather, 
the sacrificial imagery pomts to Jesus' death as an act of 5e(^sacrifice, hinted at, for 
instance, m the foot washing that appears in the context of the Last Supper. Similarly, 
Kysar observes that the evangelist most probably 'imderstood Jesus as the Passover 
lamb who removed sin by virtue of the revelation that frees humans from sin. '^^ 
From this it may be concluded that salvation as revelation is not to be viewed as 
a flimsy or superficial soteriological model that may be reduced to 'objective' models; 
on the contrary, it appears that the 'objective' models are quickly reduced to a 
revelatory model on fiirther examination. The self-sufficiency of the revelatory model is 
fiirther indicated by the fact that the Fourth Gospel is not cruciocentric, but focuses 
upon the Incarnation and crucifixion and Resurrection as one saving revelatory event. 
This is significant because it is improbable that a crucifixion in itself could reveal much 
about God, unless we knew fi"om elsewhere something of the person, significance, and 
motivation of the one condemned to death. While earlier scholars took the Fourth 
Gospel to be alike to the Synoptics in focusing upon Jesus' death, Rudolf Bultmann^* 
and Ernst KSsemann'''' in their groimdbreaking studies of John argued that the 
Incarnation is the decisive salvific event. Bultmann argues that the Cross is not salvific 
in itself, and is subordinate to the Incarnation. The Cross is the completion of Jesus' 
work as revealer, his 'release' fi-om his mission, and his return to the Father: 
F. Terence Forestall, The Word of the Cross, p. 149 
Anchor Bible Dictionary, 926.111, my emphases 
*^ Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, (2 vols) trans. K. Grobel (London: SCM Press, 
1955), 2:52-53 
" Ernst KSsemann, The Testament of Jesus: A Study in the Gospel of John in the Light of Chapter 17, 
trans. Gerhard Krodel (London: SCM Press, 1968), p.7 
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While for Paul the Incarnation is secondary to his death in importance, one might say that the 
reverse is true for John.... In John, Jesus' death has no pre-eminent importance for salvation, but 
is the accomplishment of the work which began with the incarnation. Thus Jesus' death takes on 
a double aspect in John: it is the completion of his obedience, but it is also Jesus' release irom 
his commission, and he can return to the glory he had in pre-existence.^ * 
On this view, Jesus' Incarnation and the entirety of Jesus' life is seen as a sacrifice in 
the non-cultic sense,'' and this is not limited to his death alone.*" Kasemann observes 
that the Passion narrative in John comes across as 'a mere postscript'.*' The Gospel 
narrative would make sense if it ended with Jesus 'reporting back' to God.*^ It appears 
at this moment that the Gospel could end with Jesus' Ascension, without the necessity 
for the Cross. Clearly such an option would pose a difficulty for an evangelist, aware as 
he was of the historical fact of Jesus' death, and the important place of the Cross and 
Resurrection in Christian tradition. Introducing a 'third way' between the two polar 
opposites of solely incamational and cruciocentric, Forestell argues that the Cross as 
well as the Incarnation is salvific. However, while typically those arguing for the 
salvific efficacy of the crucifixion in John generally propound a soteriology involving 
cultic sacrifice or ransom, Forestell argues that in the Fourth Gospel the Cross is salvific 
solely because of what it reveals about God. He writes that 'The theology of the Cross is 
not a theology of sacrifice or expiation but a theology of revelation.... The death of 
Jesus upon the cross is given a peculiar Johannine treatment; it is presented as the 
culmination of the revelatory work of Jesus and neither as a vicarious work of 
satisfaction nor as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of men.'*^ 
Forestell points out that the Prologue is generally thought to be a theological 
summary of the Gospel,*^ and that the Prologue is concerned primarily with the 
Incarnation and with revelation and faith, and not with the sacrifice and cleansing blood 
Bultmann, Theology, 2:52 - 53 
''John 10.36 
*° John 17.19 
KMsemaim, Testament of Jesus, p.7 
i.e. ending with Chapter 17 
Forestell, Word of the Cross, pp.113,120 
^ Forestell, Word of the Cross, p. 198 
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themes foimd in soteriology focused solely on Jesus' death. Yet the Incarnation is 
considered incomplete without the Cross and Resurrection; the Cross is the point at 
which the truth is most clearly revealed, and thus the fulfibnent of the Incarnation. 
Forestell asserts that the Incarnation is neither the mere necessary precondition for the 
Crucifixion, nor is it the sole salvific event to which the Crucifixion is subordinate. 
Rather, the Incarnation is 'the beginning of a revelatory process which cuhninates in the 
supreme revelation'.^' In this way, the Incarnation and Crucifixion should not be seen as 
two competing or even complementary events, but as two stages in one salvific 
revelatory event. Kysar concurs with Forestell's understanding of the salvific 
significance of the Cross, stating: 'Jesus interprets his death as the supreme act of love 
(15; 13) - an act which transforms the relationship of the believers to him Gcom that of 
servants to "fiiends". The cross, therefore, emerges as the model of divine love.... As it 
reveals the love of God for himians, it saves them from life in alienated lovelessness.'** 
From this it can be concluded that the Fourth Gospel does not centre primarily 
on the Cross, in contrast, for instance, with Paul. Rather, the Fourth Evangelist holds the 
Incarnation and the Cross in balance, seeing the latter as the perfection of the former. 
This is significant, since a soteriology based on Jesus' Incarnation and life as much as 
his death is not conducive to a salvific model such as sacrifice which would be focused 
primarily on Jesus' death, but to a model such as revelation which would necessarily 
also consider significant the identity and character of the revealer during his life. The 
fact that John's soteriology is revelatory and that this is a well-thought-out and deep-
rooted idea rather than a superficial theme is fiirther indicated by the fact that the 
Joharmine view of sin is one not consistent with a soteriology based on sacrifice or 
ransom, for example, but one that corresponds to a view of salvation as revelation. 
Forestell, Word of the Cross, p. 19 
^ The Anchor Bible Dictionary, 926. m 
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As a soteriology, the theme of revelation in John affirms, like all soteriology, 
that God saves, and offers an indication of what it is that God's revelation saves 
humanity from. The opposite of revealed knowledge is ignorance, and m John it is 
unbelief and misimderstanding that appear to incur criticism fi-om Jesus. We are told in 
the Prologue that that the world did not recognise Jesus, and that his own did not receive 
him, and Nicodemus is negatively portrayed for his continual misunderstanding of 
Jesus' words. The notorious 'Jews' of ch. 8 do not understand the point Jesus makes, 
and so conclude by attempting to destroy him, and even the disciples do not fully 
understand what Jesus has said until after his Resurrection. The judgmental treatment of 
misunderstanding and rejection has led scholars to assert that unbelief equates to sin. 
Carson writes, 'Unbelief is morally culpable',** and Schneider asserts that 'The 
rejection of Jesus is sin'.*' 
Forestell suggests a more subtle version of this view, suggesting that sin is not 
conceived of as wicked actions, but as a mode of existence that is the opposite of 
spiritual life, and as an attitude characterised by (but not consisting in) rejection of God. 
I would add that since sin is not wicked action but rejection of God, it is faith, and not 
moral works, that is the opposite of sin and means of overcoming the sinful life. 
Forestell asserts that it is not the case that sin is identified with unbelief, but that 
unbelief is the outward sign of a sinful existence: 'unbelief manifests a state of sin in 
which man lives.''" The sin of the 'Jews' is exposed by their antagonism towards Christ 
and in their refusal to see who he is and what he reveals, and yet this is an indication 
that they are sinful and not the substance or extent of their sinfulness. Those who do not 
believe reject God, and this state leads them to behave immorally, and, above all, to 
reject the one whom God has sent to save them. 
"John 1.10,11 
D. Carson, The Gospel According to John, (Edinburgh: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1991) p.99 
H. Schneider, 'The Word Was Made Flesh: An Analysis of Revelation in the Fourth Gospel' in the 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 31,1969, p. 350 
Forestell, Word of the Cross, p. 144 
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Forestell argues that forgiveness is not a key theme in John, and that this is 
because forgiveness supposes a more legal view of sin, a 'juridical notion of sin as a 
debt which God in his mercy remits .S in is a complex reality that cannot be dealt with 
by forgiveness, as though it were a debt to be remitted or paid, or dirt to be cleansed. 
Sin is not destroyed by a legal absolution from guilt, but when Jesus heals a person and 
gives them eternal life. As we have seen, Jesus' death is viewed as a victory over the 
world'^ and the prince of the world,'^ because it is a revelation of God's love that will 
draw all men to Jesus, and will therefore save them from sin and procure for them 
eternal life. 
The idea of salvation as revelation in John possesses an apparent similarity to 
gnosticism, in which a revealer descends to earth in order to communicate some esoteric 
knowledge to an exclusive and elect group, which will result in their liberation from the 
(evil) world and the flesh and their ascent to the reahn of spirit. However, while 
Johannine theology may have influenced later gnostic groups, Johannine theology is not 
itself gnostic. As Schneider argues, the use of the terms 'flesh' and 'world' do not 
convey anything mherently evil or sinfiil, and the Fourth Evangelist maintains that God 
loves the world,''* and that it is his creation. In addition, Forestell has argued that John's 
revelatory soteriology does not concern mere doctrine about God as gnostic revelation 
does, but is incamational - God himself becomes the fi^il and mortal indicated by the 
term 'flesh'. Johaimine revelation does insist upon the giving of true knowledge of God, 
but this knowledge is incamational, and is not propositional or ecstatic.'' The death of 
Christ, writes Forestell, is an integral part of this revelation and thus of salvation, and 
there is no hint as in some forms of Docetism that a phantom took the place of Jesus on 
the Cross. 
" Forestell, Word of the Cross, p. 149 
'^ John 16.33 
''John 12.31; 14.30; 16.11 
John 3.16 
Forestell, Word of the Cross, p. 197 
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From this it can be seen that the Fourth Gospel offers a view of sin that only 
makes sense on a revelatory soteriological model. Once again, this suggests that 
revelatory soteriology is not dependent upon other soteriological models, but stands up 
on its own, offering a subtle and complex portrayal of what it is about Jesus' revelation 
that is salvific and how it is that revelation can save the individual. While a view of sin 
as ignorance would imply a gnostic view of divine revelation, John's view of sin and of 
salvation is far more rooted in the world and cannot be reduced to the mystical or the 
academic. The proceeding section aims to give some idea of what it is that Jesus reveals 
and how it is that this is salvific. 
Due to the subtlety of the evangelist's treatment of revelation, scholars, while 
agreeing that revelation is saivific, do not concur on what is the essence of the 
revelation, that is, what it reveals and why this has a salvific effect on humanity. As we 
shall see, there is continuing debate on this subject matter, but all hypotheses might 
fairly be regarded as drawing out some important aspects and yet succeeding only to 
give a partial accoimt of the theology of revelation in John. As has become mcreasingly 
clear, this failure to give a full explanation of revelation in John is partly the result of 
the non-propositional nature of Johannine revelation: the substance of the revelation 
cannot be reduced to words but to an imderstanding of the person of Christ as a whole, 
and this imderstanding is not purely intellectual but is also experiential so that while the 
essence may be grasped it can never be subject to linguistic formulation or analysis. 
2.3 Revelation: Delivered Doctrine or Existential Event? 
Reacting against nineteenth and early twentieth century emphases upon the 
Johannine revelation as having a specific 'message' or content, Rudolf Bultmann 
argued that to express the revelation-content in propositions is to misimderstand the 
existential nature of the revelation. To attempt objectified knowledge of God, that is, to 
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speak of the content of the revelation, is equivalent to a view of salvation by works, 
since both are an attempt to guarantee the self over against God. The revelation of Jesus 
according to John must not be seen to endorse a view of salvation that requires mere 
assent to doctrinal propositions describing objective truths, but requires faith, that is, 
accepting Jesus as revealer without evidence, and an encounter with God through the 
uncertainty of the present situation, the existential event. The Gospel demands that the 
individual respond either with faith or with offence, and salvation occurs through 
responding to Jesus with the former. Therefore, the essence of the revelation is not 
related to any content, but to the very fact that Jesus claims to be revealer. Bultmann 
writes: 
Thus it turns out in the end that Jesus as the revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the 
Revealer. And that amounts to saying that it is he for whom the world is waitmg, he who brings 
in his own person that for which all the longing of man yearns: life and truth as the reality out of 
which man can exist.... But how is he that and how does he bring it? In no other way than that 
he is it and says that he brings it - he, a man with his human word, which, without legitimation, 
demands faith.** 
Jesus' revelation is a challenge, intensified by the fact that there is no evidence for his 
claims other than his own presence. Responding to Jesus with faith rather than taking 
offence saves the individual, since responding to Jesus m faith authenticates human life. 
Since there is no content to Jesus' revelation, God is not made known through Jesus' 
words - or even through his person and work - but in the act of decision to take the leap 
of faith in the absence of anything that can guarantee that the object of belief is true. 
It is uncertain whether, for Bultmann, the revelation of God remains empty, or 
whether the individual encounters God in the moment of faith, and in this sense God is 
made known to the individual'' (though faith is never made certain, since, if it were, it 
would cease to be faith). However, Gail O'Day rightly criticises Bultmann's portrayal 
^ Bultmaim, Theology, 66 
It might be argued that should the former be the case, then the individual nevers truly 'encounters' God 
because he never knows him, and cannot be transformed (which is at the root of Haenchen's objection), 
while if the latter is the case, Bultmann is retaining the idea of the revelation having content, while simply 
shifting the locus of the revelation. This latter seems to be O'Day's interpretation of Bultmann. 
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of Jesus' revelation because, even if God is revealed in the existential event, it makes 
the personal decision, rather than Jesus himself, the centre of the revelation.'* This 
means that the salvific revelation is not christocentric, and, while it is recognised that 
Bultmann was not a subjectivist", focuses on the subjective as the locus of salvation. I 
would add that such a view might be thought to replace the idea of 'salvation by works' 
with one of 'salvation by faith', still requiring that salvation is earned but disguising it 
by propounding alternative means. However, Bultmann's view of the essence of 
revelation is important as a corrective to many of the earlier attempts to describe 
Johannine revelation which spoke as though Jesus revealed propositions about God, and 
failed to recognise the actual experience of God imparted through Jesus. 
In reaction to Bultmann's existential understanding of revelation in the Fourth 
Gospel, Ernst Haenchen revived the emphasis upon content, arguing that the Gospel of 
John depicts the entire life of Jesus as the revelation and actualisation of God's love.'"" 
In his Commentary on the Fourth Gospel, Haenchen continually sees instances of the 
revelation of divine love in Jesus. Of the passage in which Jesus washes his disciples' 
feet, Haenchen writes, 'Jesus' act in washing feet - denoting his self-abnegation to the 
extent of death - is his salvific act of revelation.... John views the whole of Jesus' 
earthly life as the revelation and realization of this divine love.''"' Every instance of 
self-sacrificial love during the life of Jesus is viewed as pointing to Jesus' ultimate 
expression of love on the Cross, and every instance is salvific, since it is the revelation 
of God's love. However, this revelation only becomes clear in the light of the 
Resurrection and with the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and thus it is the case that the 
O'Day, Revelation, p.41 
^ Bultmann is wary of speaking objectively because he does not wish to objectify what is rightly 
subjective, but he does afErm objective aspects. He writes that 'The fact that God cannot be seen or 
apprehended apart from faith does not mean that he does not exist apart from faith.' {Jesus Christ and 
Mythology, cited by J. B. Webster, 'Bultmann', in the New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Sinclair B. 
Ferguson et al (Leicester: hiterVarsity Press, 1988), p. 115 -117 
Cf. Ernst Haenchen Der Vater 72, cited m Ulrich Busse,' Ernst Haenchen and his Commentary on 
John: Biographical Notes and Sketches of His Johannine Theology', in Haenchen, John, vol.2 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), p.248 
Haenchen, John, vol. 2, p. 114 
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evangelist presents Jesus' revelation with lucidity, while the characters in the Gospel 
often struggle to see the significance of Jesus' person and work. Haenchen writes, 
'...the earthly Jesus does indeed reveal the name of God in word and miracle, but the 
risen Christ makes possible saving faith in the Father and him whom the Father has 
sent, Jesus Christ.... The spirit of truth alone can lead to the whole truth.' '"^  
Haenchen was critical of Bultmann's theory on the basis that an existential view 
of revelation is anachronistic to the Fourth Gospel: '...the theme of authenticity...is 
Heidegger speaking, not the Evangelist.''"^ Moreover, he argues, Bultmann's idea that 
Jesus' revelation consists in the fact of revelation alone which demands faith m Jesus as 
revealer is problematic, since this would not lead to faith but to Nihilism.'"^ For 
himianity to be saved it is necessary that they are made aware of God's grace, which 
makes possible the forgiveness of sin and the gift of eternal life. The revelation must 
have content, argues Haenchen, since, as there is no knowledge of God prior to Jesus, 
God must be revealed in order for himians to know him and to experience salvation.'"' 
As has been noted above, it is possible that in Bultmann the revelation of God does 
occur, though in the subjective moment of faith rather than in the person of Jesus, and, 
were this the case, Haenchen's criticism would be invalid because of a failure to 
imderstand Bultmann's idea of the encoimter with God in the existential event. 
However, Haenchen's observation that demand of belief in something without any 
imderstanding of the substance or content of the something may be more conducive to 
Nihilism (in the sense of belief that the truth is that there is no truth) than to faith may 
be insightful. 
'"^  Haenchen, John, vol. 2 p. 20, my emphases 
'"^  Haenchen, John. vol. 2, p.l 14 
Busse, 'Ernst Haenchen', in Haenchen, John, p.248 
cf. Haenchen, 'Das Johannesevangelium und sein Konmientor', 121 n. 37, cited, Busse, 'Ernst 
Haenchen', in Haenchen, John, vol.2, p.248 
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The approach to revelation that emphasises the content of the revelation is 
generally associated with exemplarism. Gail O' Day manifests the tendency to connect 
this approach with exemplarism when she writes: 
When the focus is on the content of Jesus' revelation of God, revelation is primarily understood 
as something that communicates about, and Jesus' revelation can therefore be understood and 
appropriated as a series of propositions and concepts. When this content is examined for what it 
reveals about God's nature, Jesus' revelation is translated into conceptual language that speaks 
of God's exemplary righteousness and love. God's love is made known both through God's 
sending of Jesus and through the love of Jesus himself The importance of this revelation of 
God's love lies in the moral example that it sets for the believer's life.'"* 
It is not withm the scope of this dissertation to discuss whether every exponent 
of the 'content' approach to Johannine revelation has an exemplarist view of salvation. 
Haenchen masterfully draws attention to the fact that in first century thought the polar 
opposites of morality verstds faith would have been considered a false dichotomy, and 
pushed to their logical conclusion his words may indeed suggest that the individual's 
attitude towards other humans is an important aspect of faith, a view that may be forced 
into the mould of a doctrine of salvation by moral works. Haenchen writes that 
fellowship with Jesus and the Father necessitates readiness for the same act of self-
abnegation shown by Jesus, and that it is 'this kind of existence' (though not this action 
per se) that 'makes unity with the Father and the Son possible.' However, to think that 
the moral replaces faith in God is anachronistic. Haenchen writes, 'To say that this is 
only something ethical, yet lymg below the level of the religious, throws Johannine 
theology as a whole into confusion. Behaviour toward fellow Christians (or fellow 
himian beings) is not to be separated fi-om behaviour toward God and Jesus. In this 
sense, there is no such thing as "pure religion" that permits us to pass the neighbour by 
and come directly to God.''"'' 
It seems to me that in this passage Haenchen falls into the same trap as 
Bultmann in thinking that an emphasis on faith necessarily implies a view that salvation 
'°*0'Day, Revelation, p.35 
'"^ Haenchen, John, vol. 2, p.l 14 
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is achieved by the grace of God rather than that it is earned, and is erroneous because 
salvation might be thought to be earned by faith as much as by moral works. 
Haenchen's portrayal of John's soteriology is one that seems to imply that salvation is 
earned, but this is not merely through moral works: as in some other instances of 
typically Protestant thought, the individual's faith is regarded as the means of salvation. 
An exponent of such a view may rightly respond that it is God that grants the individual 
capacity for faith, and thus it is still God's grace that grants salvation to the individual. 
However, the same is also true of the exemplarist, who may argue that it is God's grace 
that grants the individual the capacity to behave morally well, or to love fellow himian 
beings and to act accordingly.'"* In noting this point, I am not intending to defend 'real' 
exemplarism, but simply to pomt out that where it fails many 'non-moral', faith-centred 
accounts of salvation fail also. 
It is important for the purpose of this dissertation that the idea that Jesus reveals 
God's love and that this is salvific does not necessarily imply 'real' exemplarism, 
despite O'Day's assertion to the contrary. The idea that God's love is only revealed as 
an example to follow misses the point that, in the thought of the Fourth Evangelist, 
knowledge of God (which may be viewed in the broad sense of implying experience of 
and fellowship with God) is that in which salvation consists. On a revelatory 
soteriological model, revelation is seen as the means of salvation. Salvation itself is 
generally viewed as a fellowship with God that has its basis in the revelation of God, 
and that spiritually transforms the individual. Moral works or the individual's attitude of 
love are not seen as accomplishmg salvation, but might best be regarded as the 
(necessary) consequence of salvation: the spiritual transformation of the individual 
brought about through fellowship with God involves an iniusion of love which 
manifests itself in an attitude of love or moral works towards other human beings. 
'™ Most 'real' exemplarists regard love of humanity rather than moral works as the key to salvation, 
though the two are usually equated by critics of exemplarism. 
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Therefore, an approach asserting that the revelation of God as love is salvific should not 
be associated too closely with an exemplarist soteriology, even though it seems that 
biblical scholars (such as Haenchen) who assert the former have often been 
unintentionally guilty of the latter also. 
From this, it may be concluded that the extent to which the 'content' approach to 
revelation has been made unpopular by its erroneous identification with exemplarism is 
unjust, for there is nothing that necessarily unites the two. Further, while the existential 
approach was an important corrective to the emphasis on affirmations of particular 
propositions that often accompanied the 'content' approach, Haenchen's work is a 
necessary counterbalance to Bultmann's hypothesis that (either) the locus of the 
revelation is the subjective experience of the individual and not the person of Jesus, or 
else that there is no revelation of God and that even the believer can have no knowledge 
of God. I f Johannine theology is indeed incamational and if salvation does consist in 
knowledge (including fellowship) of God, then it would seem that the purpose of Jesus' 
life and work according to the Gospel must be to reveal God to humanity, and to make 
him known. This debate led to a third understanding of the essence of revelation in the 
Fourth Gospel, one which stemmed fi-om dialogue with both Bultmann's and 
Haenchen's antithetical approaches to the subject. 
Ernst Kasemann's primary argument was that the fact of revelation cannot be 
distinguished from that which is revealed, and that the emphases of Bultmann and of 
Haenchen are only properly understood when they are unified. KSsemann criticised 
Bultmann for having reduced the language of the Gospel to mere event.'"' Furthermore, 
knowledge of God cannot be understood on the basis of subjective experience and faith, 
but through revelation concerning the unity between Jesus and the Father, and for this 
reason one 'should not play off the kerygma against the dogma'."" The revelation of tiie 
O'Day, Revelation, p.42 
"° Kasemann, Testament, p.25 
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'metaphysical' nature of God, that the Father and Son are one, is central for Kasemann, 
partly because it is precisely because of such unity that the 'moral' nature of the Father 
can be revealed. In other words, if the love of God is revealed through the love of Jesus, 
then it is a necessary precondition that Jesus is one with the Fatiher, since otherwise it 
might not be deduced that what is characteristic of Jesus is in the nature of the Father 
also. 
Kasemann's emphasis on the revelation of Jesus and the Father as one is 
important, since it highlights the idea that it is through the revelation of Jesus as the 
Logos Incarnate that it is revealed that God is love. However, Kasemann's emphasis on 
the dogmatic may fail to speak of the individual's experience of God and spiritual 
transformation. RashdaU's criticism that some soteriological models do not view 
salvation as affecting the individual in any real way might be applied to KSsemann here, 
as might the criticism of the 'content' approach that the revelation is reduced to mere 
affirmations of dogmatic propositions. Furthermore, in contrast to the 'content' 
approach, Kasemann seems to share with Bultmann the conviction that God is revealed 
exclusively through the person of Jesus, and, presumably, that there is no salvation for 
the non-Christian. 
From this it can be seen that, while each has some insight, these approaches 
focusing on one exclusive aspect of Johannine revelation, such as the fact of the 
revelation itself, the content of the revelation as dogma, or the content of the revelation 
speaking of the 'moral' nature of God, fail to give a coherent and comprehensive 
account of Johannine revelation. This fact is recognised by O'Day, who attempts to 
approach Johannine revelation considering not just the theological claims made through 
direct propositions, but also theological claims made through the narrative mode which 
communicate the revelation experience. O'Day writes: 'In order to arrive at a more 
integrated understanding of revelation in the Fourth Gospel, we need to approach the 
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question of revelation with categories that reflect the gospel's interplay of narrative 
mode artd theological c/a/ni.'"' We cannot, she argues, answer how it is that God is 
revealed in the Fourth Gospel, unless we comprehend the literary techniques of the 
evangelist through whom the 'message' is revealed. 
O'Day's particular contribution to this textual approach to Johannine revelation 
is through discussion of the evangelist's use of irony. For instance, as demonstrated 
through careful exegesis of John 4, the text sets up a dialogue between Jesus and an 
individual (in this case the Samaritan woman) who continually ironically affirms what 
Jesus says but misunderstands the way in which he means it. In this way the reader is 
drawn into the text, and is confronted with the decision of either understanding Jesus as 
Jesus suggests (faith), or else accepting the partial imderstanding of Jesus pertaining to 
the Samaritan woman with whom Jesus is in dialogue. This is significant for 
understanding Johannine revelation, since it is through this technique that the reader 
experiences the essence of the revelation for him or herself"^ Similarly, irony is used 
when one word is used with two distinct meanings, as, for example, when vxi/coOrjvai is 
used of the crucifixion to mean both 'lifted up' and 'exalted'. It becomes increasingly 
clear in the text that both meanings of the word are appropriate, and so the reader comes 
to recognise that the Cross is to be seen as the enthronement of Jesus. Use of such 
technique means that revelation is not understood by the reader as empty, revealing only 
itself Rather, the reader is teased into reflection of the meaning of the revelation of 
Christ and encounters through the text and through contemplation of the text the essence 
of the revelation, an encounter with God. 
Supporting O'Day's move away from the antitheses of fact versus content, 
Ashton combines O'Day's appreciation of the text with a consideration of the nature of 
a gospel. The Fourth Evangelist, he argues, deliberately chose to write a gospel, as 
O'Day, Revelation, p.46 
O'Day, Revelation, p.lO 
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opposed to a revelatory discourse, homily, or collection of sayings put in the mouth of 
the glorified Christ. While the Fourth Gospel is not considered an historical document, 
the fact that it is a Gospel indicates that the evangelist had an interest in the earthly life 
of Jesus. Therefore, the Johannine revelation is not pronounced simply through the 
words Jesus speaks (as in a revelatory discourse or collection of sayings), but also 
through Jesus' deeds and character. The attempt to isolate the revelatory message from 
Jesus' life and character necessarily results in an unrevealing revelation. Ashton 
concludes that the revelation 'is indeed God's plan for the world, but in so far as the 
plan is transcribed m terms of a human life it is not to be understood from words but 
from deeds.... What the divine agent 'heard' from God is disclosed not in his words but 
in his life; the 'what' is displayed in the 'how'. The matter of the Gospel, its true 
content, is indistinguishable from its form: the medium is the message.'' 
The revelation presented in the Fourth Gospel does have substance, yet this is 
not limited simply to those things which Christ says of himself or of the Father in 
propositional form. The essence of the revelation is to be found in the person of Christ, 
and in his entire salvific work begun at the Incarnation. Indeed, the Incarnation itself is 
essential to the revelation, for it is the unique instance of God becoming known not 
through the flesh, but in the flesh. Saeed Hamid-Khani writes ' When God in the Word 
became flesh and dwelt among us, the eternal became mortal, the timeless became 
locked in time and space. The event of the Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection is the 
quintessence of revelation and the exposition of the meaning of it is theology par 
excellence.'' 
The ministry and teaching of Jesus are also revelatory, since it is through Jesus' 
teaching that it is revealed that Jesus and the Father are one, and thus the nature of the 
Father is disclosed in the person of Jesus. In other words, it is because the reader is 
'"Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel, p.553 
' ''*Saeed Hamid-Khani, Revelation and Concealment of Christ: A Theological Inquiry into the Elusive 
Language of the Fourth Gospel (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), p.352 
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aware tiiat Jesus' words and deeds reflect finitely what God is like infinitely, that tiiey 
know that the character of Jesus and his attitude towards people encountered must also 
be - in a finite and human form - the character of God and his attitude towards 
humanity. I f the Fourth Gospel portrays Jesus' life as one of compassion and love, as 
when Jesus gives up his life for his friends or weeps at the death of Lazarus or heals 
through compassion, it discloses the love and compassion of God also. Jesus' death is 
considered to be the ultimate expression of his love, and reveals also the extent of God's 
love for the world, for 'it is through the death of Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God, that 
the Father's love and forgiveness are made known.' 
From this brief study of the nature of sin and of the substance of revelation in 
the Fourth Gospel it can be seen that the idea of revelation as salvation in John is not a 
flimsy and semi-transparent disguise which, on closer inspection, is seen to be hiding an 
alternative soteriological model, such as sacrifice or ransom. Rather, revelation 
permeates every moment of the Fourth Gospel, and the understanding of revelation is so 
subtle and comprehensive that it must be concluded that the evangelist understood the 
savmg person and work of Jesus primarily (if not solely) in terms of revelation. 
Revelatory soteriology is to be regarded as an independent model involving its own 
distinctive imagery and conceptual apparatus, and, as we have seen, there is no moment 
in the Gospel in which the revelatory model falls back upon other models because it is 
incomplete or superficial taken on its own. 
2.4 Revelation. Salvation, and Ethical Exhortation 
Applying existentialist language to Johannine thought, Schneider suggests how 
it is that knowledge revealed concerning God might be considered salvific by the Fourth 
Evangelist, and what comprises this salvific revelation. According to Schneider, the 
"^Hamid-Khani, Revelation, p. 352 
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Johannine term 'flesh' is to be understood as frail and mortal humanity, distinct and 
ignorant of God, but not necessarily sinful."^ Flesh becomes sinful when man attempts 
to become independent of God and self-sufficient, that is, when he builds upon his 
frailty and mortality rather than upon God: 'Centering his life and attention on himself 
man turns from God and from the l i gh t . 'When this happens, the reahn of flesh 
becomes 'co-extensive' with the reahn of darkness."* Sin is the self-confidence of the 
world, a radical turning away from God. Men walk in death and darkness because they 
reject God's love,"' believing that they do not need God. To depend upon the frail and 
mortal is to point to 'the prince of this world', the incarnation of the purely fleshly mode 
of existence.'^ " 
In contrast are those who are of the realm of spirit. Such people put their faith in 
God and do not depend upon the frail and mortal. Those of the spirit point beyond 
themselves to God, and 'are defined by their radical turning toward God.'*^' In order for 
individuals to turn away from the realm of the flesh to the reahn of spirit God must be 
revealed to them, since otherwise those belonging to the flesh will not know God in 
order to put their faith in him. Schneider expresses this, writing that 'The former [mode 
of existence, that of flesh] absolutizes the world of contingency to which man belongs 
and the second [the reahn of spirit] makes man accept himself for what he really is. He 
turns toward life, toward God and hopes for salvation. I f it is true that the reahn of flesh 
has of itself no knowledge of God (John 15. 22 - 24; 3. 6), then God had to reveal 
himself, otherwise man could never know and live according to the spirit.' 
The revelation of God to humans that saves humans from their attempts at self-
sufficiency is the Logos mcamate, and this is epitomised in the declaration of the 
"*c/John 3.6; 3.15, 22-24 
H. Schneider, 'The Word Made Flesh', p. 345 
John 1.5; 8.12; 12.35; 11.10 
' " Note that it is not the case that God rejects humanity, but vice versa. 
'^ o John 8.44 
Schneider, 'The Word Made Flesh', p.345 
'^ ^ Schneider, 'The Word Made Flesh', p.345, my emphasis 
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Prologue, 'The Logos became Flesh'.'^ ^ The Incarnation of the Logos means that 'God 
reveals himself not in and through the flesh: God is the weak, the contingent, the mortal 
human being Jesus.'The revelation consists in the relation between the Father and 
Jesus, and - perhaps more essentially - the love and self-giving of the Father for and to 
the world. Schneider writes: 
The Son is totally obedient to the Father and thus perfectly reveals the Father (14. 9). How does 
he do that? He does it by being what he is - by being Son. Thus who God is, namely a loving 
Father, and who Jesus is, can only be revealed by a total self-giving, which is, on the one hand, 
perfect obedience to the Father's will and, on the other, a self-sacrificing love for men. Thus in 
the Fourfli Gospel the Cross becomes the place of the fiill revelation of the Son and the Father 
and the Father's love for the world.'^ 
One final question concerning the revelatory soteriology of John is whether such 
a view of salvation based on revelation necessitates 'real' exemplarism. Interestingly, 
there is very little emphasis on morality m John in comparison to the Synoptic Gospels. 
Obvious examples of morality in the Fourth Gospel include the woman caught in 
adultery who is told to sin no more, the foot washing as an example to be followed, and 
the command to 'Love one another'. However, the story of the woman caught in 
adultery is generally agreed to be a later addition, and cannot be taken as representative 
of the Evangelist's thought. The foot washing is an example of self-sacrifice to be 
followed by Jesus' disciples, but this is only secondary, since the primary point of the 
foot washing seems to be that it points to Jesus' death as an act of self-sacrifice. Jesus' 
command to 'love one another' seems to refer to the disciples' attitude toward the other 
disciples, and, by extension, the Johannine community's outlook within itself There is 
no mention of loving neighbours or enemies, as in the Synoptics. Throughout the 
Gospel, there is absolutely no indication that good moral behaviour leads to salvation, 
and no significant emphasis on Jesus as a moral example to follow. This fact 
demonstrates tiiat while the Fourth Gospel suggests a revelatory soteriology, it is in no 
'^ ^ John 1.14 
124 Schneider, 'The Word Made Flesh', p.346 
'^ ^ Schneider, 'The Word Made Flesh', p.353 
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way exemplarist. That is not to say that the Fourth Gospel has no place for morality 
whatsoever: an implicit reference to good moral behaviour as consistent with belief in 
Jesus is made through Jesus' pronouncements that he is the Light and the Way. 
With the exception of that found in the Prologue, the unagery of Jesus as the 
light of the world has moral overtones. Forestell observes that in the Old Testament and 
in late Judaism the Law, the revealed Logos of God, is sometimes regarded as a light 
which leads men to life. '^ Jesus' words, ' I am the Light of the World, the one following 
me will not walk in the darkness''^ ^ imply fiirther moral connotation, since 'to walk' is 
a Semitic metaphor for moral conduct. Likewise, the imagery of Jesus as 'the Way''^* is 
morally connotative, having the implication of being the way marked out by the Law of 
God.'^' In the context of the Farewell discourses, Jesus is probably suggesting that it is 
his mission to show the world the way of faith which people must follow to the Father's 
house. From this it appears that Jesus does not only reveal his own identity and the 
nature of the Father, but also the mystery of God's plan for humanity.'^ " A part of 
God's plan for humanity appears to involve that humans adopt an attitude of love 
towards God and toward one another, and this may be regarded a moral exhortation. 
However, it is not the case that humans are saved by good moral behaviour, rather, 
eternal life, involving love, appears to be the mode of existence individuals are saved 
for through the revelation of God in Jesus, and so 'moral' behaviour is a corollary, and 
not a cause, of salvation. 
Svnopsis 
From this discussion of salvation in the Fourth Gospel, it is apparent that 
revelation is viewed as the means of salvation, and knowledge (in the sense of 
Forestell, Word of the Cross, p.32 
'"John 8.12 
John 14.6 
Forestell, Word of the Cross, p.34 
'^ •^  Forestell, Word of the Cross, p.35 
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fellowship rather than purely intellectual knowledge) of God is viewed as salvation 
itself Furthermore, the evidence suggests that revelatory soteriology is not superficial 
or insubstantial, but that it is deeply-rooted and complex, accompanied by its own 
understanding of sin, of the essence of the revelation, and of the person and significance 
of Jesus. This shows that there is an exception to Mclntyre's statement that 'There is 
virtually no bibUcal evidence for regarding 'revelation' as a soteriological model, 
worthy to be ranked along with the others we have examined','^' and suggests that 
perhaps revelation ought to be reconsidered as a first-order model in the hght of the 
biblical scholarship we have reviewed. Important in this respect is that fact that, as we 
have seen, a revelatory soteriology is not exemplarism under another name, since the 
Fourth Gospel is far from implying 'real' exemplarism at any point. For this reason it 
may be worthwhile sketching a revelatory model and then exploring fiirther whether 
revelatory soteriology falls into the same fraps as exemplarism, as Mclntyre anticipates 
that it would. First, however, it may be valuable to look at some representations of 
revelatory soteriology m the Christian tradition outside the Scriptures, and to observe 
and learn from some of the different ways and forms in which the theme has developed. 
'^'Mclntyre, The Shape of Soteriology. p.50. Cf above, 1.3 
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Chapter Three 
Christian Tradition and a Forgotten Legacy 
3.1 Abailard and the Revelation of Love 
Peter Abailard's thoughts on salvation, expressed most fully in his Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans, are often referred to as the 'moral' or 'exemplarist tiieory' of the 
Atonement. This epithet is misleading in two respects. In the first place, it is erroneous 
to view Abailard as propounding a particular theory of the Atonement. There are 
certainly distinctive and original ideas Abailard explores and consistently expounds 
throughout his work, as, for instance, his perception of the divine essence and divine 
grace as love, his emphasis upon the individual and upon fi%e will, and the 
intemalisation of both sin and salvation. However, it is mistaken to suppose that 
Abailard develops an entire and comprehensive theory of the Atonement, or to assert 
(with Rashdall'^ ^ and others) that he rejects unqualifiedly models such as Christus 
Victor and metaphors alluding to Christ's blood as buying back sinners.'^ ^ The term 
'moral' or 'exemplarist theory' is also deceptive because, as I shall suggest, Abailard 
does not propound an understanding of Atonement which makes moral works the means 
of salvation, nor does he view Christ's importance as consisting primarily in a moral 
example for Christians to follow. As this brief study of Abailard's soteriology aims to 
demonstrate, the consideration of the means by which salvation is attained is focused on 
the revelation of God's love in the person and work of Christ, and the infiision of love 
in the individual that liberates from sin and unites the recipient in love with God and 
with neighbour. 
Discussion of Abailard's soteriology begins with the following passage from his 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 
Rashdall, 'The Abelardian Doctrine of Atonranent', in Doctrine and Development, pp.128 - 145 
'^^ Theol. 'Simmi Bom'TSL. \, cited R.E.Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the 
Soteriology of Peter Abailard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 128 - 129 
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Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the blood of Christ and 
reconciled to God in this way: through this unique act of grace manifested to us - in 
that his Son has taken upon himself our nature and persevered therein in teaching us by 
word and by example even unto death - he has more fully bound us to himself by love; 
with the result that our hearts are enkindled by such a gift of divine grace, and true love 
might not shrink from enduring anything for him.'^'* 
In reaction against this key passage and others expressing similar ideas, 
contemporary and later scholars alike have charged Abailard with Pelagianism or 
exemplarism.'^ ^ Passages such as these appear to imply a superficial understandmg of 
sm, an tmderstatement of the role of grace, and a belittlement of Christ's earthly life and 
death. Bernard of Clairvaux writes that, according to Abailard's teaching, Christ lived 
and died 'for no other purpose than that he might teach how to live by his words and 
example, and point out to them by his passion and death to what limits their love should 
go!''^^ Most recently, even sympathetic Abailardian scholars such as John Marenbon 
continue to emphasise the element of Christ's example as the purpose of the Incarnation 
and crucifixion. Marenbon writes that, concemmg the reason for the Incarnation, 'this 
involved especially emphasizing the Passion as an example of supreme, self-sacrificing 
love, by following which we are enabled to love God properly.''^^ The impression of 
Abailard given here is that an individual's love of God follows on as a consequence or 
reward of their good ethical conduct, that is, of following the moral example of Christ's 
Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, HI. This translation is based on those of both Weingart, and 
E.R. Fairweather in A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham (The Library of Christian Classics Vol. 
X, London, 1956) 
'^ ^ Bernard of Clairvaux, De erroribus Abaelardi, ix. 23, and Thomas of Morigny, Disputatio 
catholicorum patrum adversus dogmata Petri Abaelardi III, cited Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, 
p. 125 
^* Tractatus contra quadam capitida errorum Petri Abaelardi, ad Jnnocentium II Pontificem vii. 17, cited 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p.202 
'^ ^ John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p.64 
60 
self-sacrificing behavioxir. The ethical tendency of Abailard as perceived by Marenbon 
is affirmed when Marenbon writes that Abailard's is a 'morally based view of why God 
became incarnate and suffered death on the Cross'.Clearly such a view would have 
only a minor role for God's grace, believing Christ's work to be not one of transforming 
the individual but merely of showing the individual the means by which they might 
transform themselves. Bernard asks, 'Did he [Jesus] then teach righteousness and not 
bestow it; reveal love and not infiise it?''^' 
I f we take a second look at the representative passage taken from Abailard's 
Commentary on Romans, we may find that Abailard's answer to Bernard would have 
been a firm denial. It might be suggested that the ideas propounded in the passage may 
be re-expressed without any addition or shift of emphasis as follows. Salvation takes 
place through the revelation ('manifestation') of God's love (grace) in Jesus' 
Incarnation, life, and death. This revelation binds individuals to God in Christ by love. 
This has two results. First, the individual is inspired and infiised ('our hearts are 
enkindled') by the love of God. Secondly, because of the love for God with which the 
individual has been inspired and infiised, the individual lives according to God's will. It 
is significant that the ethical element is said to be the result of the revelation and 
inspiration of love, and not, as Marenbon suggests, a cause of being able to love God 
properly. 
A few other points might usefiiUy be made in connection with the passage. First, 
Abailard writes as though God were active in salvation, while the individual is 
relatively passive. God manifests his grace to the individual and binds the individual to 
himself by love. In contrast, the individual is passive; their heart is enkindled, and they 
are bound to God in love. In addition, while it seems at times in Abailard that the 
individual earns salvation, not through moral works but through the ability to love God, 
Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abailard, p.64 
Bernard of Clairvaux, 'Epistle 190 7 - 9', cited and trans. L.W.Grensted, i n ^ Short History of the 
Doctrine of the Atonement (Manchester, 1962), p. 106 
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it is clear on a closer reading that it is God's grace, and not individual free will, that 
enables the individual to love, and actually infuses the individual with love. It appears 
from this that the role of God's grace in the salvation of the individual is not 
undervalued, and that Christ's life and work is in no way reduced to that of moral 
example. 
The work of the revisionist Abailardian scholar R.E. Weingart argues 
persuasively that Abailard is neither exemplarist nor Pelagian. Abailard, he contends, 
maintains the divine initiative, since 'Man is saved by grace, a free, unmerited gift that 
first fransforms his heart before any moral efforts bear the imprint of love.'*'"' The 
means of salvation in Abailard's thought is the revelation of God's love in Christ, and 
'Abailard's primary attention focuses on Jesus Christ's work of revealing divine 
love.''"" However, as with John, the knowledge imparted in this revelation is not 
primarily propositional, but experiential. Just as it is only through knowing that God is 
love that the individual can experience God's love, so it is only through experiencing 
God's love that the individual knows that God is love. Weingart writes that 'The 
knowledge of God revealed in Christ makes a vital difference to the existence of the 
knower.... The disclosure of divme love is tantamount to salvation for those who 
receive God's revelation in faith, hope and love.''''^ 
Weingart emphasises the fact that the revelation of God in Christ is not thought 
by Abailard to be a mere exhibition of what God is like or (as is more commonly 
thought) of what humanity ought to be. Rather, the self-disclosure of God in Jesus has a 
real effect on the individual, since it inspires and infiises divine love into the heart of the 
individual, and it is this which overcomes sin, for God's love reconstructs and reorients 
' the diseased and disordered spiritual life of the sinner.''"^ The revelation of God's love 
Weingart, TTJC Logic of Divine Love, p. 126 
^eingiat. The Logic of Divine Love, p. 121 
'"^  Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, pp.122 - 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 , 1 2 6 
143 ' Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 124 
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does not exhibit love to the mdividual and leave them to replicate it, but spiritually 
transforms the individual, binding them to God and to the rest of hiunanity by love: 'AH 
the possibility of human love for God and other men is created in the revelation of 
divine love.'*'*^ Weingart argues that the divine love revealed in Jesus is 'creative, 
transforming love.'*'*^ It first restores the spiritual life of the individual, renewing the 
individual's relationship with God and with the rest of creation. This love is called 
'grace', since the individual does and is nothing which merits it, and 'because it is 
substantive, a new quality of life that is infused in the heart of man by God.'*'** As 
illustrated by the Romans passage discussed above, it is only after the individual has 
received the gift of transforming love that they participate in the true love of God, 
including ethical behaviour. To do this is not a way of earning salvation, but a fruit of 
salvation. God's love transforms the individual so that they are enabled to 'do all things 
out of love rather than fear - love to him who has shown us such grace that no greater 
can be foimd.'*'*' 
From Weingart's groundbreaking review of Abailard's soteriology it can be 
seen*'** that Abailard is in no way Pelagian or exemplarist. It is not the case that the Ufe 
and death of Jesus are purely exemplary (though they are this secondarily) but that the 
revelation of divine love transforms the individual and infuses them with love. In 
answer to Bernard, Christ did not teach righteousness but not bestow it; nor did he 
reveal love and not infuse it. Paul Fiddes' work on soteriological models recognises this 
in moving away from the use of the term 'subjective theory' in relation to the 
Abailardian soteriology. He observes that Abailard's reflections on the work of Christ 
are focused on the objective work of God as well as on the complementary subjective 
element of himians being prompted by the love of Christ to love God. Abailard speaks 
'""^  Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 125 
'""^  Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 125 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 125 
'"•^  'Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans', n. iii, in Fairweather, A Scholastic Miscellany 
cf Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love 
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of the power of God's love to create as well as to encotirage love within the individual. 
It is not the case that Abailard suggests that Christ's life is a mere demonstration or 
exhibition of love which humans follow in order to accomplish salvation. Rather, 
Christ's demonstration of love is at the same time an objective transformation of 
humanity. Thus Fiddes explains that Abailard believed that '...the revelation in Christ, 
when received by the human mind, is at the same time an actual infiision of love. The 
exhibition is a restoration. The manifestation is a transformation.''"*' In Abailard's 
thought salvation is an objective reality given directly by God, and not a subjective 
process earned by merit, or even given indirectly by God. Abailard's theory, then, it 
seems, is not guilty of reducing the significance of Jesus' Incarnation and death, nor of 
belittling the role of grace or suggestmg that individuals are capable of extricating 
themselves from sin and death. Given this, it would seem strange that Bernard and his 
contemporaries took offence at Abailard's works, and repeatedly had them condemned 
by ecclesiastical authority. 
In the light of this, I suggest that, while not Pelagian or exemplarist in any sense, 
recognition is needed of the distinctiveness of Abailard's views of grace, sin, and 
salvation. Such recognition is important, because some of the distinctive elements of 
Abailard's thought might be integral to a revelatory soteriology. For this reason, I shall 
now turn to distinctive Abailardian ideas such as the interplay between free will and 
grace, and the individualisation and intemalisation of both sin and salvation. 
While it is untrue that Abailard plays down the role of grace, it is true that his 
view of grace is unconventional in comparison with that proposed by Augustine and 
accepted by Anselm, Bernard, and mediaeval theologians in general. Abailard begins by 
questioning how it is that individuals may be damned i f God has chosen to withhold 
from them divine grace, since, he argues, they cannot be guilty unless they are given a 
Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1989), p. 154 
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choice in the matter.'^ " In the light of the Augustinian assertion that prevenient grace is 
needed m order for an individual to accept God's offer of grace, Abailard pushes the 
question further, using the analogy of a sick man and a doctor:'^' a doctor brings to a 
sick man medicine that can cure him, but the sick man is too feeble to reach for and take 
the medicine, and the doctor does not pass it to him. Is the sick man at fault, and can the 
doctor be commended? Abailard's unprecedented suggestion is that, while humans 
certainly need grace, a new 'dose' of grace is not needed at each moment of a 
Christian's life.'^^ There is a single gift of grace, offered to the entirety of humanity, and 
each person is free to accept or reject the grace they are offered. Abailard solves the 
problem by arguing that every person has the innate ability to accept the grace that God 
offers. Following the doctor analogy, Abailard says, ' I do not see how I could solve this 
problem, unless I said that the sick man had something from himself which enabled him 
to get up [and reach the medicine]. And we say that, in the same way all men have from 
themselves that which enables them to get up [and accept the grace they are offered].''^^ 
Avoiding a doctrine of predestination, Abailard appears to some to over-emphasise the 
role of free will in the salvation of the individual. However, the innate ability to accept 
God's grace is a gift thought by Abailard to be given to humans by God, and it is God 
who first offers his unconditional gift of prevenient grace to which people are free to 
respond. Abailard portrays a subtle interplay between grace and free will so that they 
cannot be divided into polar opposites and played off against one another, but must be 
accepted as mutually component and inseparable in the field of salvation. 
God is compassionate, revealing to hiunanity his love, and transforming and 
liberating them from sin. God is also just, and for this reason he rewards with eternal 
Comm. Rom. 240:78 - 242:363, cited in Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, p.325 - 326 
SententieParisienses6Q:lS-21, citsd in Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, p.326 
'^ ^ Though this is contrary to Abailard's statement that 'Grace certainly anticipates us that we may will, 
then follows us so that we are able, and finally joins with us so that we may persevere.' {Apologia seu 
Fidei Confessio 107, cited Tunothy Gorringe, God's Just Vengeance: Crime, Violence, and the Rhetoric 
of Salvation [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p.l 11 - 112) 
Sentientie Parisienses 60:18 - 21, cited in Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, p.326 - 327 
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life those who are Hberated from sin, and who are justified in his sight, and punishes 
those who have neglected to do his will. Once again Abailard appears to verge on 
Pelagianism, but again he is innocent of this charge because of his emphasis on divine 
grace. Those who accept God try to follow his example, living in love in accordance 
with God's wUl. However, it is inevitably the case that even the saints do not reach 
moral perfection or sinlessness, and that they remain imperfect and deficient in this 
respect.'^ '* Abailard writes that these deficiencies are supplemented by Christ's 
meritoriousness,^^^ so that God makes humanity justified in his sight. In so doing, 
Abailard is distinctive in the context of Augustinian theology, reintroducing the 
apostolic idea of the perpetual intercession of Christ for humanity. 
The question of what is to be understood by Christ's meritoriousness, and how 
this may supplement humanity's deficiencies, is one which has aroused a degree of 
scholarly controversy. Weingart underlines the fact that the idea is unrelated to the 
notion of satisfaction propounded by Anselm, and argues that meritoriousness does not 
refer particularly to Christ's death.'^ ^ Weingart suggests that, in a broad sense, Christ's 
meritoriousness alludes to Christ's work, that is, the undoing of the harm done by 
Adam, and thus the forgiveness of sin, justification, and the elimination of the penalty 
of sin.'^ * In a narrower sense, Weingart suggests, Christ's meritoriousness is that which 
comes forth from Christ's absolute obedience to the will of the Father, even to the 
extent of giving up his life, and this meritoriousness supplements that which is lacking 
in the recipient of salvation. Because Abailard internalises sin, the notion is probably to 
be seen as the supplementation of an imperfect or incomplete attitude towards God and 
not the supplementation of particular moral works. Abailard never regards Christ's 
Exp. In Epist. Ad Rom. II. v, cited in Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, pi 42 
' Exp. In Epist. Ad Rom. H. v, cited in Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 142 
Adolf von Hamack, History of Do^na, Vol. VI, trans. William M'Gilchrist (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1899), p.80 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 142 -143 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 144 
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meritoriousness as 'a sum of distinct actions; the fullness of love to God dwelling in 
Christ is His merit.'''' Christ's meritoriousness lies in his self-giving attitude and his 
perfect relationship with God, since 'it is in will, not in works, which are common to the 
good and evil, that all merit consists.''^ " Here as elsewhere, it is untenable that there is 
any suggestion that the believer earns salvation. Rather, salvation involves an attitude of 
love towards God and neighbour which, in order to be complete, requires not only 
God's grace in the form of the intiision of love but also God's grace in the form of 
supplementation of Christ's meritoriousness arising from his life and person. Once 
again, grace and fi^e will are seen to be involved in a complementary and interrelated 
role in the salvation of the individual. It is in Jesus' free human response to the Father 
that meritoriousness is able to supplement the love of the individual, and yet it is also 
through God's grace that the perpetual intercession of Christ is made and is able to be 
made. 
In addition to a distinctive view of grace, Abailard offers a distinctive and 
original angle on sin and salvation, in that, while his understanding is essentially that of 
a late Augustinian theologian, Abailard individualises and internalises sin and salvation 
in an unprecedented way. While both Augustine and Abailard internalise sin and agree 
that it is neither actions nor carnal appetites that in themselves constitute sin, Abailard 
replaces the Augustinian assertion that it is the will to sin that constitutes guilt with the 
idea that it is consent to sin that is the source of guilt.'*' Sin is defined not as a 
particular action, but as the contempt for God's will that harms our relationship with 
God. While it is often observed that an 'exemplarist' view necessitates moral severity, 
Abailard leniently asserts that even i f our desires, that is, will to sin, are not wholly 
quenched, there is no sin so long as we have not consented to sin. Intention is the 
Peter Abailard, cited in von Hamack, History of Dogma, p.79. Hamack does not offer references for 
these quotations. 
Peter Abailard, cited in von Hamack, History of Dogma p.79 
J.G. Sikes, Peter Abailard (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp.185 -190 
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criterion by which our guilt and merit are judged, so that i f we intend to do evil but are 
prevented we are guilty, while i f we intend to do good but cannot we are viewed as 
meritorious in God's sight. I f morality is based on consent and intention, then God's 
will must be known before it can be either taken up or rejected, and so actions contrary 
to God's will committed in ignorance do not confer guilt. Therefore, while Bernard and 
Ansebn believe that those who crucified Christ were guilty only of venial sin because of 
their ignorance, Abailard goes a step further and argues that, because they believed they 
were doing God's will, those who killed Jesus were not guilty. This claim, he writes, is 
supported by Christ's prayer to forgive them, 'for they know not what they do'.'^^ 
The intemalisation of sin in Abailard leads to the individualisation of sm, 
perhaps his most radical contribution to theology. F.W. Dillistone observes that the truly 
distinctive aspect of Abailard's thought lies not in any perceived 'subjectivity', but, 
rather, in the emphasis upon the individual: 'Abelard marks the transition from an 
outlook which saw God dealing with humanity as a whole, either through a legal 
transaction or through a mystical transfiision, to one in which the ethical and 
psychological qualities of the individual within the community began to receive fuller 
recognition.''*"' One interesting aspect of intemalisation and individualisation is that it 
means that sin and guilt necessitate reason and therefore free will, thus leading to the 
rejection of the Augustinian notions that humans could not help but sin because of their 
disposition towards evil, and that imbaptised infants are guilty of sin through 
inheritance.'^ Placing a heavy emphasis on the necessity of reason and free will for sin, 
Scito Teipsum, 13% coll. 653flF, cited Sikes, Peter Abailard p. 187 
'^ ^ F.W. Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonemeni (Welwyn: Nisbet, 1968), p.325 
In opposition to this stand statements in which Abailard claims that unbaptised babies are damned in 
the sense of being deprived from the beatific vision, and says that God mercifiilly allows to die 
unbaptised only those babies whom he has foreseen would have grown up to be very wicked and incurred 
greater punishments still if they did not die in infancy (Comm. Rom. 164: 536 - 170: 554, cited 
Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard p.325). Further, Abailard writes, it is not extraordinary that 
the unbaptised that die in mfancy should be punished while their parents are pardoned, since the sin is 
transferred to them in the wicked concupiscence involved in their conception (Comm. Rom. 250: 72 - 7, 
cited Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard p.330). These more traditionally Augustinian ideas 
have less prominence in Abailard then those which he suggests to supersede them. It is possible that 
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Abailard defines venial sin as that done in forgetfiilness, or because a person is 
provoked or particularly prone to a certain failure. Mortal sin is reserved for that which 
is premeditated or done for pleasure. Therefore, in contrast to McGrath's portrayal of 
Rashdall, Abailard would be more temperate towards those who suffer from a 
psychological disorder that prevents them from doing God's will, than were 
contemporaries of Abailard such as Bernard.'*' 
The way in which salvation takes place according to Abailard is similarly 
internalised and individuaUsed, and it is this that has led scholars to regard Abailard's 
model as 'subjective'. However, it is not the case that Abailard's view of Atonement is 
a 'subjective' one. Rather, Abailard demonstrates psychological insight into how the 
'objective' revelation given by God in Jesus affects and transforms the individual so as 
to bring about their salvation. However, the 'objective' revelation of God's love as the 
means of salvation remains central to Abailard, in the same way that Jesus' sacrifice on 
the Cross or the satisfaction of the Father were central to Augustine and Anselm before 
him. 
The primary content of Jesus' salvific revelation is that God is, in his essence 
and in his attitude toward humanity, the God of love. Abailard expresses this repeatedly 
in his Conmientary on the Epistle to the Romans, as when he writes of the Pauline 
phrase, "To the showing of his justice", 'that is, his love - which as has been said, 
justifies us in his sight.''** The nature of God as unconditionally loving and 
compassionate is disclosed throughout Jesus' life, person, and work, but is revealed 
most especially in his sufferings and death. The rejection, agony and torture Jesus 
Abailard is employing irony in these passages, to ridicule the opinions he opposes. However, it is equally 
possible that Abailard reverts to traditional Augustinian thought at times since, while he represents the 
marri^e of rationality and faith, it may be anachronistic to suppose that he had done away with these 
ideas all together. 
Sikes, Peter Abailard, p. 187 -188 
'Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans', III. xxiv, in Fairweather, A Scholastic Miscellany, p.279 
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underwent during the last days of his earthly life are a certain indication of the value of 
sinners in God's eyes.'*' 
One facet of the disclosure of God's love is that, as the crucifixion reveals, 
forgiveness of sin is costly to God and involves self-sacrifice. Sin frustrates God's plan 
for creation, disordering the unity and wholeness of creation and alienating creatures 
from God and from one another.'** While Abailard continues to maintain divine 
unpassibility, he asserts that the decision to forgive humanity is not one God can make 
indifferently or apatheticaUy, since to forgive necessitates self-sacrifice of God. 
Weingart asserts this when he writes, 'Even though God is eternally forgiving, his 
mercy would too easily be counted as indulgence if he had not revealed its cost to him 
in the Incarnation and death of his own Son.''*' Perhaps the inclination to express this 
verity is part of the reason for Abailard's return to the language of the preciousness of 
Christ's redemptive blood,''" which emphasises the cost to God of humanity's 
Atonement. At any rate, this emphasis demonstrates that, contrary to critics, Abailard 
does not take sin lightly or see himians as capable of disentangling themselves from 
something that affects the very fabric of creation. 
Additionally, from this it can be seen that, m Abailard's thought, the revelation 
of God in Christ takes place primarily on the Cross, demonstrating God's love for his 
creation, and, in relation to this, the cost to God of forgiveness and the value of 
hiraianity to him. The cruciocentric nature of Abailard's thought transpires to be 
problematic for a revelatory soteriology, since, taken on its own, it may not reveal 
anything imless it falls back upon an alternative 'traditional' model. This is shown by 
Fiddes' criticism that the Abailardian model does not explain why Jesus' death was 
necessary to reveal God's love. Echoing Denney, Fiddes asks why it is that Jesus' death 
' *^ Exp. In Epist. Ad Rom. II. iii, cited Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 122 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 129 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 128 
™ Ep. V, cited Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p.l28 -129 
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is salvific since, on an Abailardian model, it fails to explain why it is on the Cross that 
God's love is demonstrated. A less cruciocentric approach may have rescued Abailard 
from this problem. In addition, as Fiddes points out, the notion of the revelation of God 
as suffering would salvage Abailard's arguments had Abailard been able to siumoimt 
the insistence upon divine impassibility in the theology of his day. This appears ironic, 
since Abailard is often thought to propoimd the absolute freedom of God, yet here he 
reverts to other soteriological models for support because he cannot contemplate that 
God is free to suffer. The tendencies to emphasise the Cross exclusively and to deny 
divine passibility may be a weakness in Abailard's thought, but is something that is not 
inherent to a revelatory soteriology. A discussion of the reason for Jesus' death on a 
revelatory model will be imdertaken in the Conclusion. 
A further but subordinate revelation takes place through Jesus' Resurrection and 
Ascension. Abailard taught that the Resurrection is a revelation of Jesus' divine status, 
because God has raised Jesus from the dead and his body is now glorious and 
incorruptible.'^ * Moreover, m the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,'''^  
Abailard, following Paul, emphasises the idea that Jesus' Resurrection is the guarantee 
of the future resurrection of the dead, m which the bodies raised will, like Christ's, be 
spiritual, glorified, and immortal.''^ Thus Weingart writes of the Abailardian view of 
Christ's work, 'In his incarnation and death he revealed the divine love; in his 
resurrection and exaltation he reveals the future glory of elect mankind.''^* 
The revelation of divine love in Christ is the means by which God secures 
himianity's salvation, and this is concomitant with the salvific re-binding of the 
individual to God by love and the infusion of love. In those who accept the revelation of 
God in Christ, God infuses the divine grace, which in Abailard is love, which spiritually 
In die Paschae, cited in Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p.416 
Exp. In Epist. Ad Rom. I. i, cited in Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 147 
Exp. In Epist Ad Rom. I. ii, cited in Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p.l47 
Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 149 
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transforms the recipient, 'joining him to God and his neighbour in an indissoluble bond 
of affection.Weingart speaks of how divine love effects a spiritual transformation in 
the individual, vmting that: 
It [divine love] works a radical transformation of man's spuitual centre and reorientation of his 
rational, volitional, and emotional faculties. Whereas the old man of sin wrongly loves the 
shadow of the truth, in Christ he is instructed in the truth by the Truth himself; whereas he 
consented to evil and despised his Creator, in Christ he is freed from sin that he may love God in 
perfect obedience; whereas he was emotionally warped by servile fear, in Christ he is re-created 
in the affection of love, by which he loves God only for his own sake and the neighbour for 
God's sake.... Man is justified and sanctified by God in love, he is recreated by the Lnilision of 
love, he lives a life of love in the community of the faithfijl.'^* 
Because of the intemalisation of sin, the infiision of divine love is salvation because it 
liberates the individual from obeying God through fear, which is a sinful attitude, to 
obeying God through love, which is a person's proper attitude towards God. Once 
again, salvation is perceived as being given by God rather than being eamed by humans: 
while himians respond freely to God's initial revelation, it is God that rnfiises in those 
who accept his revelation the gift of love that liberates from sin and fear. 
Scholars have emphasised Abailard's inclusion of the importance of Christ's life 
and teachings as an example and pattern to follow, and it is tme that Abailard gives a 
significant place to Christ's example in his theology. Jesus' earthly life provides the 
Christian with a pattem to follow, and, according to Abailard, it is the divine plan that 
humanity surpass its pre-Fall state.'^' The infusion of love frees the individual from sin, 
so that they may strive for moral perfection, having been given by God the ability to 
love God and neighbour, from which they were formally prevented by their estranged 
state. Jesus demonstrated by actions and words the way in which humans should live, 
taught his disciples how to pray, and, in particular, through his passion and death, 
showed Christians the exfremes of suffering which they may have to imdergo, and the 
attitude with which suffering should be faced. Abailard writes, 'So that we might persist 
'^ ^ Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 124 
'™ Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p.204 - 205 
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strongly in the agony of suffering for Christ's sake, he is always to be before our eyes 
and his passion ought always to be an example for us lest we fail.''^* 
Those who are saved in Christ have an example to follow, a moral paradigm 
after which to strive. However, contrary to those who see Pelagianism in Abailardian 
theology, moral goodness is always regarded a consequence and not a cause of 
salvation: moral perfection is not what liberates humanity, but is part of what himianity 
is liberated to. While Abailard seems to deny the idea that grace is given perpetually and 
at every moment, he does insist that individuals are saved by grace and that grace alone 
makes himian value and good works possible. He writes that 'The grace of God is 
necessary for everyone, and... without it neither a natural faculty nor free will is 
sufficient for salvation.'"' 
Abailard is significant for this study, primarily because he is accused of 
exemplarism but actually suggests a revelatory soteriology. In addition, Abailard is 
important because his psychological insight into how the revelation and infusion of love 
affects the individual may highlight a potential valuable characteristic of revelatory 
soteriology. The related individualisation and intemalisation of both sin and salvation, 
and the refusal to separate the complementary roles of grace and free will, are, as we 
shall see, perennial issues to the discussion. The remainder of this chapter, however, 
will be comprised of a consideration of whether Abailard's revelatory soteriology is an 
exception without foimdation or reiteration in the rest of Church tradition, or whether 
the Abailardian model represents one strand of Christian tradition that has been 
overlooked and neglected by exponents of so-called 'objective' models. While Abailard 
represents something of a test-case for the discussion of whether a revelatory model has 
established itself m Christian tradition, I shall turn now more briefly to Origen, to GWH 
Lampe, and to the Romanian Orthodox theologian Dumitru Staniloae, in order to show 
Sermo XIV, cited in Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, p. 126 - 127 
Apologia seu Fidei Confessio 107, cited Gorringe, God's Just Vengeance, p. I l l 
73 
that Abailard is by no means unique in suggesting a revelatory model. It should be 
emphasised that the scholars I now intend to discuss are few and far between, not 
because representatives of a revelatory model are sparse and difficult to fmd, but 
because I hope to represent, however briefly, Christianity as a whole, in its ancient and 
its contemporary, and in its eastern and western forms. 
3.2 Origen and Redemptive Pedagogy 
The theme of salvation as divine revelation was prominent in the patristic era, 
and therefore it would be equally plausible to discuss the idea as it developed in 
theologians such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Irenaeus of Lyons. 
However, I have chosen to highlight the pedagogical soteriology of Origen, since, while 
the theme is crucial to the other fathers, it finds its cuhnination as a distinctive 
soteriology in Origen.'*" As with Abailard, the theme does not become a theory in 
Origen, but remains an idea developed alongside other soteriological themes, 
particularly in Origen's case that of Christ as a ransom to the devil. However, contrary 
to Origen's critics,'*' it is not the case that ransom and revelatory soteriology are 
incompatible. The former concerns the initial liberation of humanity from evil forces, 
while the latter speaks of the pedagogical process individuals then undergo in order that 
they may turn freely to God.'*^ Significantly, Origen develops a soteriology that is both 
revelatory and pedagogical, rooting the salvific work of Christ in the context of God's 
saving work in Israel, and the salvific work of the Holy Spirit in the Church and in the 
life of the individual. While it is only within the scope of the current dissertation to 
discuss christocentric soteriology alone, Origen's sense of the interconnectedness of 
Christ's work to that of God throughout history adds insight mto the pedagogical 
Cf Karen Jo Torjesen, 'Pedagogical Soteriology from Clement to Origen', m Origeniana Quarta: Die 
Referate des 4. Intemationalen Origeneskongresses (Innsbruck, 2. - 6. September 1985), p.370 - 379 
Especially De Faye, Origen, iii, p.210, and Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, p.l9, cited in Jean Danielou, 
Origen, trans, by Walter Mitchell (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p.269 
This observation was made by Danielou, Origen, p.269 
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experience of the individual that can only be hinted at here. While the work of Christ as 
Revealer takes precedence here, I hope to touch upon the idea of divine pedagogy in 
order to give an impression of the theological fi-amework in which a christological 
revelatory soteriology is best understood. 
The idea of Christ as Revealer permeates Origen's writings. In speaking of the 
relationship between Father and Son, for instance, Origen cannot help but speak of the 
revelation of the Father in the Son. Origen characteristically uses analogy to express the 
relationship between the Father and the Son, and the analogy used expresses well the 
idea of the revelation of God in Christ. Suppose, he writes, that there were a statue so 
large that it fills the whole world, and could therefore be seen by no one, and that 
another statue were made identical, yet far smaller, 'altogether resembling it in the 
shape of the limbs, and in the featiu-es of the countenance, and in form and material, but 
without the same immensity of size'. Such a statue would make known the first statue to 
those who were formally imable to see it, by virtue of the fact that the second is made so 
entirely in the image of the first. In a similar way, 'the Son of God, divesting Himself of 
His equality with the Father, and showing to us the way to the knowledge of Him, is 
made the express image of His person: so that we, who were unable to look upon the 
glory of that marvellous light when placed in the greatness of His Godhead, may, by His 
being made to us brightness, obtain the means of beholding the divine light by looking 
upon the brightness.''*^ Here, as throughout Origen's thought, the purpose of Christ's 
Incarnation, life and death lies in the revelation of the divine nature to creation. 
Again, the idea of Christ as Divine Pedagogue is crucial to Origen's thought. 
Meditating on Paul's words that Christ is the 'brightness of the gloiy of God', Origen 
speaks of God as the light from whom brightness proceeds inseparably, illuminating all 
of creation. It is by the splendour of brightness that hvunans tmderstand and know what 
De Principiis 1.2.8, trans. Frederick Crombie, The Early Church Fathers and Other Works 
(Edinburgh: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1867) 
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light is, and, in like manner, Christ is the brightness and splendour through whom 
humanity can ultimately know the Light. Origen speaks of Christ's pedagogy as a 
tender infroduction to light that will eventually enable humans to enjoy the divine vision 
unresfricted and without limit: 
And this splendour, presenting itself gentiy and softly to the frail and weak eyes of mortals, and 
gradually training, as it were, and accustoming them to bear the brightaess of the light, when it 
has put away from them every hindrance and obsdaiction to vision, according to the Lord's own 
precept," Cast forth the beam out of thine eye," it renders them capable of enduring the splendour 
of the light, being made in this respect also a sort of mediator between men and the light. 
Origen's emphasis on the work of Christ as Revealer and the soteriology arising 
from this is rooted in a Logos christology. In this way, the pedagogical work of Christ is 
not restricted to that of the earthly Christ in first-century Palestine, but to the work of 
the Logos in etemity. The Logos reveals the divine nature to humanity, both through 
creation and through Scripture. Revelation takes place through Scripture, though not 
primarily through the history or words literally understood. Rather, salvation is imparted 
through the 'inner rationality of Scripture'.'*^ The literal aspect of Scripture holds the 
image of the Logos veiled, while the 'rationality of Scripture' (its spiritual sense) 
discloses the Logos unveiled. Origen expresses this by speaking of the literal sense 
being seen, while the spiritual sense is perceived. Characteristically, this is related by 
Origen to Christ's hiunan and divine natures, the former of which is seen and which 
veils the latter, potentially perceived nature inherent in the spiritual sense of 
Scripture.'** The many layers of meaning to be fotmd in Scripture and the diversity of 
genre and content make Scripture the perfect instrument for the revelation of the Logos, 
both in terms of the fact that differing individuals have differing needs of salvation. 
De Principiis 1.1.7, trans. Crombie, Early Church Fathers 
Torjesen,'Soteriology', p. 374 
Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 11, cited Torjesen, 'Soteriology', p.374 
Origen, Commentary on John, 1.20, cited Torjesen, 'Soteriology', p.376 
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and, consequent upon this, in terms of the multiplicity the Logos took upon himself in 
order to make God (unknowable in his simplicity) known to creation.'** 
Revelation also takes place through creation becausie the world was made 
through the Logos, and, therefore, all of creation bears the image of the Logos. This 
image is thought by Origen to be an inner rationality (or logos), the reason for existence, 
and purpose. For this reason, Origen (in contrast to Clement and others) views 
knowledge of the cosmos as an inherent part of knowledge of the Logos, for 'to know 
the Logos of a thing is akeady to possess partial knowledge of the Logos himself whose 
unage they reflect'.'*' Origen presupposes a particular affinity between God and the 
human mind, and this presupposition lends itself to a pedagogical soteriology."° 
The revelation and pedagogy of the Logos is not regarded simply as a sort of 
super donum given over and above the gift of salvation. Rather, revelation and 
pedagogy are the essence of the means of salvation, and salvation is, accordingly, 'face 
to face knowledge of God'.'" The revelation of God in the Logos takes place 
throughout the history of creation, as is recognised by Jean Danielou when he writes 
that Origen 'regards the world as the scene of an educative process carried on by the 
Logos, who as Master and Healer was gradually inducing all free creatures to return to 
the good' and that Origen holds 'the idea of the Redemption as something 
pedagogical'."^ Despite the universalising of Christ's revelation, the Incarnation is still 
regarded as the focal point of this revelation, 'a veritable revelation of God'"^, and in 
some sense the crux of God's saving activity, so that 'Even at the very highest climax of 
contemplation we do not for a moment forget the incarnation.' 
Origen, Homily on Numbers. XXVH. l , cited Torjesen, 'Soteriology', p.376 
' Toqesen,' Soteriology', p.373 
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Salvation takes place through the revelation of the divine nature and through the 
pedagogy of Christ the eternal Logos. However, this not to imply that in order to be 
saved it is necessary to be intellectual or to possess particular spiritual insight. As with 
the other revelatory soteriologists considered, the revelation is not primarily 
propositional or intellectual, but experiential, involving relationship with God."' In 
addition, pedagogy is a progressive affair, and, accordingly, Origen outlines a schema 
for the development and salvation of the Christian. Danielou writes that 'Revelation was 
... at once a single entity and a gradual unfolding. It is important to realize that if, in 
Origen's view, revelation implied an advance in knowledge, it also meant an advance in 
the out-working of salvation.''^ The Logos does not reveal to or teach in the sarne way 
to every individual, and the content and the medium of the revelation is dependent upon 
the capacity of the recipient. Of the different senses of Scripture Origen writes that 'For 
pedagogical reasons, it is so constructed that the simple will think it simple; but people 
who want to go deeper will find, i f they have the ability, that wisdom really worthy of 
God's word is hidden in it. '* ' ' This idea corresponds to a view that sees salvation as 
corresponding to individual potential, so that the divine vision is revealed in proportion 
to the degree to which a particular person can grasp it. The experiential and capacity-
relative nature of Origen's view of divine revelation and pedagogy is simmiarised by the 
fact that the 'education soteriolo^' of Clement and Origen moves away from what 
scholars have called 'Christos Didascalos' soteriology to a 'Christos Paedagogos' 
soteriology. The significance of this lies in the fact that 'didascalos', emerging from the 
context of philosophical schools, expresses the idea of teaching in the sense of 
demonstration and explanation.'^ In contrast to this, 'paedagogos', arising from the 
context of bringing up children, includes the idea of instruction of a novice, and 
Gorringe, Redeeming Time, p. 4 
Danielou, Origen, p. 126 
Origen, Contra Celsum 5.6, trans. Crombie, Early Church Fathers 
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discipline and correction. The idea of Christ as Pedagogue, therefore, involves not 
primarily intellectual or propositional teaching, but the kmd of gentle progressive 
encouragement and education suggested by an ideal model of child nurture. 
In the light of Origen's revelatory and pedagogical soteriology, one may be 
justified in asking whether Origen should be categorised as suggesting an 'exeniplarist-
type' soteriology. Unlike Clement, Origen sees Christ's salvific work not primarily as 
offering an example and teaching to live a perfect life, but as revealmg the divine nature 
and guiding the individual to God. Toijesen writes that 'the Logos Paedagogos of 
Clement is first a trainer and disciplinarian in the life of virtue and then a guide and 
model for the ethical perfection of the Gnostic. In contrast, the Logos Paedagogos of 
Origen is a revealer, mediating a knowledge of God through his own self-disclosures in 
the Scriptures and in the cosmos.^^'^ This would suggest that Origen's soteriology, 
while focusing on a soteriology which would be regarded by critics as 'subjective' and 
'moral', does not suggest a view of salvation that is based on example. 
This view is further confirmed by the fact that Origen concurs with Celsus' 
criticism that Christianity has nothing new to offer in terms of morality and ethical 
teaching. The Greek philosophers have already said all that is important on the matter, 
and, fiirthermore, every individual has an inborn and instinctive awareness of what is 
right and what is wrong, so that 'it is not therefore matter of surprise that the same God 
should have sown in the hearts of all men those truths which He taught by the prophets 
and the Saviour'.^"' Christianity does not teach an original and unprecendented ethical 
system, but reveals God's love, thus providing a theological basis for existing moral 
principles. Chadwick expresses this when he writes that 'It [the Gospel] does not bring a 
new morality, but a recognition of the divine righteousness and love as the underlying 
Torjesen, 'Soteriology', p.376 
Origen, Contra Celsum, 1.4, trans. Crombie, Early Church Fathers. Cf also 2.5 
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ground of the highest ethical aspiration.'^ "^ While an exemplarist view tends to see 
Christ as inaugurating a completely new moral system, Origen believes that the 
importance of the Incamation lies not in ethical teaching and example, but in the 
revelation of God. Of course, the life of the believer becomes rooted in this 
imderstanding of God, and this results in a corresponding love of neighbour that 
produces moral behaviour. However, it is not the case that Christ's significance is 
reduced to this alone, or that individuals can cam salvation and forgo God's grace. 
Chadwick vmtes that Origen did not suggest 'that the believer, following Christ as 
example, can find his ... way to God independently of Christ.'^ "^ 
To conclude, it can be said that Origen, alongside other scholars we have 
discussed, represents one significant and neglected strand of Christian thought. Here as 
elsewhere, the idea of salvation as revelation emerges as distinct and independent of 
exemplarism. In confrast to Abailard, Origen represents it in its eastem and early form, 
emphasising the significance of the Incamation and not yet focusing primarily on Jesus' 
death. Origen is significant for this dissertation, because, while it is not withm the scope 
of the dissertation to develop the idea, Origen gives a sense of the way that the 
revelation of God in Christ is to be seen in the context of God's pedagogical work 
throughout history, and not as an isolated occurrence of the first-century. 
3.3 Lampe: Revelation and Faith 
G.W.H. Lampe's essay "The Atonement: Law and Love"^"^ attacks 'legalistic' 
interpretations of Jesus' death, suggesting in their place what Alister McGrath calls 'an 
Chadwick, Christian Thought, p. 105 
"^^  Chadwick, Christian Thought, p.92. Chadwick is speaking in the context of Origen's view of 
deification, but the same may also be said of salvation more generally. 
G.W.H. Lampe, Soundings: Essays Concerning Christian Understanding, ed. A.R. Vidler, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p.l73 -192 
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exemplarist approach based on "the paradox and miracle of love.'"^"' As has been seen, 
an exemplarist approach may be defined as the soteriological model that holds that 
Jesus' significance lies in providing an example through his life and teachings of a good 
moral life, which is to be followed by those seeking salvation. Such 
characteristically involves a belittlement of grace in favour of tiie idea that humans earn 
their own salvation, and an inadequate and superficial view of sin as ignorance. I shall 
turn now to Lampe's work, suggesting that Lampe is erroneously labelled 'exemplarist' 
by McGrath, since he is a further representative of that strand of Christianity which
propounds a non-exemplarist revelatory model of the Atonement. I shall focus in 
particular on the role of grace and the nature of sin according to Lampe, because these 
highhght the vast difference between exemplarism and a model based on revelation, and 
because of their insight and their significance for a revelatory soteriology. I shall 
include some of Lampe's criticisms of'legalistic' models such as that of satisfaction, for 
it is primarily in his negation of and in contrast to these that Lampe's own model comes 
to light. 
In reviewing the work of Lampe, I hope to demonstrate that the following is true 
of his soteriological model. In essence, the salvific work of Christ for humanity is that 
Christ reveals to humanity the xmconditional love of God for them. Such a revelation is 
thought to be salvific for it transforms the individual's relationship with God from one 
of various attempts at self-justification, to one of faith that God accepts them despite 
their sinfiilness. One result of this faith is that the individual freely chooses to behave 
more ethically, responding positively to God's unqualified love for them. Moral 
behaviour is not viewed as a requisite of salvation, for, Lampe insists, God accepts them 
before any ethical transformation, that is, while they are still sinfiil. Grace plays the 
cenfral part for Lampe, and it is pivotal for him that God reconciled humanity to 
Mister McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1994), 
p.359 
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himself, rather than that humanity reconciled God to itself, as in some of the post-
biblical, "objective" models. Sin is viewed, not as ignorance, but as individuals' 
attempts at self-justification which lead to self-righteousness or to self-hatred and away 
from faith in God. 
According to Lampe, the belief that God is love has its root ultimately in 
Christ's death and Resurrection, since it is on the Cross that God is 'revealed as life-
giving love'.^*'^  Jesus' death is the supreme act of divine love, which reconciles us to 
God, because it reveals his love for us. As in much post-Reformation theology, the 
opposite of sin is viewed, not as virtue, but as faith. In the revelation of divine love in 
Christ, God has overcome sin by establishing the possibility of faith, that is, he has 
'broken through the barrier of man's estrangement from his Maker and brought him into 
the relation of a son to a father'.^"' The essence of the Christian Gospel is radical and 
world-shattering, demonstrating that God reconciles humanity to himself. This is a 
reversal of all ordinary values, especially those of religion, which generally involves 
humans attempting to reconcile God to themselves, either by obeying his laws or else by 
offering satisfaction or sacrifices to him. Because of the newness of this idea, it catmot 
easily be expressed in the existing categories of religious thought. The ancient 
conception of a covenant between God and humanity has not only been fulfilled in 
Christ - it has been given a new meaning. What is entirely new about the covenant is 
that it is not the case that God's love and compassion towards people is the result of the 
people's observance of God's law or of any recompense they make for having 
disobeyed it. The right relationship to God (which is righteousness) cannot be attained 
by humanity's own wil l or ethical behaviour. Rather, sinners do not need to attempt 
^ Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 175 
"^^  Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 175 
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self-justification, for God accepts them as they are: 'The new covenant rests simply on 
God's acceptance of sinners.'^ "* 
Biblical motifs such as sacrifice, deliverance, and Adam-Christ parallels arose as 
a result of the need to express this new covenant in the conceptual fi-amework of the 
older religious ideas. They all contain some aspect which gives them some affinity with 
Christ's reconciliation of humanity to God, yet, even taken together, they only express 
the truth partially, for 'they belonged to a reakn of religious belief which had been 
radically transformed.'^"' Paul recognised that Christ effected a transformation in which 
the principle of law was superseded by that of imconditional divine love. God is no 
longer seen primarily as a divine judge, punishing the wicked and rewarding the 
righteous. Rather, 'His gracious approach encountered man, not in the state in which he 
would like to be, but where he actually is, in a condition of alienation and enmity.'^'" 
Legalistic religion is fundamentally self-centred, because it concerns humans' 
efforts to justify themselves, both to themselves, and to God. The attempt at self-
justification prevents the individual fi-om accepting God's unconditional love, that is, 
the acceptance of the sinner as they are. The attempt to become acceptable produces 
internal discord, involving the refusal on the part of the individual to come to terms with 
themselves. It is the attempt of the individual to make themselves acceptable (and not 
ignorance) that is the essence of sin, for this is the 'impassible barrier which interposes 
itself^'' between God and the individual. 
Legalism (epitomised for Paul in the Pharisee's reliance upon the Torah) serves 
sin, because it advocates either self-righteousness or else self-hatred. It 'expresses and 
generates that attitude to God which consists either in confidence in one's own 
achievement and the belief that one can become acceptable to God by virtue of one's 
Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 176 
Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 177 
Lampe, 'Atonement', p.l78 
^" Lampe, 'Atonement', p.l78 
83 
own merits, or else in the overwhelming sense of guilt which indicates hatred of oneself 
and either despair said hatred of God or the fear of God which seeks for some means to 
propitiate his wrath and satisfy his justice.'^'^ The Gospel supersedes the law because, 
according to the Gospel, 'justification comes from the free and unmerited grace of God 
and has only to be accepted'.^" God is the Father and not the judge of humanity, and he 
becomes their judge only i f they insist upon regarding him as such. 
The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England assert that Christ 'truly 
suffered, was crucified, dead and buried, to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a 
sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for all actual sins of men'.^"* This assertion 
is a reversal of the Gospel advocated in the New Testament, for in the Thirty-Nine 
Articles humans reconcile God to themselves, while in the Gospel God reconciles 
humanity to himself. The estrangement now appears to be on the part of God rather than 
on the part of humanity: 'God was at enmity with us, rather than we with him.'^'^ God 
is reconciled to humanity through Christ's death, which aimuls human's sin and makes 
them acceptable to God: 'The work of Christ is now seen, not as effected from the side 
of God towards men, reconciling them to God, but from the side of man towards God, 
reconciling him and causing him to acquit the guilty.'^'^ The Gospel is forced back into 
the sphere that it replaced, that of legalistic justice and transgression. God's grace is still 
required, since other humans could not do what Christ did for them, but this does not 
alter the fact that God is no longer seen to express unconditional love for and 
acceptance of his creation. In addition to this problem, Lampe criticises this legalistic 
attitude, for it interprets sm 'as a transgression of commandments instead of as a deep 
violation of personal relationship.'^'^ 
'^^  Lampe, 'Atonement', p.l79 
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To interpret Jesus' death in this way, as represented by an interpretation of the 
Cross as satisfaction or as sacrifice, neglects the fact that Christ's teachings and works 
speak of God's love and unconditional acceptance of humanity, as, for instance, Jesus' 
declarations of divine forgiveness of sinners and reception of them into fellowship with 
himself. This acceptance comes before Christ' death, and before any ethical behaviour, 
though ethical behaviour may be the result of the revelation of unconditional love: 
'Zacchaeus was not called upon to make restitution before Christ entered his home; he 
repented and made amends because Christ had already accepted him as a sinner.'^'* 
Lampe particularly criticises TertuUian's view of 'satisfaction' being made by 
the penance of sinners,^" which is especially representative of a legalistic approach. 
Such a portrayal of both God and sin, i f applied to Jesus' parable of the prodigal son, 
would make for an entirely alternative ending, since it 'would make the Father exact 
compensation from the prodigal son before killing the fatted calf for him.'^^" Where this 
view of satisfaction is applied to Jesus' death, it is not the case that the expression of 
God's love disappears entirely. Rather, God expresses his love by finding a way to 
satisfy his demands of justice and so overcome the punishment due to humans, given 
that fallen humanity is unable to accomplish it for itself. However, on this model love is 
secondary to justice. Lampe observes that 'love has to serve the ends of justice, and 
justice remains the higher principle, inhibiting the free acceptance of sinful men imtil 
fiiU satisfaction has been made on their behalf.'^' Lampe notes that it is no wonder that 
models which make God's justice the highest principle and speak of God's love only 
secondarily are often accompanied by an hierarchical view of the Trinity, in which 
Christ, representmg love, is subordinated to the Father, who is seen as justice. 
Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 190 
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In the context of the Reformers, who saw God as unable to forgive until 
compensation had been made, Lampe notes that forgiveness after satisfaction has been 
fully made is no forgiveness at all, even though m this case it is God, the forgiver, who 
undertakes to pay the compensation to himself.'^^^ Advocating the Christ-Adam motif, 
developed primarily by Irenaeus and later Luther, Lampe underscores the idea that 
Christ reversed Adam's disobedience, which was attempted independence and self-
justification, by showing utter dependence upon and obedience toward God. In so 
doing, Christ overcame sin, restoring the relationship between God and his creation. 
To portray God as punishing humans retributively is to make God in the image 
of sinful humanity. It is arguable that the corporal punishment is necessary in an 
unperfect society such as ours, but, either way, it indicates the limited and often flawed 
nature of our society, signifying 'the bankruptcy of justice through the failure of 
love.'^^^ It is, ultimately, an admission of failure on the part of the executioners, because 
' I t is a short-term way of dealing with an unsolved problem, but it is no solution' 
Were God to adopt the same policy and condemn sinners to destruction in hell, he could 
not be called Ahnighty, but impotent. This is because 'To hang the criminal is to admit 
defeat at the level of love, and a God whose dealings with his creatures end in their 
condenmation to hell is a God whom evil has defeated' .This is the case, whether the 
view involves sinners being thrown into hell because of their misdeeds, or that Jesus 
suffers and dies in their place. 
To deny the idea that God exercises retributive justice is not to deny the reality 
of hell, which, Lampe argues, does pertain. Hell is the state of existence of those who 
refuse God's unconditional love, who persist in attempts at self-justification. Hell is 
estrangement from God - but this estrangement is not decreed by God, nor does he 
Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 185 
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throw humans into it. Instead, 'Hell is made by man, and only man can consign himself 
to it'.^^^ Similarly, Christ's death was inflicted as a punishment, not by God, but by 
humans in an attempt to justify themselves and to secure their own righteousness before 
God. Paradoxically, this was to reject God utterly, 'to ki l l him with every 
accompaniment of contempt and hatred'^^', because it was to reject his imconditional 
love. 
The Cross is both the ultimate sign of humanity's hatred of God, and the 
ultimate sign of God's love of humanity. It is on the Cross that God accepts humanity at 
its most depraved and imacceptable: ' in that very focal point of hatred the love of God 
accepts him despite the worst that he can do, in his most extreme sinfuhiess and bitter 
e n m i t y ' C h r i s t takes upon himself humanity's hafred, and shares humanity's 
estrangement and despair. Jesus' death is an expiation for sin, but only in the sense that 
through it the sinner is accepted as a child of God. In Christ's death, the old, self-
centred Adam is slain, so that Jesus' death is 'a death to sin and self-justification, 
leading to life as a son of God, reconciled to him through faith responding to love'.^^'' 
Jesus' death reveals God's unconditional love and invites the sinner to accept it, saving 
him from sinfril attempts to become acceptable and justified to God through moral 
works, sacrifice, or satisfaction. 
Lampe, like Abailard and Origen, sees salvation as taking place through Jesus' 
revelation of the divine nature, and, in particular, in the revelation of God's love for his 
creation. Far from expressing exemplarist tendencies, Lampe emphasises the role of 
grace in the redemption of humanity, and sees Christ's significance as surpassing that of 
exemplar or teacher. Furthermore, Lampe attests against Mclntyre's view that a 
revelatory as well as an exemplarist soteriology would have a superficial view of sin. 
Lampe, 'Atonement', p. 189 
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such as sin as ignorance. Rather, Lampe's view of sin involves the psychologically 
insightful idea that sin is an individual's attempts at self-justification and independence 
of God, their pride, and their attempts to over-compensate in the face of self-hatred. 
Like Abailard and the writer of the Fourth Gospel, Lampe moves away from the idea of 
sin as immoral action, to the idea of sin as an attitude of rejection towards God. 
Certain aspects of Lampe's work seem less essential to a revelatory soteriology, 
and may even seem to detract fi"om the coherence of a view of salvation as revelation. 
For instance, at times Lampe appears to assert that Christ not only reveals God's 
unconditional acceptance of himianity, but actually effects it in inaugurating the new 
covenant. Such a view, while having much in common with 'objective' models of the 
Atonement, can seem to imply that God did not love humanity unconditionally before 
Christ's death, but did indeed demand self-justification from humans in the form of 
sacrifice, satisfaction, and moral works. It seems to me that this is not Lampe's 
intention, but is perhaps a danger in speaking of a new covenant in a context which is 
used to hearing of 'an objective transformation', or of God's undergoing 'a change of 
heart' toward humanity. 
A second problem is that Lampe appears to me to be too cniciocentric to do 
justice to a revelatory soteriology. The revelation of God in Christ is perhaps elucidated 
more clearly i f seen in the perspective of Jesus' entire Incarnation, life, death, and 
Resurrection. The tendency toward cruciocentrism is common to Abailard and some 
other theologians discussed so far. However, far fi"om a more incamational approach 
being a breach of tradition, an exception or an innovation, such an approach is central to 
the eastern church, m which cruciocentrism has never been prominent. I shall turn now 
to the work of one contemporary representative of the eastern church, hoping to learn 
from an outlook that views neither a non-cruciocentric nor a revelatory approach to 
salvation as an novelty. 
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Having looked briefly at the theme of revelation as salvation in the modem 
western thought of Lampe, I now turn to the work of the Romanian Orthodox scholar 
Dumitru Staniloae, in order to ascertain that revelatory soteriology is not particular to 
the western church in general, but that it is universal in Christian thought, and, indeed, 
has established itself in the east to a greater extent than in the west. Though primarily 
eastern in culture and theology, Romanian Orthodoxy is in the unique position of being 
a Latin-based Orthodox Church, and, being surrounded by other churches including 
Roman Catholic, Uniate, Baptist and Unitarian, is a theological melting pot and place of 
potential ecumenical dialogue. Staniloae, while remaining an Orthodox priest, was 
receptive to western ideas, and, having studied western existential philosophy and 
theology, introduced aspects, such as an emphasis on personal experience, to the 
Orthodox faith. Such a universal and open-minded approach means that Staniloae may 
be thought to represent not only Orthodox theolo^, but may be seen to be of 
significance to Christian theology more universally. 
3.4 Staniloae, Revelation and Deification 
According to Staniloae's biographer and critic, Emil Bartos,^^" the soteriology of 
Staniloae is focused on revelation as the means of salvation. Revelation is seen as the 
divine self-disclosure of God as Trinity through the medium of creation as the Creator, 
Reconciler, and Saviour of all creation. In comparison with other knowledge, revealed 
knowledge has a unique epistemic status: knowledge of God is independent of and is of 
a different kind to all other kinds of knowledge. Divine revelation is the resuk of the 
intentional action of God, who expresses his wil l , freedom, and being in disclosing 
himself God's actions are necessarily the expressions of his being since God is not 
Emil Bartos, Deification in Eastern Orthodox Theology: An Evaluation and Critique of the Theology 
of Dumitru Staniloae (Cumbria: Paternoster Press, 1999), p.74 
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restrained by any external factor. The action of God as Trinity is unitary but not 
uniform, indicating the 'imity of intention and act, wil l and being in God'.^^' 
The content of God's revelation concerns not only doctrines about the 
metaphysical nature of God, but expresses the 'moral' nature or character of God m a 
way that in western thought might be characterised as inaugurating a 'personal 
relationship' with God. Bartos says, 'God does not reveal only propositions about God; 
God reveals Himself However, this does not imply that God's being is fiiUy 
accessible to the minds of his creatures, or that they know him as he knows himself, but 
that they grasp who and what he is. The content of God's revelation is his action in 
creation, reconciliation, and salvation, and this unity of content reflects the identity of 
God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
The Holy Spirit actualises the universal truth of God's revelation, that is, the 
Gospel, through his activity in the lives of believers. In this way, the Gospel is 
' v ind ica ted ' fo r individuals as the reaUty of then- personal existence and of creation as 
a whole, that is, as they experience the process of salvation. To speak of this is to speak 
of the revelation becoming effective, since the revelation is the active and salvific 
instrument of God's grace, and not merely a disclosure that remains for individuals to 
take in and act upon or reject. In this understanding of revelation Staniloae comes very 
close to Abailard, and Fiddes words that 'The exhibition is a restoration. The 
manifestation is a transformation'^^"* might be applied to Staniloae also. 
While Staniloae recognises other divine revelations, presimiably such as those 
recorded in the Old Testament, the revelation of God in Christ is the supreme and 
unique divine disclosure. The Christ event is the 'paradigmatic disclosure, God 
Bartos, Deification, p.75 
Bartos, Deification, p.75 
^" Bartos, Deification, p.75 
Paul Fiddes, Past Event, p.l54 
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disclosing Himself in created reaUty.'^^ Christ is the fiilfilment and completion of all 
divine revelation, and is unique in that, rather than being given through words or 
visions, 'Christian revelation is given in a Person.'^ ^* The Holy Spirit guides the 
Church's interpretation of the revelation of God in Christ. 
Salvation for Staniloae, as for most of the Orthodox Church, involves the 
fiilfilment of humanity's telos, deification. For many western thinkers, deification has 
appeared an abhorrent concept, implying that humans become less human and are 
absorbed into the divine being until they loose altogether their distmctive identity. Hans 
Kung writes, 'But does a reasonable man today want to become God?... Our problem 
today is not the deification but the humanization of man.'^^'' However, the conception of 
deification does not imply that individuals loose their distinctive identity, but, on the 
contrary, that their imiqueness and integrity is more fiiUy realised, as they become that 
for which God originally created them. Humans are not amalgamated into the divine 
being, but are united in love with God and with the rest of creation. Within the 
fimiework of Staniloae's metaphysics, deification is described as 'assimilation to and 
union with the divine energies, not with the divine essence'. 
The concept of deification has been understood diversely, and different models 
are used to communicate its meaning. Staniloae uses two models of deification, the first 
of which is the 'realistic' model.^^' Staniloae shows affinity to Abailard in this respect. 
While for Abailard, salvation involved the infusion of love in humanity and bond of 
love between God and himianity, Staniloae sees the whole of creation as being drawn 
mto a union of love with God through the Incarnation. Bartos writes that, for Staniloae, 
Christ's himian nature is 'a place of contact between Himself and nature; or, in other 
Bartos, Deification, p.76 
^ Dumitru Staniloae, Theology and the Church, p.l 11-112, cited in Bartos, Deification, p.76 
Hans Kimg, On Being a Christian, p. 442, cited in Bartos, Deification, Footnote 29, p. 16 
Bartos, Deification, p. 10 
The distinction between the models and attribution of terms is to be found in N. Russell, The Concept 
of Deification in the Early Greek Fathers, p.l - 2, cited in Bartos, Deification, p.9 - 10 
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words, a centre in space and time which organises existence around itself'^'"' As in 
Abailard, salvation is internalised in that it is seen as the spiritual transformation of 
humans. Salvation takes place within himianity because it takes place within the 
personal being of Christ, who is both God and man. Christ is God in hypostatic union 
with humanity, and, therefore, what Christ is in his attitude towards himianity, God is m 
his essence. The Incarnation is salvific because it unites God and humanity in love, in a 
way not dissimilar (though achieved through different means) to the bond of love 
formed through Christ's work according to Abailard. Bartos expresses this 
understanding of the Incarnation when he writes, 'The hypostatic union brings God and 
man together in Christ in an ontological connection of love.' 
The second model of deification Staniloae adopts is the 'ethical or 
philosophical' model, which bears some resemblance to the moral effects of salvation in 
Abailard and Lampe, which, I suggest, have mistakenly been branded 'exemplarist'. For 
Staniloae, the believer is deified partly by attaining to the likeness of God, 'reproducing 
the divine attributes in himself by imitation.'^'*^ Imitation of the divine attributes is the 
free moral striving of the individual, though there is no doubt in Staniloae that this is in 
response to the salvific revelation of God in Christ and the uniting of God and humanity 
in love through the Incarnation, and it is not the case that humans earn their own 
salvation or could be saved except for the divine initiative. In Staniloae as in other 
theologians we have considered, revelation forms a bond or union of love between God 
and humanity and this is viewed as salvation, while the ethical behaviour of the 
individual is not seen as salvation itself, but as a consequence or effect of having been 
saved or spiritually transformed. 
Such a soteriology evidently emphasises the redemptive nature of the 
Incarnation, and yet it is not the case that the Incarnation takes the place that the Cross 
Bartos, Deification, p.228 
Bartos, Deification, p.229 
"^^  Bartos, Deification, p. 10 
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holds on a cruciocentric model, or that Christ's life and death are thought to be 
insignificant to salvation apart from the hypostatic imion between divine and human 
natures. Christ's entire earthly life, cukninating in death ^ d resurrection, are perceived 
as being salvific. His Incarnation united God and humanity, and his life was the 
revelation of God's nature and of what humanity was originally intended to be, 
cuhninating in his death which was offered in complete obedience to the Father. While 
western theology speaks of the crucified Christ as a 'substitute', Staniloae sees Christ as 
'substituting' for humanity throughout his incarnate life. The Cross is not a cultic 
sacrifice, but another aspect of Christ 'wrestling with humanity's plight'j^'*^ and the 
'cost' involved is not bearing the punishment of sin, but, rather, the sorrow, pain, and 
suffering of the world that is caused by sin.^ "*^  
Staniloae's conception of sin and evil differs from a western or Augustinian 
model, and is important because it sheds some light on the idea of Christ taking upon 
himself not the penalty of sin but the suffering that is caused by sin. Evil is perceived 
far more as a metaphysical 'reality' than a moral one, and so sin is seen primarily as an 
infection causing disorder. Redemption is seen as the re-ordering of the Universe, and, 
in particular, as overcoming not humanity's revolt from God, but non-moral corruption, 
that is, mortality. Being vulnerable to corruption and death is a sickness in humanity 
that is caused by the free act of sin, and mortality and corruption need to be overcome in 
order for humanity to be perfected or deified. Christ is in a position to save himianity, 
since he has taken upon himself our post-fall nature and is 'one of us', and yet he also 
reveals our intended nature, imiting God and humanity in love, and overcoming sin and, 
consequently, corruption, suffering, and death. 
In the theology of Staniloae, the Atonement (Christ's person and work, which is 
not restricted to the Cross) does not bring about the forgiveness of sin, but is far more 
Bartos, Deification, p.228 
'^^  Bartos, Deification, p.234 
245 Bartos, Deification, p.234 
93 
constructive in what it effects. Staniloae emphasises that the love of God is the source 
and cause of the Incarnation or Atonement, and that the Atonement is not the pre-
requisite of forgiveness, since forgiveness precedes the Incarnation. God engages in the 
act of forgiveness 'before' the Incarnation, and the mission of Christ is, rather, to bring 
about more perfect divine fellowship through the union of love between God and 
humanity. With respect to this, Bartos says that Christ's work involves much more than 
a 'restoration of the relationship between God and man: it is a real sharing in the inner 
life of God in this earthly l ife. '^^ 
Synopsis 
This brief study demonstrates that western theologians who have emphasised the 
Incarnation or taken a non-cruciocentric stance with respect to their soteriology, while 
imusual by the standards of the rest of the western church, are not unusual in 
Christendom as a whole, for they share much in this respect with the eastern church. 
Furthermore, as Origen, Abailard, and Staniloae have indicated, developing a revelatory 
soteriology is not a novel introduction to, but is firmly rooted in, the Christian faith, and 
there is no necessity for this idea to infringe upon that of the divine initiative in 
salvation. Additionally, Staniloae's alternative interpretation of evil and redemption 
challenges western assumptions concerning evil as equivalent to immorality or sin, and 
redemption as Christ taking upon himself the penalty of sin and thus facilitating God's 
forgiveness. The problem with which Christ deals according to this eastern model is not 
God's anger, but is humanity's current imperfect and unhappy state of existence. 
Exploring an alternative view of the nature of sin may help to open possibilities 
concerning the nature of salvation that have previously been overlooked, and I shall 
therefore take this as the starting-point of the following chapter. 
Bartos, Deification, p.229 
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Chapter Four 
'Jesus, Revealer and Redeemer': Revelation, Infusion and the God of Love 
This chapter suggests that, in revealing God as love, Christ inspires and infuses love in 
the individual, freeing the individual from sin and resulting in the human fulfilment that 
is salvation. The revelatory model of salvation suggested here is not intended to be 
complete or perfect, or prescriptive or normative of other revelatory models. Rather, it is 
intended to be a somewhat skeletal indication of what such a model might look like, 
thus facilitating some critical review of such a model in the Conclusion by reference to 
something more concrete and self-conscious as a model than the insights into salvific 
revelation displayed in the works of the Fourth Evangelist, Abailard, and others. The 
model suggested here is to be viewed as equivalent and comparable to other 
christological models of Atonement, and, therefore, while the role of the Holy Spirit in 
the work of salvific revelation is recognised, it is not within the scope of this 
dissertation to discuss that work as distinct of that of the Incarnate Word. 
A salvific model presupposes a corresponding notion of sin, and to some degree 
the view of sin determines the view of salvation just as a diagnosis of an illness 
determines the method or type o f cure. For instance, on a satisfaction model of salvation 
sin is often seen as an offence to God's honour, and on either a ransom or a Christus 
Victor model sin is viewed as enslavement to diabolical forces. On a revelatory model, 
critics have often said that sin would be seen as ignorance. Such a view of sin seems 
inadequate, given the tendency in humans not only to sin through ignorance, but also to 
sin deliberately and maliciously. Clearly the imparting of knowledge to humanity is not 
sufficient to overcome sin, and something more is needed to effect humanity's salvation 
and transformation. The following section shall argue that, on a revelatory model, sin 
need not be viewed as ignorance. Rather, sin may be seen more realistically as a lack of 
95 
love, and, resultant upon the lack of love, a lack in the state of human fiourishing, a 
wrong relationship with God and with neighbour, and either false magnification or else 
hafred of the self. To clarify an imderstanding of sin is vital for the current essay, for it 
is only through recognising what sin is that one can anticipate what salvation might be 
and how it is accomplished by God in Christ. 
4.1 An Hamartiological Model 
A revelatory model of salvation may, I suggest, correspond most naturally with 
an understanding of sin as the privation of love. In order to elucidate the idea of sin as 
the privation of love and so as to provide some sort of substance to such a view I shall 
turn to some of the insights of Augustine of Hippo. While Augustine's hamartiology is 
generally associated with confroversial ideas such as original sin and human sin as the 
source of all worldly evils, the concepts that are of interest here are those of evil as non-
being and sin as privation, sin and virtue as based on intention or motive rather than 
action, and the assertion that all sin stems from a lack of love and that all virtue is a 
form of love. Other aspects of Augustinian hamartiology have no direct bearing on 
these insights, and may be accepted or rejected with no consequence to the current 
subject matter. 
In the face of evil and sin Augustine offered an alternative to the polar opposites 
of denying either God's goodness or else God's omnipotence. This alternative was to 
suggest that evil was non-being, that is, a lack of the goodness in the created order made 
by God out of nothing. In the context of speaking of the erroneous hamartiology of his 
Manichean days, Augustine writes that ' I did not know that evil has no existence except 
as a privation of good, down to that level which is altogether without being.'^'*'' As 
Charles Matthewes expresses the Augustinian view of evil, 'Ontologically, in terms of 
247 Confessions, Ul.vii (12), trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 
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the status of evil in the Universe, it understands evil as nothing more than the privation 
of being and goodness - "evil" is not an existing thing at all, but rather the absence of 
existence, an ontological shortcoming.'^ '** All things are created good, so that to be 
corrupted is to become less good, and thus to become less existent, even to the point of 
ceasing to exist altogether. All of God's creation is good, and yet because it is created 
out of nothing it is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption is essentially deterioration and a 
return to nothingness, to the nothing out of which things were created. Thus there is no 
'thing' that is essentially evil, since evil is merely the privation of the good that is God's 
creation, and sin a deterioration of the good in a being. In speaking of corruption as a 
deterioration of the good, Augustine writes that: 
It was obvious to me that things which are liable to corruption are good. If they were supreme 
goods, or if they were not good at all, they could not be corrupted. For if they were supreme 
goods, they would be incorruptible. If there were no good in them, there would be nothing 
capable of being corrupted. Corruption does harm and unless it diminishes the good, no harm 
would be done. Therefore either corruption does not harm, which caimot be the case, or (which is 
wholly certain) all things that are corrupted suffer privation of some good. If they were to be 
deprived of all good, they would not exist at all. If they were to exist and to be immime from 
corruption, they would be superior because they would be permanently incorruptible. What 
could be more absiu^ than to say that by losing all good, things are made better? So then, if they 
are deprived of all good, they will be nothing at all. Therefore as long as they exist, they are 
good. Accordingly, whatever things exist are good, and the evil into whose origins I was 
inquiring is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it would be good. Either it would be an 
incorruptible substance, a great good indeed, or a corruptible substance, which could be 
corrupted only if it were good. Hence I saw and it was made clear to me that you made all things 
good, and there are absolutely no substances which you did not make.^ '" 
To develop Augustine's view in this respect, we might turn to the phrase inai n^n 
in Genesis I , interpreting this as the 'void and non-being' out of which is created all that 
now pertains except for God himself.^'" God imposed positive attributes and qualities 
which he derived solely from his own nature upon the 'nothing' and so what was 
previously non-existent was given properties of order, form, life, substance, and, in the 
Charles Matthewes, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p.6 
^"^ Confessions, Vn.xii (\S)cf. Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 14 
cf. The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 
1996) 
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case of humanity, mind, love, and spirit.^'' Evil and sin, then, are the return or 
deterioration of creatures to the void out of which they were created, where this return 
to nothing is not natural, in the sense of intended by God. 
In order to clarify the idea of evil as non-being fiirther, we may liken evil as 
darkness and God's (good) creation as light. Without light there is merely darkness, 
though strictly speaking darkness does not actually exist: it is merely the lack of light 
and not an opposing power or force. When light is imposed upon it, the darkness seems 
to disappear, though in reality it was never 'there'. A lesser degree of light would give 
the appearance that it is becoming darker, though in reality there is simply a greater lack 
of light. Similarly, evil does not 'exist', but is merely a lack of goodness. It is neither 
an opposing power, nor a product of God's creation. It is not. When we imagine 
goodness, we imagine evil being overcome, and when we imagine evil, we imagine a 
victory of evil over the powers of good. I would argue that this is erroneous: though the 
evil seems to be overcome, there is simply goodness imposed upon where it was not 
previously, and where there appears to be evil, this is simply a decline in the goodness 
that has been imposed upon the void. 
An examination of the criticisms levelled against a metaphysic of evil as non-
being will help to clarify and develop the theory further. In the first place, Karl Barth 
has argued against the Augustinian view of evil as privative, agreeing that evil is 
'nothingness' {das Nichtige), and yet arguing that this is not 'nothingness' in the sense 
of a lack, but is the powerful negation of all creation and ultimately of God himself. 
Augustine's view is problematic because 'das Nichtige is not sunply to be equated with 
what is not.'^^^ To illustrate this point, Barth points out that God is God and is not the 
creature, but this clearly does not imply any element of das Nichtige in God. Rather, 
this 'not' is part of God's perfection: 'The diversities and fi-ontiers of the creaturely 
This list is illustrative, not prescriptive, and is not exhaustive. 
Church Dogmatics m/3, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), p. 
349. That it is Augustine's view that Barth is opposing is implied, but not explicitly stated. 
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world contain many 'nots'. No single creature is all-inclusive. None is or resembles 
another.'^ ^^  While for Augustine, therefore, diversity within creation is comprised of 
limitation and privation, and different degrees (or none) of a property, for Barth, there 
are no limitations but simply a diversity of unique attributes, regarded as good. 
My criticism of Earth's objection is two-fold. First, Barth misunderstands the 
Augustinian theory i f he believes that it is the case that evil is non-being and that 
therefore non-being must be evil. Evil is oukontic (absolute non-being), but it does not 
necessarily follow that all that is non-existent or privative is necessarily evil. Secondly, 
perfection is that which is fulfilled that is proper to a particular creature or entity, and 
an imperfection is an unfulfilled attribute or quality that should be present in that 
creature in order for it to be how it was intended to be. As Aquinas has pointed out,^ "^* 
blindness is an imperfection in a man, because humans were intended to have sight, but 
no one would claim blindness to be an imperfection in a stone. 
A second criticism of the concept of evil as non-being is raised by John Hick,^ ^^ 
drawing upon Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions.^ ^^ Russell argues that the 
'existence' of non-being is an illusion grounded in the existence of nouns such as 
'nothing'. This implies to people that there is a separate realm of 'nothingness' and 
'non-existence' in addition to a reahn of existence, and is fallacious. Hick concludes 
from Russell's point that the idea that evil is non-being is philosophically flawed, for it 
presupposes that 'nothing' is, as it were, a 'something', even in a negative or subsistent 
way. While I believe Russell to be correct in his claim that there is not a separate realm 
of non-being or non-existence, I do not believe this to be a problem with respect to evil 
as non-being in the sense of oukontic rather than in the Platonic sense of non-being as 
Church Dogmatics III/3, ed. Bromiley and Torrance, p.349 
Aquinas, Summa Theologice: A Concise Translation, pt. I, Q. XlLVin, art. ii, trans, and ed. by 
Timothy McDermott (Texas: Christian Classics, 1989) 
Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Fontana/CoUins, 1968) p. 186 
cf. Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', sect. V, in Logic and Language, ed. R.C. 
March, cited in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 186 
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meontic^^^ (relative non-being, or that which is contrary to 'Authentic Being' and 
subsists in the 'reahn of Non-Being'^ ^*), since the idea of evil as oukontic asserts that 
non-existence and non-being are, quite literally, non-existence and non-being. There is 
no separate realm in which they pertain or subsist; they merely are not. There is a 
related linguistic problem with this theory, however. It is difficult to talk of evil, which 
is not substance or power but which is void, in terms that attribute to it anything other 
than activity and substance. For instance, it is difficult to talk of evil instantiated in the 
world when what is really meant is the failure or lack of instantiated good. Similarly, to 
include in a clause 'evil is...' would be attributing existence to evil and would therefore 
contradict the idea of evil as a privation of the good. However, I do not see this as a 
logical objection to evil as oukontic, but rather, a linguistic problem that may be 
surmoimted by some redefinition and some caution concerning terms. Henceforth the 
term evil will carry the impUcations of oukontic non-being and imcreated void, which is 
passive, a privation of the good, and ultimately non-existent. 
Augustine's hamartiology viewed sin and evil as two aspects of the same 
problem, and so the idea of sin as privation follows on logically fi-om Augustine's idea 
of evil as non-bemg. Sin is essentially privative, passive, and consists in the 
deinstantiation of God's creation into the non-being out of which it was created. On this 
model therefore, we may say that sin is a failure of the individual to fulfil their telos, 
that is, a failure to become that for which they were created by God. G.R. Evans 
explains that for Augustine everything of which God is Creator is something, 'But since 
to be nothing is to depart fi-om the God who is supreme being, that means that evil takes 
away into its negativity all good, all joy, all clarity, all reconciUation with God, all hope 
of heaven for the sinner who is infected with it.'^^^ This highlights the important idea 
Hick's point is, however, pertinent with respect to Plotinus. Cf. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 40 
Cf. Enneads i. 8, 3 
G.R. Evans, 'Evil', in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopaedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), p.340 - 344 
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that sin is something privative, and that sinfulness is that which detracts fi'om an 
individual's fulfihnent as a person, that is, that for which God created them. 
Augustine's contributions to hamartiology on a revelatory model of salvation are 
further significant in that, as has ateady been noted,^ *'*' Augustine (and later Aquinas 
and Abailard) internalised sin. This means that sin is not to be understood as wicked 
action, but as evil intention or motive, as something which makes the very being of the 
individual other than the individual should be, and leads to their deterioration as a 
person. Such a view is reminiscent of that of Forestell's interpretation of the Fourth 
Gospel, according to which sin is not conceived of as wicked action, but as a mode of 
existence that is the antithesis of spiritual life, and as an attitude expressed in (but not 
consisting in) rejection of God.^ *' Actions are not themselves sinful, but neutral, though 
they become sinful or virtuous depending upon the motives and mode of existence fi-om 
which they are derived. This view is related to the Augustinian idea developed by 
Thomists that moral evil (which is a part of sin but is not identical with sin) is moral 
evil because of the implications an intention has on the perpetrator, and not because of 
the effects of an action upon a separate v i c t im .The perpetrator makes himself a 
moral victim. This can be illustrated by the fact that, i f one accidentally dropped a stone 
and this stone fell on a neighbour's head, there would be no moral evil, or sin, involved, 
because there would be no morally culpable perpetrator. If, on the other hand, one 
deliberately threw a stone at someone's head, but missed, while there would be no 
damaged victim a moral evil would have occurred, because the intention and inclination 
of the action would make the perpetrator culpable. Sin and moral evil, therefore, are not 
to be associated with particular actions, but with particular intentions and motives that 
^ See above, 3.1 
FoiesteU, Jlte Word of the Cross. See above, 2.2 
See Herbert McCabe, 'Evil', in New Blackfriars, vol. 62(1981), p.36 - 45, for a classic and witty 
expression of the Thomist position on evil. 
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render the perpetrator guilty and sinfiil, and make them less than (or detract fi-om) that 
for which they were created. 
In the light of the Augustinian idea that sin is the privation of good, an 
occurrence of sin may be said to be one in which an agent intends to do something 
through motives and intentions which are not good, that is, which are lacking in or 
deprived of goodness. This 'sin' may be regarded as bringing about a state of sinfiilness, 
that is, the deinstantiation of the good in an individual and the failure to be that for 
which God created them. A fiulher insight into the nature of sin of pertinence to a 
revelatory soteriology lies in the fact that Augustine views all sin as stemming from the 
sinner's lack of love. The lack of love is 'the cause and ratification of all sin'^^. Thus 
Augustine writes, 'What is sin? To do contrary to the commandment. What is the 
commandment? "A new conmiandment give I unto you, that ye love one another." Mark 
well! This commandment of Christ is called, "love." By this love sms are loosed. I f this 
love be not kept, the not holding it is at once a grievous sin, and the root of all sins.' 
An illimiinating connection may be made between the Augustinian view of sm 
and evil as privation and non-being and the idea of sin as a lack of love i f we consider 
the idea that the opposite of love is not hate but indifference or apatheia. Such a view 
would involve the perception that hatred is often close to or connected with love (as for 
instance in the case of jealousy or the extreme hatred a person may feel if they are hurt 
by someone they love, rather than the more moderate anger they may feel towards 
someone with whom they were previously not emotionally involved) and thus that 
hatred may best be seen as the flip-side or shadow-side of love rather than its absolute 
opposite. Kierkegaard expresses the idea that hate is essentially love burning as its 
opposite, rather than the equal and absolute antithesis of love. He writes that 'Hatred is 
Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, 'Love', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p.510 
Augustine, 'Homily on the First Epistle of John', 5.2, in Homilies on the Gospel according to St. John, 
and his first Epistle, trans. H. Browne (Oxford: John Henry Parker; F. and J. Rivington, London, 1849), 
my emphasis 
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a love that has become its opposite, a love that has perished [gaae til GrundeJ. Down 
into the groimd [i Grunde] the love is continually aflame, but it is the flame of hate; not 
imtil the love has burned out is the flame of hate also put out. Just as it is said of the 
tongue that "it is that same tongue with which we bless and curse,"^ *^  so it may also be 
said that it is the same love that loves and hates.'^ *^  
Several reflections on the relationship between other, yet related, concepts may 
elucidate this relationship between love as the relative opposite of hatred, and apathy as 
the absolute antithesis of love. For instance, Barth's distinction between Schaffenseite 
(the 'shadow side' or relative converse of goodness and creation) and das Nichtige (the 
ultimate antithesis of goodness and creation) may be considered a paradigm for and also 
interconnected with the idea diat indifference is the absolute antithesis of love while 
hatred is only the flip-side of love or love that has been warped and redirected into a 
negative rather than a positive force. Again, William Blake's words that 'Joy and Woe 
are woven fine'^^' expresses the connected idea that sadness is often the flip-side of 
happiness and often gives happiness its meaning, and it may be said that it is depression 
or emotional 'flatness', the absence of any emotion and so emotional nothingness, is the 
true opposite of happiness. 
This conception of the relationship between love, hatred and apathy is supported 
by the non-equivalence of the concepts of love and hate. While love is an absolute good, 
hatred may not be an absolute evil, since it may be regarded as a good thing to hate evils 
such as injustice, malice or dishonesty, and so hate cannot be the absolute antithesis of 
love. Furthermore, it might be observed that both love and hatred are proactive, love 
^*^C/James 3:10 
Seren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans, and ed. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995) p.34 
Peter Porter (ed.), William Blake (London: Aurum Press, 1986), p. 50, from the poem. Auguries of 
Innocence. 
^ On the other hand, it might be argued, love is not an absolute good since to love evil is itself evil, and 
is not redeemed by the fact that it involves love. Against such an objection, it might be maintained that 
the word Move' describes a multitude of different concepts. For instance, the love of God or the self-
giving love of one person for another is quite different from love of good wine or love of money. The 
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being proactively creative and hate proactively destructive, while indifference is passive 
and latent. Therefore, we might conclude, that, while hatred is clearly a 'relative 
opposite' warping of love, it is apatheia that is love's absolute antithesis. Thus whereas 
love is essentially creative (and God as love the Creator), apathy is fundamentally 
privative, a deinstantiation of all love, all joy, and all hope. 
The revelatory model I am suggesting conciirs with Augustine in saying that sin 
is the privation of love, adding that this privation of love is itself a spiritual, mental and 
emotional nothingness, an apathy that detracts from joy and love and the process of 
human becoming, and leads ultimately to the deterioration of a person and to their 
spiritual death. On this model, therefore, sin is that which detracts from an individual's 
goal of becoming that for which God created them, that is, the goal of deification in the 
Staniloan sense, or of human flourishing. Sin is essentially privative, and leads to the 
deterioration of an individual's humanity, away from liberation and transformation and 
toward spiritual, emotional, and mental non-being. 
The view of sin as something which detracts from the aim of human fulfilment 
or salvation may be associated with Lampe's view of sin according to which sin is 
viewed as individuals' attempts at self-justification which lead to self-righteousness or 
to self-hatred and away from faith in God. On this model, the revelation in Christ of 
God's imconditional love for humanity initiates a response of faith in the individual, so 
that they no longer hate themselves or attempt to justify themselves in God's sight. 
While Lampe's focus is upon Christ's revelation of God's love as initiating a response 
of faith, on an Augustinian view the revelation of God in Christ primarily involves 
initiating a response of love, in which, as we shall see, faith and all other 'virtues' or 
aspects of salvation are encompassed. With this in mind it is now to a revelatory model 
suggestion being made in this essay is not that every use of the word love in the English language refers 
to the ultimate good, but that the sort of love shown by God for humanity and expressed in some 
extraordinary human actions is to be identified with the very being of God and transforms the individual 
and effects their salvation. 
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of salvation that I wish to turn, once again beginning from and developing the insights 
of Augustine into how the revelation of God's love for himianity might be salvific. 
4.2 Salvation, Revelation, and God as Love 
While Augustine undoubtedly employs 'objective' and 'traditional' metaphors 
of the Atonement, and while literature on Augustine's soteriology is generally 
concerned with sacrifice, recapitulatio and Christus VictorAugustine insists that the 
reason for and purpose of the Incarnation is the revelation of God's love for hiraianity, 
so that it is arguable that it is the disclosure of divine love that is in fact at the centre of 
Augustine's soteriology. Van Bavel writes that Augustine taught that 'The reason for 
the incarnation of the Son of God is the revelation of God's love for the human 
being'^ ™, and in his Sermons on I John, Augustine says that i f the only words in 
Scripture were "God is love" (I John 4. 8), this would be enough for our redemption.^ '^ 
Augustine teaches that it is not the case that God has tiuned away fi"om humanity 
because of sin, but rather that humanity has turned away from God so that they can no 
longer 'see' or 'know' God without grace. Like Lampe, Augustine insists that God does 
not need reconciling to humanity, but that humanity needs reconciling to God, even 
though post-lapsarian human 'sight' of God erroneously perceives that God is angry with 
hiraianity and that God must be reconciled to them. Salvation, therefore, involves a 
revelation of God's true attitude towards hiraianity, so that humanity's attitude to God 
may be changed and therefore that the relationship may be made right. As Lewis Ayres 
writes of Augustine's view, 'Christ has come in the flesh, in a way that we can now see. 
Cf. Finbarr J. Clancy, 'Redemption', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia 
™^ Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, 'Love', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p.510 
Augustine, 'Homily on I John', 7.4; 20.31, in Homilies on the Gospel according to St. John, and his 
first Epistle, cited Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, 'Love', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p.510 
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to enable us to offer testimony to that which has always been present.'^ '^  Far from 
belittling Christ's work by suggesting that Christ merely reveals an aheady present 
situation rather than effecting a new situation, Christ would, on this model, be seen to 
effect an entirely new relationship between God and humanity precisely in revealing 
God's true nature and attitude and initiating a response in the human person that would 
be deemed, on this model, as salvation itself. 
The revelation of God's love for us is salvific because it initiates in us a 
response of love for God, and, consequently, for our neighbours, our selves,^ '^  and our 
bodies."'* The important question of how the initiation of God's love into the individual 
takes place is related to Abailard's central insight that what makes himians love is that 
they are loved first, with a love that is unmerited and which gives of itself without 
expectation or limit. The love initiated m an individual is a gift from God, and the first 
aspect of this gift is that God loved us first, since humans only love God because of 
God's love for them. Yet the gift of love is not only inspired but is also mfused: because 
Augustine radically equates God and love absolutely^", the indwelling of God in the 
Christian means that they are instilled with love. Augustine writes that in order that we 
may love God, we must allow God to live in us, and so 'let him love himself through us, 
that is, let him move us, enkindle us, and arouse us to love him.'^ ^^ In this way, the 
dichotomy between inspiration - implying a natural psychological response - and 
Lewis Ayres, 'Augustine, Christology, and God as Love: An Introduction to the Homilies on 1 John', 
in Nothing Greater Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer 
(Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001), p.73. cf Augustine's First Homily on I John, especially regarding 
I John 1. 1 —2, in Homilies on the Gospel according to St. John, and his first Epistle 
Augustine sometimes speaks of love of God as being concomitant with contempt of the self (e.g. City 
of God, XIV. 28), implying to some that Augustine thinks that hatred of the self is a good idea. However, 
the point seems rather to be that in renunciating the T , the individual is loving themselves because they 
are going firom egocentricity to theocentricity, thus finding their salvation and ultimate happiness, and so 
Augustine advises that one should 'Learn to love yourself by not loving yourself.' (s. 96.2.2, cited in Van 
Bavel, '^Lowe', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p. 512) 
^''^ doc Chr. 1.23.22 - 1.24.24, cited in Van Bavel, "hove\ in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p.514 
Augustine is radical in saying not only that 'God is love' but also that 'Love is God' - an assertion that 
later theologians have been hesitant in making. Cf. Lewis Ayres, Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, p.86 
^™ s. 128.2.4, cited in Van Bavel, 'Love', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p. 115 
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infusion - suggesting special divine grace - is resolved, since a free and 'natural' 
psychological response is itself the particular divine grace, because love is God himself. 
One of the things that emerges from this is that according to this model there is 
no thought that this salvation takes place through some sort of moral exemplarism, that 
it is purely 'subjective' or that it involves the Pelagian view that humans save 
themselves and are not saved through God's grace. Rather, it is through the revelation 
and initiation of love (revelation and inspiration/infusion being two inseparable aspects 
of the one divine activity of salvation) into a person that God effects their salvation, 
since love not only makes humans good but also unites the lover with the object of that 
love. Consequently, it is only in loving God that we are in fellowship with him, and that 
our likeness to God develops. Furthermore, because God himself is love, through love 
of God we come to know God, and through coming to know God we come to love God 
more. The love of God shown in Christ might therefore be seen to initiate a pedagogical 
process that involves both coming to know God and coming to love God, for the two are 
inseparable. Thus a revelatory model may see salvation not as an instant event, but as an 
ongoing process transforming the life of the individual, since, as Gorringe perceives, 
'The process itself is an essential part of the liberation. ''^^^ While 'knowledge' of God 
is in some sense that in which salvation consists on a revelatory model, there is nothing 
intellectualist about such a view; the more we come to know God and to love God the 
more we perceive his inefifability and our own inability to 'know about' God.^ *^ As in 
the Fourfli Gospel,^'' the knowledge imparted in the revelation of God in Christ is 
primarily experiential, and any theoretical content that it has is merely a means to this 
experiential knowledge of God. Thus a revelatory model may say with Briimmer that 
'Love is not the source of this kind of knowledge, it is this kind of knowledge. To know 
Gorringe, Redeeming Time, p.66 
^™ En Ps. 99.5 - 6, cited in Van Ravel, 'Love', m Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p.510 - 511 
cf. above, 2.3 
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someone in this sense is to have fellowship wititi or to love that person. The antitiiesis of 
this kind of knowledge is not ignorance but estrangement.'^ *" 
Love is salvific because (to employ Hick's terminology) it leads individuals 
away from egocentricity to theocentricity and, as a part of this, to other-centredness.^ *' 
Theocentricity and fellowship with God is salvation, since, as Augustine says to God, 
'you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.' Love is 
the only thing that can make a person good, that is, in fellowship with God and, 
consequently, virtuous.^ *'' In fact, every virtue is a manifestation of love, including the 
faith that is so central in Lampe's soteriology. Van Bavel expresses the Augustinian 
idea that love is not one virtue among others but is the source of all virtues, writing that: 
Temperance is love which knows how to protect its integrity and is dedicated wholly to what is 
loved. Fortitude is love that is capable of enduring much for the sake of the beloved. Justice is 
love which does not desire to retain for itself the good things of life but knows how to share them 
equally. Prudence is love that knows how to discern what will benefit love and what will harm it 
{mor. 1.15.25).... Love is a dynamic reality; it possesses beginning and perfection: perfect love 
is perfect righteousness Q'ustitia) (nat. etgr. 70 .84)^ 
Love is made manifest in the fruits of salvation, so that kindness and fidelity (for 
instance) are not ways of 'earning' salvation, but are outward signs of an individual's 
love of God and of creation. Augustine is so far from a 'moral' view of salvation that he 
has even been accused of teaching that 'all things are lawful' and that a person may do 
anything so long as they love God and their neighbour. This accusation is misplaced, for 
it is rather that Augustine teaches that i f an individual loves then they will always act 
virtuously and so, for instance, the Ten Commandments are not displaced by the law of 
love, but subsumed by it. Therefore, Augustine writes, 'Love, and do what you will. I f 
Vincent Brummer, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p.l80 
For Augustine, the self and other humans are to be loved primarily because they are God's creation 
and because of God's presence in them; and only God is to be loved absolutely in and of himself. 
Confessions 1.1, trans. Henry Chadwick 
Being virtuous is a consequence of being saved and in fellowship with God, and is not a cause of 
salvation, as in exemplarism or Pelagianism. 
Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, 'Love', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p.509, 510 
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you keep silence, keep silence in love; if you correct, correct in love.... Let love's root 
be within you, for fi-om that root nothing but good will spring.'^ *^ 
The aim of this chapter thus far has been to sketch what a model of salvation 
based on revelation might look like, drawmg upon and developing many of the insights 
of Augustine into the nature of sin and the salvific power of love. Such a view has at its 
core the idea that sin is the privation of love and consists in apatheia, and that this 
results in the deinstantiation of good in the individual and in their ultimate non-being. 
Accordingly, salvation is seen as the revelation and 'mfiision' (these two being one 
activity) of God's love, and brings about in the individual a transition fi-om 
egocentricity to theocentricity and other-centredness, and thus human fiilfilment that is 
characterised by love of God, self, and creation. Gorringe demonstrates this 
understanding of salvation (conceived as education) as human fiilfilment characterised 
by love, and expresses the liberating and transformative effects such a life has upon the 
individual. He writes: 
Underlying all notions of completeness... is the notion of human fiilhiess, the realisation of 
personhood, of authentic subjectivity, of the human capacity for freedom and for love....The 
only purpose of any education [in this case, that of the salvific process] is that human beings 
should have life and have it more abundantly, that through the educational [salvific] process 
persons may be more fiilfilled, and therefore more creative, more free and therefore more loving, 
more loving and therefore more flee. The ultimate aim of education is the becoming of human 
being.^ «* 
This brief sketch of the idea of salvation based on the revelation of God's love in 
Christ seems to me to go some way towards combining an understanding of tiie 
'objective' nature of salvation as wrought in Christ with an appreciation of the 
'subjective' salvation worked out in the life of the individual. Yet as it stands it is 
inadequate and even naive, for the concept of revelation needs clarification and 
reinforcement if the ideas suggested here are to be put forward as a soteriological model 
Augustine, 'Homily on 1 John', 7.8, in Homilies on the Gospel according to St. John, and his first 
Epistle, trans. H. Browne (Oxford: John Henry Paricer; F. and J. Rivington, London, 1849) 
Gorringe, Redeeming Time, p. 7. Gorringe propounds a pedagogical view of salvation, and what is true 
of education is true also of salvation at this point 
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of the first order. In particular, how can the finite human Jesus be said to reveal the 
eternal God who is beyond all himian thought and comprehension? Even supposing that 
Jesus does display the divine nature, how can humans receive or imderstand this as a 
revelation i f God is, by his very nature, beyond human thought? Again, how can we 
know which of Jesus' attributes are to be attributed to God the Father also, and which 
are simply characteristics of Jesus' human nature? Even supposing that we knew which 
of Jesus' attributes were to be predicated of God in his essential nature, it seems as 
though attributes such as love when predicated of the divine nature would never have 
anything in common with human instantiations of love - and this fact would render the 
Johannine insight that 'God is love' (and thus our salvific opportimity) entirely 
meaningless and redundant. 
4.3 Divine Ineffabilitv: An Obstacle for Revelation? 
The questions I have posed all centre around the problem of how humans can 
speak of God's ultimate nature given the divine ineffability that orthodoxy maintains. 
God, it is argued, is outside the world and is therefore not an object of himian 
knowledge, being beyond comprehension, classification, and description. God 
transcends the world and so cannot be described by words, which fail to refer to God's 
attributes in the way that they refer to the world, or to objects within the world such as 
himian beings. Aquinas expresses the problem more fully, writing: 
'...nouns are either abstract or concrete. Neither are appropriate to God: concrete noims because 
he is simple, abstract nouns because they don't express complete subsistent things. So no nouns 
apply to God. Moreover, nouns express sorts of things, verbs and participles are tensed, 
pronouns are either demonstrative or relative. None of this is appropriate to God, who is without 
qualities or incidental properties, exists out of time, can't be ostensively demonstrated to our 
senses, nor referred to by any pronoun referring back to a noun or participle or demonstrative 
pronoun. So no sort of word can apply to him.^ *^  
Aquinas, in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, trans., selected & ed. Timothy 
McDermott, cited Brian Davies, Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 156 
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Barth perceives there to be a problem not only in speaking of the divine reality 
but also in knowing the divine reality whatsoever. God, Barth argues, is absolutely and 
radically other to the created order, and therefore himians have no capacity to know God 
or to see God whatsoever. Barth borders on agnosticism (in the literal sense), asserting 
that 'we have no organ or capacity for God... we are in enmity against Him and 
powerless to be obedient to Him'^ ** and 'he [man] does not possess the possibility of 
communion with God'.^*' In addition to these two perspectives on ineffability^'", some 
have wanted to say, with Augustine, that God is ineffable as a result of himian sin, 
because of which human minds and emotions have been clouded by sinfulness, so that 
people cannot experience God who is holy and entirely removed from sin. Given the 
problems which face humans in speaking of or in experiencing God, how can we speak 
of salvation as taking place through the revelation of God's love in Christ? 
One possibility of how himians can speak of and know God is rooted in the 
Scholastic principle that all effects reflect their cause. This lead Aquinas to assert that 
knowledge of God could be acquired through natural theology, since it follows that 
there is an intrinsic relation between God and humanity. This intrinsic connection 
makes possible an analogy of intrinsic attribution, that is, 'an analogy where the 
denommating form exists intrinsically in both (or all) the terms, in one absolutely and in 
the other or others relatively, through intrinsic relation to the former'.^'* Therefore, the 
intrinsic relation between God and creation allows humans to speak of God's love 
through analogy, asserting that love exists in God's nature absolutely, while it exists in 
humanity in a relative way and dependent upon the derivative relation of humanity to 
God. As Alan Torrance points out, this basis for speaking of and knowing God has 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/1, p.l68 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/2, p.257 
290 To say that God is ineffable is not to say that ineffability is an essential attribute of the divine nature, 
but, rather, to say something about humans - namely, that there are limitations on their capacity for 
knowledge and understanding of God. 
Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, p.40, cited in Alan 
Torrance, 'Is Love the Essence of God?' in Nothing Greater Nothing Better, p. 118 
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several theological insights. First, the imderstanding of analogy based on intrinsic 
attribution has more potential for speaking of the divine nature than some other models 
of analogy.^ ^ Secondly, Aquinas' view asserts that any attribution of the divine nature 
must always be 'of one to another', and therefore insists upon the absolute 'ultimacy' 
and supremacy of the divine nature, since God and creation can never be subsumed 
imder a third party such as the platonic form of love. Furthermore, this model of how 
we can speak of God recognises the priority of God over the created order, so that 
'perfection is primarily affirmed of God and only secondarily and in a derivative sense 
of the creature.'^ ^^ However, Torrance argues, such a model is erroneous, since it 
applies the Scholastic rule of an ontological likeness between cause and effect to God, 
who is not subject to the same laws as the created order and to whom the rule of causes 
being like effects may not apply. Therefore, while Aquinas' argimient contains some 
important insights, it cannot be maintained as a model of how humans can know and 
speak of the divine reality. 
One possible way in which Aquinas' insights might be maintained without 
falling into the trap of subsuming God imder human norms might be to assert that 
humans are intrinsically connected to God and may thus speak of and know God not 
because they are created by God per se but because they are created in God's image. 
Because of this, it might be argued that (contra Barth) humanity has an inherent 
capacity for fellowship with God, and, furthermore, humanity may reflect imperfectly 
what may be said of God absolutely. This view would imply that salvation and 
communion with God is 'natural' to humanity and the fiilfilment of that for which God 
created humanity, and would also explain the phenomenon of shared insights into the 
divine nature in both natural theology and revelation. However, there is a problem in 
taking our creation in imago Dei as our basis for God-talk and knowledge of God: 
cf Alan Torrance, Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, p. 116 -123 
Alan Torrance, Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, p. 120 
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because of the 'existence' of sin, humans no longer reflect only the divine nature but 
also reflect the non-being from which they were created, so that it can no longer be said 
that humans finitely and imperfectly express what God is perfectly and infinitely. 
Furthermore, it might be claimed, humans can no longer even perceive God clearly, for 
sin has warped the minds and perceptions of human beings so that they no longer 
perceive reality as it is. Therefore, while it might be affirmed that humanity has the 
inherent capacity to know and speak of God because of the creation of hmnanity in 
God's image, something else is needed to give himians the conceptual apparatus for 
speaking of God and the basis of knowing what God is like and having fellowship with 
him. 
A fiirther possible solution to the problem of God-talk Ues in the Barthian idea 
that the revelation of God in Jesus' Incarnation and earthly life comprise not only 
humanity's salvific opportunity, but also (as a precondition to this) the possibility of 
knowing and of speaking of God at all. As a consequence of the Incarnation, that is, the 
revelation of the divine reality in the person and works of a finite human, there is a 
starting-point for speaking of divine love. The revelation of God in Christ provides a 
basis for God-talk, rooted in the idea of analogy as the projection of ordinary concepts 
(such as love) onto the divine reality. However, the use of these ordinary concepts in 
relation to God requires that the concepts themselves and even our thinking undergo a 
transformation m the light of what Christ reveals about God. Torrance writes that there 
is a 'semantic shifting of our concepts in parallel with the "reschematization" of our 
minds (Rom. 2. 20) so that they might truly and appropriately refer to the divme.'^ ''* 
Thus there is a reciprocal relationship between our ordinary concepts and language and 
revealed theology. Christ reveals God's love in the finite form of human self-giving, 
and yet this transforms the human understanding of love so that the ideal type of human 
Torrance, Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, p. 123 
113 
love becomes that which God reveals of himself in Christ, and so that humans better 
understand the nature of God's love as revealed in Christ. For Barth this poses a further 
problem: because of the radical otherness of the divine nature, the revelation of God in 
Christ is also a veiling and the divine nature can still never be comprehended by 
humanity which has no capacity for it. Therefore, on a Barthian model, the problem 
remains that, while humans can see the human Jesus, they will still fail to perceive the 
divine nature of Jesus and therefore will still not be able to know or to speak of God.^ '^  
However, this poses less of a problem i f one presupposes that humanity is made in 
God's image since it allows for some capacity for and awareness of God through natural 
theology and for a greater perception of God in the incarnate Christ. 
Given the basis of God-talk 1 have outlined, I suggest that Christ reveals divine 
love in two ways. First, because humans are created in God's image and Jesus is the 
'true and normal' or 'proper' human being, Christ's human love reflects and so reveals 
the love of God. Secondly, because of Christ's Incarnation through which human and 
divine natures are co-joined without contradiction, we can say that Jesus reveals in a 
finite way the divine love that is the love of God the Father in eternity. Therefore, I 
suggest that the revelation of the divine being is a possibility through the person of 
Christ, and that this revelation provides not only our salvific opportunity but, in 
addition, our very possibility of speaking of God. Divine ineffability is therefore not an 
insurmoimtable obstacle to the idea of the revelation of God in Christ, for it is the 
Christ-event itself that overcomes the problems of speaking of or knowing God. 
Crucially, properties (such as love, in its highest form as revealed by Christ) may be 
attributed to God as well as to humanity through Christ, though with the qualification 
that what is characteristic of human love is true of divine love in an infinite, perfect and 
absolute way. In speaking of Christ's revelation, therefore, it is to be maintained that 
Barth overcomes this idea with recourse to the idea of the gift of faith being able to perceive which 
attributes of Jesus should be attributed to Christ and which are particular to Christ's human nature. 
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what hiunans see of Jesus' love is divine love in a finite and human form, that analogy 
is needed in order to attribute this love to the divine being in eternity, and that it cannot 
simply be said that 'what is true of Christ is true of God in eternity also'. Such a view is 
reminiscent of the statue analogy of Origen, according to which God is known through 
Christ, who is the perfect image of God and yet is comprehensible to humanity because 
of the 'smallness of his size' - that is, his finitude and humanity. 
Synopsis 
To conclude, it has been suggested that salvation - as liberation and as the 
fulfilment of the human being as that for which they were created - takes place through 
the revelation of God's love in Christ, which inspires and infuses liberating and 
transforming love in the individual. Central to this idea is the Johannine assertion that 
'God is love', so that the love infused in the individual constitutes the indwelling of 
God in the individual. This, it has been suggested, is the essential nature of a revelatory 
(and not an exemplarist) soteriology. In discussing questions concerning revelation, it 
has been suggested that because himians were created in God's image, people have the 
capacity to perceive and have fellowship with God, and that the revelation of God in 
Christ makes this possible in the face of sin. Furthermore, humans may gain insight into 
the nature of God's salvific love through Christ, first, because they are created in God's 
image so that Christ as the 'true and normal' himian being reflects and so reveals God's 
love, and, secondly, because Christ as the Word Incarnate makes God's infinite love 
known in a finite and therefore comprehensible form. It is emphasised, however, that 
this insight in the divine nature is by means of analogy, so that it is recognised that what 
is true of the finite and human Jesus is not identical to the divine being in eternity. This 
brief and limited sketch of salvation through revelation will, I hope, serve as a basis for 
discussion in the conclusion of whether (as Mclntyre suggests) a revelatory soteriology 
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is essentially reducible to exemplarism, and whether it suffers from some or all of the 
failings that McGradi, Mclntyre, White and Gunton recognise in exemplarist 
soteriology. 
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Conclusion 
Reviewing Salvation as Revelation: Towards a Revelatory Soteriology? 
Having sketched a possible revelatory soteriology in Chapter Four, I now propose to 
review such a model of salvation in order to go some way to exploring its theological 
implications and testing its worth as a first-order model. In particular, I shall question 
whether, as Mclntyre suggests,^ '^  a model of salvation based on revelation really does 
fall into the same traps as exemplarism, and whether it should therefore remain a taboo 
in or, at most, inconsequential to, theology. With this in mind, I shall consider four main 
criticisms that have been levelled against exemplarism or against a potential revelatory 
soteriology, exploring how they might relate to the revelatory soteriology sketched in 
the previous chapter and how a proponent of this model might respond to them. The 
four questions to be considered are as follows. First, would such a model be 'subjective' 
rather than 'objective', and would it therefore underestimate God's grace? Secondly, 
does such a model have an inadequate understanding of Jesus' person and work? 
Furthermore, is Jesus' death unnecessary? Thirdly, does a revelatory model have an 
intellectualist and knowledge-based view of salvation? In particular, does the emphasis 
on knowledge of God through Christ's revelation rule out the salvation of those who do 
not know of Christ, and what is the status of alleged revelation in other faiths and 
human experiences? Fourthly, does a revelatory model have a naive view of sin and of 
himian nature? While it is not possible to provide a comprehensive discussion of these 
perermial issues, it is hoped that, in the light of Chapter Four, suggestions may be given 
that might cast doubt on the conclusive condemnation of a revelatory soteriology as a 
first-order model. 
cf. ahoye,l3 
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5.1 Subjective and Objective Salvation: A False Dichotomy? 
In reviewing the revelatory model of salvation sketched in the previous chapter 
in the light of the criticisms outlined in Chapter One, I shall begin by looking at the 
accusation that a revelatory model is subjective and, consequential upon this, that it 
belittles God's grace and in some sense implies that humans accomplish their own 
salvation. In order to do this, I shall begin by looking at what is meant by 'subjective' 
rather than 'objective' views of salvation, for I believe that these terms have 
erroneously-applied overtones that confuse the issues and misrepresent the nature of a 
revelatory model. 
The term 'objective' refers most properly to the property of existing regardless 
of whether or not the object is thought to exist. 'Subjective', by contrast, refers to the 
property of existing only in the sense and to the degree that the entity is thought to exist 
by the human mind, and which is, furthermore, 'merely a convenient human posit for 
practical purposes.'^'' In theological and philosophical thought 'subjective' has come to 
refer to human thoughts, feelmgs and emotions, so that, far fi-om being mutually 
exclusive, the subjective may helpfully be seen as the human experience or response to 
an objective 'external' truth. Applied to soteriology, the terms have become associated 
not only with the 'outward' and 'inward', but also with the past accomplishment of 
salvation in Christ in contradistinction to the present realisation of salvation in the 
himian individual. For this reason, Fiddes defines subjective soteriology as a view of 
'salvation as a present human experience', while objective is seen as a view which 
'locates salvation in a past event, outside our experience and feelings.'^'* 
Theologians such as Fiddes view objective and subjective models of the 
Atonement as complementary aspects of the same reality. For this reason, Fiddes writes 
T.L.S. Sprigge, 'Ethical Objectivism', in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.284 
Fiddes, Past Event, p.26 
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that 'The question is not whether a view of atonement is objective or subjective, 
although much fruitless argument has been spent on this by Christian thinkers in the 
past; the question to be asked is how well it integrates the two elements.'^ ^ Outward 
and inward, past and present, are all necessary aspects of a first-order model of 
Atonement. A revelatory model, 1 would suggest, integrates these elements, since it 
balances an emphasis on the 'objective' revelation and infusion of God in Christ to the 
individual, with 'subjective' insight into the transformation tiiis effects in tiie life of the 
individual. So, we might ask, why is it that a revelatory model is branded subjective, 
and in what ways might it diminish the role of God's grace? 
In contrast to Fiddes' definition of objective and subjective, highlighting the 
complementary nature and the integratory role of the two aspects, other scholars have 
tended to see objective and subjective aspects as mutually exclusive approaches to 
soteriology, and have attached entirely different nuances to tiie two terms. In the first 
place, as Fiddes perceives, objective and subjective have often been mistakenly 
identified with 'the polarity of act and response.'^ ''" This, 1 suggest, has led to a further 
erroneous identification of objective and subjective with the (often supposedly polar 
opposites) of God's grace and human merit. However, as Fiddes points out, God works 
in and through the human response of individuals (the 'subjective' element), and Christ 
as a human as well as a divine being was the agent of God's grace in freely 
accomplishing humanity's (objective) salvation. In addition, the perception of God's 
grace and human merit as opposites may also be an artificial one. It is suggested in this 
essay that God's grace, the revelation and infusion of love, is responsible for the 
transformation of the free human person into one who lives in love and who becomes, 
through love, a virtuous human being. To ask whether it is grace or the human 
acceptance of God that is responsible for salvation is to miss the point concerning the 
'^^  Fiddes, Past Event, p.26 
^ Fiddes, Past Event, p.26 
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subtle relationship and interplay between the two. To say this is not to deny the primacy 
of God's grace, but to recognise tiiat the free human acceptance of God and God's grace 
are interconnected in the process of salvation, and catmot be separated in the experience 
of salvation. 
A fijrther polarity between objective and subjective models of salvation lies in 
the idea that objective models assert that, as KShler put it, Christ initiates an entirely 
new state of affairs, while subjective models merely speak of the revelation of an 
'eternally present situation'.^"' Clearly such a polarity is an error. A so-called subjective 
model, such as one based on revelation (or, indeed, on moral example) effects an 
entirely new situation in the individual and, therefore, in the relationship between God 
and humans, precisely because it reveals an eternally present truth about God. On a 
closer examination of this particular and peculiar distinction between objective and 
subjective, it transpires that the underlying distinction is rather between whether 
salvation effects a change in God's essential nature or in his attitude towards humanity 
(objective), or whether salvation effects a change 'merely' in the essential nature of 
humans and in their attitude to God. Again, this distinction seems to me mistaken, for it 
is precisely in changing humans' attitudes to God that a new relationship between God 
and hunwiity is initiated, which is as pertinent a transition for God as for humanity. In 
addition, the change in the divine nature because of the Christ-event as suggested by an 
'objective' model becomes, in effect, a revelation and thus 'subjective' in Christ: were 
Christ to effect a change in the divine nature, this would necessarily be a change in the 
eternal divine nature, so that, paradoxically, the change initiated would be an eternally 
present situation. In other words, were the Christ-event to effect a change in the divine 
nature, such as the ability to forgive or, as White^"^ more promisingly suggests, the 
'new' experience of suffering or temptation to sin, a change could not come into being 
Zttr Lehre von der Versohmmg. Dogmatische Zeitfragen II (1898), cited in McGrath, 'Moral Theory', 
p.211 
White, Atonement and Incarnation 
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in the divine nature only 'after' the Christ-event (since it is senseless to speak of 
'before' or 'after' in eternity), but would have to be an eternally present state of affairs, 
and thus it would only be the revelation of God as this which would be 'new' at the 
Christ-event. In terms of what is instituted that is 'an entirely new situation', this may 
ironically be expressed as the revelation of 'an eternally present situation'! To say this is 
not to say that there is necessarily no 'objective' ontological change because of Christ in 
the divine nature, but that such a change is necessarily 'an eternally present situation', 
and that the only 'new thing' that can be instituted is one that does not involve a change 
in the divine nature but only in the attitude of humanity and the relationship between 
God and humanity, the revelation of God in Christ. Leonard Hodgson's insistence that 
'Both in theory and in practice, we need to maintain at the heart of the doctrine of the 
atonement the message of an objective atonement wrought once for all by God in the 
history of the world, in virtue of which things are not as they were'^ "^  paradoxically 
must, in view of the nature of eternity, refer to the revelation and infusion of God's 
love, rather than to a metaphysical transition in the divine nature. 
From this it can be seen that, while often useful for distinguishing two 
complementary aspects of a single entity, the distinction between objective and 
subjective as conceived here is an artificial one, and cannot be applied in absolute terms 
to a soteriological model such as revelation. I f it is applied rigorously in this way, it can 
be turned on its head by reference to God's eternity so that the two terms become 
applicable only to their supposedly converse models. In the light of this, we can say that 
a revelatory model such as that sketched in the previous chapter is not merely or solely 
subjective, and that there is no indication that such a model would belittle God's grace. 
' Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Atonement, Nisbet 1951, p. 146 
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5.2 Theologv and History Reimited: The Cross of Christ 
Given that it has been concluded that a revelatory model need not belittle God's 
grace, we may, recalling the criticisms fired at 'exemplarist' and more generally 
'subjective' models at the beginning of the paper, question whether a revelatory model 
would have an inadequate understanding of the person and work of Christ. In particular, 
in view of the great importance placed upon the Passion by 'traditional' soteriological 
models and in the Christian tradition more generally, would a revelatory model trivialise 
the theological significance of Christ's deatii, making it an incidental event and 
interpreting it as purely historical in nature? While a revelatory model need not claim to 
be exclusive of other models of the Atonement, i f it is to be reconsidered as a first-order 
model it must offer some insight into the theological significance of Jesus' death, since, 
as a first-order model, it cannot depend upon the interpretations of other models in order 
to overcome this difficulty. A revelatory model claims neither that Jesus' death was a 
sacrifice or satisfaction to God, nor that it was a ransom or victory over diabolical 
forces. What interpretation or insight can be given, on a revelatory model, to the 
question, 'Why did Jesus die?' 
The interpretation offered on a revelatory model must by nature concern the 
Cross as a revelation and an infusion of God as love, and, in turn, the institution of a 
new relationship between God and humanity. Yet such an answer raises further 
problems and is not, as it stands, sufficient to explain the necessity of Christ's death for 
humanity's salvation. As Denney has pointed out"*^  in relation to an exemplarist model, 
Jesus' death is not an example of self-sacrificing love unless there was a further purpose 
for his death, since the mere fact of being crucified is not necessarily or inherently 
cotmected to self-sacrificing love. Therefore, Denney argued, a further soteriological 
model is needed to give meaning to the exemplarist one, and the latter is therefore 
304 Denney, 77ie Death of Christ, p. 172 
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dependent upon and inferior to the former. Does not the same apply to a revelatory 
model? The suffering and death of Jesus do not reveal anything about the nature of God 
in and of themselves, since to throw one's life away simply to show the extent of one's 
love if there is no benefit to be gained from this by the beloved does not express love 
but is simply futile. Must a revelatory soteriology therefore be relegated to the status of 
a second-order model, dependent upon rather than mutually complementary with, the 
first-order models propounded by Gunton and Mclntyre and others? 
As 1 suggested earlier,^ "^  a revelatory model might lend itself to holding together 
the Christ of theological reflection with the Jesus of history. At this point, therefore, 
reflection on the theological significance of Christ's death might characteristically turn 
to the historical reason behind Christ's execution. In particular, it might be suggested, 
the 'historical'^"^ narrative of the Gospels provides an inherent coimection between 
Jesus' death and his self-giving love that might provide the key to understanding the 
meaning and significance of the crucifixion on a revelatory model. All four Gospels 
unequivocally connect Jesus' ministry of love and, concomitant with this, his 
uncompromising criticism of the exaltation of certain elitist groups and their oppression 
of the poor, with the plot of the authorities to kill Jesus. For instance, in Mark 3.1-7 
Jesus expresses his compassion in healing a man with a withered hand, despite the fact 
that this is at obvious risk to himself because it necessitates breaking the Sabbath rules 
overly-rigorously enforced by the Pharisees. It is, the evangelist tells us, as a direct 
result of this that the Pharisees conspire to have Jesus executed: 
And he [Jesus] entered again mto the synagogue; and there was a man there which had a 
withered hand. And they [the Pharisees] watched him, whether he would heal him on the sabbath 
day; that they might accuse him. And he saith unto the man which had the withered hand. Stand 
forth. And he smth unto them. Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath days, or to do evil? To save 
life, or to kill? But they held their peace. And when he looked round about on them with anger, 
being grieved for the hardness of their hearts, he saith unto the man. Stretch forth thine hand. 
c/above, 1.4 
To call the Gospels 'historical' is not to claim that they are entirely historically accurate, nor to 
suggest that they are without theological reflection, but to recognise that they speak of the historical 
Jesus, rather than being in the form of theological treatises or discourses, for instance. 
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And he stretched it out: and his hand was restored whole as the other. And the Pharisees went 
forth, and straightway took counsel with the Herodians against him, how they might destroy 
him.' 
Again, in Matthew, Jesus' criticism of the oppression of the poor by the ruling 
classes of the Temple, as well as the healing he undertook there, tells us both of the idea 
that his ministry was one of love and compassion and also of the response of enmity 
leading ultimately to the plot to execute Jesus by the ruling classes themselves: 
And Jesus went into the temple of God, and cast out all them that sold and bought in the temple, 
and overthrew the tables of moneychangers, and the seats of them that sold doves, and he said 
unto them. It is written. My house shall be called the house of prayer, but ye have made it a den 
of thieves. And the blind and the lame came to him in the temple; and he healed them. And when 
the chief priests and scribes saw the wonderfiil things that he did... they were sore displeased.'^ ^ 
Numerous other examples could be cited to illustrate the close connection 
between Jesus' ministry of love and the plot of the authorities to have him executed. In 
Luke, Jesus' concern that the Pharisees ostentatiously exalt themselves above the 
common people and that they 'lay men with burdens grievous to be borne'^ ''^  is met 
with the desire to 'catch something out of his mouth, that they might accuse him',^°' and 
Jesus' fiiendship with social outcasts is a fiirther source of the Pharisee's and scribe's 
discontentment with him.^'" Again, in John, Jesus demonstrates self-giving love during 
the raising of Lazarus, which causes the rulers political inseciu-ity and incites them to 
conspire against him.^'' 
The historical connection between Jesus' death and his self-giving love is also a 
theological one: Christ's ministry of healing, liberating and even giving life was the 
direct cause of his death, and the fact that he did not cease his ministry despite the 
inevitable and foreseeable consequence of his death points to the self-sacrificing nature 
of his love. If, as orthodox Christianity affirms, Jesus is the Incarnation of the eternal 
"'^Matthew21.12-15 
Luke 11.46 
Luke 11.54 
''"Luke 15.2 
'"John 11.53 
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God, then this fact about his life has great significance for our understanding of the 
divine nature. Jesus' self-giving that necessitates and includes his ultimate self-sacrifice 
on the Cross is the revelation of God's absolute and costly love for creation. So while 
the crucifixion is not given a unique nature divorced from the rest of Jesus' life, and 
while it is not through Jesus' death alone that salvation is accomplished, the Cross may 
still be viewed on a revelatory model as the crowning-point of God's self-giving love 
and of the Atonement or reconciliation of humanity to God. 
For further elucidation of the meaning of Christ's death I wish to turn to Michael 
Winter's cruciological development of Karl Rahner's work on the sacraments.^ '^  
According to Rahner,^ '^  the sacraments should not be viewed as the sole channels of 
God's grace, and cannot be separated from God's work of salvation in the world as a 
whole. Rather, they are the visible means of grace, and are, as Winter puts it, 
'operations of special mtensity, rather like the concentration of light at the focal point of 
a magnifying glass, so as to produce not just light, but fire.'^''* Winter adds to Rahner's 
understanding of the sacraments by suggesting that they are channels of 'covenanted 
grace'. Because God has promised his grace through the sacraments, humans can be 
sure of the achievement of their effects, though this is always with the qualification that 
we do not claim to 'possess' them and do not take them for granted, since to do this is 
incommensurable with a belief in grace as a free gift. 
In the light of this understanding of the sacraments, Rahner and Winter (among 
others) widen the concept of sacrament beyond the traditional Catholic seven, so that 
'sacrament' is 'used in other cases where the bestowal of grace takes place with 
particular intensity, and at the same time is made visible in a symbolic way.'^'^ This 
understanding of sacrament was applied to the Church at the Second Vatican Council. 
Michael Winter, The Atonement (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1995) 
Karl Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, London, 1963, cited Winter, The Atonement, p. 129 
Winter, The Atonement, p. 130 
Wmter, The Atonement, p.l31 
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The decree. Lumen Gentium, reads, 'By her relationship with Christ, the Church is a 
kind of sacrament, or sign of ultimate imion with God, and of the imity of all mankind. 
She is also an instrument for the achievement of such union and unity.'^'* As Winter 
observes, this tmderstanding of Church and of sacrament takes into account not only 
God's salvific action through the traditional sacraments of the Church, but also God's 
salvific action tiiroughout the entire world. While sacraments mediated by the Church 
are seen as operations of special intensity of God's grace, it is recognised that such 
grace is not limited to people within the visible Church. 
The significance of this view of sacraments for the current essay lies in the 
potential for understanding the Cross as a sacrament in the sense that Winter suggests. 
On such a model, the crucifixion would be seen as one part (and not the whole) of 
God's saving work, and yet would be regarded as an operation of greater intensity in 
mediating - revealing and infiising - God's grace (love) to the world. Winter, 
propounding a model of Atonement based on intercession, suggests that the crucifixion 
is the 'sacrament of the intercession'. On a revelatory model, the crucifixion may best 
be seen as the sacrament of the revelation of God's love for the world and the infusion 
of love concomitant with this. While the crucifixion is not, on a revelatory model, seen 
as the total of God's saving activity, nor as a salvific process qualitatively different to 
that of Jesus' entire Incarnation, it might be suggested that not only becoming human 
and living a life of love but also (necessitated by this kind of life) giving up one's life, is 
the greatest expression of love and so the fullest sign of God's self-giving love for 
creation. As the greatest sign of God's love for the world, it is also the point of greatest 
intensity in God's salvific woric as a whole. As Rahner expresses it, 'The cross is the 
signum erfficax, the efficacious sign, of the redeeming love that communicates God 
himself, because the cross establishes God's love in the world in a definite and 
Lumen Gentium, sections 1 and 9, cited Winter, The Atonement, p.l31 
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historically irreversible way... Given these presuppositions the cross of Christ can 
really be seen as the efficacious sign of God's salvific will in the world.'^" 
From this it can be seen that a revelatory model would not only not belittle the 
role of grace, but it would also not fail to give due significance to Jesus' life and, in 
particular, to his passion. On the contrary, a revelatory model would emphasise the role 
of God's grace in salvation, and give meaning to our often elusive and hazy 
understanding of God's grace and the life and death of Christ. A revelatory model 
would see the Christ-event as a part of God's saving activity throughout creation, and 
yet would offer a distinctly christological imderstanding of salvation and suggest a 
qualitatively unique view of Christ's Incarnation and death that is in no way reductive 
or devoid of grace. 
5.3 On the Redemption of Non-Christians and Salvation in Christ 
As White points out,^ '* a christological revelatory model^'' may fall into a 
further trap precisely because of its emphasis upon the distinctiveness and uniqueness of 
the revelation of God in Christ. How can a revelatory soteriology tiiat insists upon the 
revelation of God in other faiths and experiences be considered a first-order model in 
view of its apparent inability to see the whole of salvation as taking place in Christ? 
Alternatively, how can the salvation of non-Christians be seen to be 'in Christ' i f it 
comes about through the revelation of the divine apart from the Christ-event? The 
problem can helpfully be re-expressed i f we say that the following assertions appear to 
be inherently contradictory so that it is logically impossible for all three to be true, as a 
revelatory model such as that suggested in the previous chapter would hope to do. 
i) Salvation takes place through revelation 
Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol.21 (London, 1988), p.250, cited Winter, The Atonement, p.l32 
White, Atonement and Incarnation 
In contrast to a pluralistic and/or non-incamational revelatory model. 
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ii) All salvation takes place in and through the Second Person of the Trinity 
iii) Non-Christians, m the sense of those who have not experienced the 
revelation of God in the Second Person of the Trinity, may be saved 
It is not within the scope of this essay to propoimd an answer to this problem, 
but, given its great weight as a stimibling-block for seeing revelation as a first-order 
model, 1 hope to show that, while there is no adequate theory to deal with this problem 
on a revelatory model at the present, there is no logical impossibility in asserting both 
that other religions may impart salvific revelations of the divine, and that all salvation 
takes place through the Second Person of the Trinity. In order to show this I shall utilise 
some of the thought of Justin Martyr, whose ideas may be a useful springboard for the 
development of a model that answers this riddle in the future. 
For Justin, Christ, or the Logos, is not only a designation of the divine nature 
who is active in creation,^ '^ but is also the source of the logos spermatikos - the seeds 
of reason in himianity which facilitate knowledge and perception of God, potentially 
both through natural theology and through revelation. While Origen hints at this idea 
and so provides some kind of basis for divine revelation to himianity as a whole,''^ ^ 
Justin's notion of the logos spermatikos provides an opportimity for him to take it far 
further. Such an idea is related to ttie idea that humanity is created in God's image, and 
so can perceive and experience the divine being in a finite way. Justin writes that 'In 
moral philosophy the Stoics have established right principles, and the poets too have 
expotmded such, because the seed of the Word is implanted in the whole human 
race.'^ ^^  The Logos makes the Father known to the whole of humanity through these 
The unity of the Godhead is balanced by Justin with the insistence that the Son has a distinct identity 
of the Father. 
n Apol. VI, 3, cited Danielou, A History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council ofNicaea, 
Vol. H: Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Austin Baker (London: Darton, Longman 
and Todd, 1973) p.41 
See above, 3.2 
n Apol. Vm, 1, cited Danielou, Early Christian Doctrine Vol. II, p.41 
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seeds of reason, so that, developed on a revelatory soteriology, it might be said that 
salvation is not restricted only to those who experience the revelation of God in the 
Incarnate Logos, but includes all those who experience the revelation of God through 
other means, which are ultimately attributed to the divine Logos in eternity. According 
to Justin, the revelation of God in the Logos made incarnate in the human Jesus is the 
supreme and unique revelation of God, and transcends other revelations of God through 
the Logos, since he is not only an agent or prophet of God but is actually God himself 
He writes, 'Our doctrine s;irpasses all human teaching, because we have the Word in his 
eternity in Christ, who has been manifested for us, body, reason, and soul.'^ ^" This sort 
of idea (though not necessarily with the attendant Stoic-based metaphysic) lies behind 
much tiieology concerning 'anonymous Christianity'^^ or 'the invisible Church'.^ '^ ^ The 
significance for the current essay lies in the fact that a view based on Justin may see 
salvific revelation as taking place in many different reHgions and human experience, 
and yet affirms that all salvation is ultunately 'in Christ'. While as it stands this idea is 
not conclusive in showing that a revelatory model would hold a consistent and 
satisfying view concerning the salvation in Christ of all creation through revelation, it is 
enough here to indicate that such a view is logically possible, and not (as appears at 
first) inherently contradictory. To my knowledge, no satisfactory model of how this 
could be has been developed without contradiction or compromise, but it lies beyond 
the boundaries of this essay to suggest one here. 
n Apol. X, 1 , cited Danielou, Early Christian Doctrine Vol. II, p.41 
For instance, in the work of Karl Rahner. 
The term is originally Augustine's, and was used to distinguish between the members of the visible 
Church who were righteous and to be saved from those members of the visible Church who were not. I 
use it in the more popular and contemporary sense to express the idea that, while there is a clearly defined 
'visible Church', die question of who is to be saved (whether inside or outside the Church) is a mystery in 
the present 
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5.4 Concerning Sin and its Weight 
Finally, I shall attempt some response to the criticism that revelatory approaches 
to salvation have an inadequate view of sin,^ '^ and thus do not offer a satisfactory 
account of salvation. The questions raised concerning sin are the most perennial 
criticisms of an allegedly 'non-constitutive' soteriology, and can be grouped into four 
main categories. I shall outline these four main categories and provide some response to 
them, before moving on to a fiirther critique of the view of sin suggested in Chapter 
Four. 
First, such a model demands that humans 'save themselves' by moral perfection, 
and yet this involves too high an expectation of what humans can achieve morally'^ *, 
and erroneously implies that people can live up to Christ's example of ethical 
perfection.^ ^" Secondly, those who cannot exercise their free will fiiUy - such as those 
with a psychological disorder such as kleptomania - are excluded from salvation, since 
they are unable to become completely moral individuals.^^" Thirdly, sin is seen as 
something that imprisons people, and holds them captive. Revelation is an inadequate 
response to the problem of sin, since education does not entail liberation.^ '^ Fourthly, a 
'subjective' model sees sin as purely moral, whereas m actuality it permeates the totality 
of human existence.^ ^^  Given the charge that a revelatory model would suffer all the 
same failings as an exemplarist one,^ ^^  how might a revelatory approach still be 
reconsidered as a first-order model? 
In response to some of these criticisms, it might be observed that the revelatory 
model suggested in the previous chapter implied neither that humans earned their own 
Cf. Mclntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, p.49 
McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
Mclntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, p.49 
McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
McGrath, 'Moral Theory', p.219 
Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, p. 160 
333 Mclntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, p.49 
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salvation, nor that salvation was a primarily moral experience. Rather, it was 
emphasised that Christ's saving work lay in the revelation of God's love for humanity, 
in the concomitant incision of love, and in the consequential transformation and 
liberation of the individual. This suggests that it is mistaken to charge a revelatory 
model of believing that sin is purely moral, that it is the key to salvation, and thus that it 
involves a naiVe and inadequate view of sin. While ethical behavioiu" and moral striving 
may result from the salvation of the individual, there is no demand inherent in the 
model upon the individual to become morally perfect. Furthermore, and as a 
consequence of this, a psychological disorder such as kleptomania would not exclude 
the individual from salvation, though salvation on a revelatory model may involve in the 
liberation of the individual from their psychological disorder.^ '^* Incidentally, if, as 
McGrath (citing Kant) claims, free will necessitates moral responsibility, so that ' i f man 
can advance to moral perfection, it necessarily follows that he must do so', then the 
converse must also be true - i f an individual suffers from a disorder that prevents them 
being morally good, then it follows that they are morally innocent to the extent that their 
free will is restricted - so that McGrath's criticism even of a purely moral and 
exemplarist model does not apply. Again, it is not at all clear that McGrath's assertion 
that education does not accomplish liberation is necessarily true. The pedagogy of an 
individual and the revelation of imconditional love for them may indeed liberate and 
transform the individual, and so bring about their salvation. From this it can be 
concluded that the criticisms put forward asserting that 'exemplarist-type' soteriologies 
have a weak and inadequate view of sin is, contrary to Mclntyre, not applicable to the 
revelatory model suggested in Chapter Four. 
At this point a revelatory model might overlap with a Christus Victor model, drawing upon Jesus' 
healing and exorcisms as an aspect of the divine revelation. The fact that the kleptomaniac is often not 
healed does not necessarily indicate that they are not experiencing salvation, for, since salvation is 
eschatological as well as present, it is not to be supposed that individuals experience salvation fully in this 
Ufe. 
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A question more pertinent to the view of sin suggested in Chapter Four as a 
basis for a revelatory soteriology lies in the issue of whether apathy and the privation of 
love are suflRcient accounts of evil, or whether such a view is inadequate so that the 
revelatory soteriology which rests upon it is rendered untenable. In particular, is sin as 
apathy and a lack of love insufficient and naive in view of the proactive existence of 
evils such as Hitler's deliberate attempt to eliminate the Jews, the enslavement and 
abuse of Africans by slave-traders, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war in Japan? 
How can such evils be put down to mere privation and be seen as passive and ultimately 
non-existent in the Ught of their clearly proactive and positive-negative nature? In 
anticipation of this criticism, I hope to suggest an answer that demonstrates how the 
hamartiology propounded in Chapter Four is an adequate view of sin. 
The first distinction to be drawn here is, as Augustine and Abailard have already 
argued, between sinful intentions, will, desire and motives, and the actions that they 
instigate. It is suggested that actions are not in themselves good or evil, but are morally 
neutral. It is the intention or motive behind the action that renders the action morally 
good or evil, and thus it is in intention and motive that culpability lie. The act of turning 
on a tap is, in itself, morally neutral. I f an agent turns on a tap with the intention of 
releasing a flow of gas to kill human beings, then the act is rendered morally evil. If, on 
the other hand, an agent turns on a tap with the intention of instigatmg a flow of water 
so as to quench a fire and save lives, then the act is rendered a moral good. An action 
does not necessarily reflect the intention, since a morally good intention may result in 
'evil' consequences, and an evil intention may fortuitously have a positive effect. 
Actions are, by nature, active, and yet this does not necessarily indicate that that which 
instigates the action is proactive and 'existent' in and of itself. 
A second point to be made, and one that is impeded by the limitations of 
language, is that intention and will per se are always positive, active, existent, and 
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morally neutral. For instance, the fact that an agent wills to do nothing rather than 
willing to do something does not imply that the will is lacking, but simply that the 
'subject' of the will is privative. The agent may wish to do nothing, so that the 'subject' 
of the will is passive and privative etc., and yet the will is never passive, privative etc., 
for the agent may will to do nothing very actively and sfrongly. Thus while intention is 
the vehicle of sin, and action the expression of it, it does not follow that sin itself takes 
on the nature of action and intention (i.e. active), but merely appears to take on its form. 
From this it can be concluded that the proactivity and force of 'evil' actions and 
intentions do not necessarily imply that sin is similarly proactive and 'existent' in 
nature, and that tiie active 'doing' of sin in the world does not invalidate a view of sin 
based on apathy and mdifference. 
However, it may well be asked whether, even if proactive intention and action 
are in themselves morally neutral, can sin be seen as privative given that many 'evil' 
actions spring from, and many evil intentions consist in, negative forces such as cruelty, 
hatred, and brutality? While omitting to do good is sin that may spring from apathy, can 
the same really be said of cruelty and of malice? As I suggested in Chapter Four, hatred 
and related 'sin' - cruelty, brutality, and gratuitous anger, for instance - are not tiie 
absolute antithesis of love, but, as Kierkegaard says, are love - and the derivatives of 
love - burning as love's opposite. Supposing that all humans have the potential for love, 
it would follow that all people have also the potential for cruelty, hatred, and brutality. 
The claim being made about apathy and the privation of love is not that all sin is apathy 
but that, just as all goodness derives from love,^ '^ so all sin derives from the privation of 
love and from apathy. The argument suggests, for instance, that potential cruelty may 
only be realised in an individual through the individual's apathy and indifference, that 
is, through a lack of love. I f love is the 'arch-good' from which all goodness originates. 
Augustine, 'On Nature and Grace', 70.84, in Four Anti-Pelagian Writings: On Nature and Grace, On 
the Proceedings ofPelagius, On the Predestination of the Saints, On the Gift of Perseverence, trans. John 
A. Mourant and William J. Collinge (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992) 
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then the apathy is the 'arch-sin' from which all sin is derived. Thus, while certain 'sins' 
are negative forces, are aspects of love that are warped or corrupted and bum as love's 
opposite, the root of all sin is essentially privative and is ultimately and leads ultimately 
to oukontic nothingness. 
The view of sin put forward in Chapter Four is essential and inherent to the 
revelatory model of salvation that I have suggested. Were the view to underestimate the 
force or extent of evil in the world, or to portray an overly optimistic picture of human 
nature, a revelatory model would offer an inadequate soteriology because the 'remedy' 
it prescribes would be based on an inadequate diagnosis of the illness. However, from 
the critique of sin as the privation of love offered above, it may be deduced that, while 
the force and proactive nature of evil in the world appears to invalidate the idea of sin 
and evil as essentially privative and passive, it does not in fact do so. Rather, apathy and 
the privation of love in an individual lead to the corruption of the positive force of love, 
and that which derives from love, and so produce negative yet proactive intentions, will, 
and actions. In the light of this, there is no reason why such a view of sin should offer 
an obstacle to the reconsideration of a revelatory soteriology as a first-order model. 
Synopsis 
In this essay I have suggested that much soteriology that has been branded 
exemplarism actually contains a far more subtle soteriology based not on Christ's moral 
example but upon the revelation of God in the person of Jesus. I have attempted to 
demonstrate that this revelatory model has a precedent both in Scripture and in the 
Christian tradition, and in so doing have explored some of the many forms it has taken. 
I have sketched a possible revelatory model, re-appropriating several Augustinian 
themes and yet developing the model beyond its historical forms and foundations. In 
addition, 1 have attempted some defence of how revelation of God might take place in 
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the face of divine ineffability. In the Conclusion, I have reviewed the revelatory 
soteriology suggested in Chapter Four in the light of the possible difficulties raised by 
Gunton, McGrath, Mclntyre, and White. I have sought to show that none of the 
difficulties raised are insurmountable, and have suggested that some are based on 
erroneous premises or are inapplicable to a revelatory rather than an exemplarist model. 
Unfortimately, the revelatory model itself and many of the responses given m this 
review - particularly concerning the salvation of non-Christians - have had to be left 
imdeveloped in this paper. However, 1 suggest that what has been demonstrated is that 
none of the criticisms raised are conclusive evidence against a revelatory model being 
considered as a first-order model. 
In addition to demonstrating that many of the criticisms of a revelatory model 
are inconclusive, I hope that this paper has provided some sense of why a revelatory 
model might provide imique insights into salvation, and thus why there is good reason 
for it to be re-considered a first-order model. For instance, I have suggested that a 
revelatory model is insightful because it takes into account the entire mcamate life of 
Christ, and does not concentrate exclusively on the Cross. Again, a revelatory model 
unifies the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith in a way lacking in some theology. 
Likewise, a revelatory model does not appear to offer a merely hypothetical soteriology, 
but recognises the salvific work of God in the transformation and development of Ae 
person in the present. Fiuthermore, a revelatory model is valuable in imifying objective 
and subjective approaches to the Atonement, and, in so doing, presents the subtle 
interplay between grace and human response sometimes absent in other soteriology. A 
revelatory model, I have suggested, is more intelligible to contemporary people than 
much other soteriology, views salvation as being more than mere forgiveness of sin, and 
has a more philosophically defensible view of divine eternity. While it has not been 
within the scope of the essay to provide a comprehensive account of the benefits of such 
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a model to soteriology as a whole, or, indeed, to develop a revelatory model fiilly or to 
counter the objections against it more completely, I hope that the paper has opened up 
possibilities for a revelatory model of salvation that may be taken up and developed in 
the fiiture. 
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